Korea | United States

[Jay]

To: United States Air Force < Odinson > | < Boeing > CC: ParkHyunjin@mnd.kr.gov, LeeHyuk@mofa.kr.gov, KimMinseo@cheongwadae.gov,

From: HanChusok@rokjtc.kr.gov

Subject: Aircraft Swap

Security: Private and encrypted Protected by the NIS and MoFA DPB

Dear General Elliot Patel,

I hope this email finds you well. I am emailing you pertaining to matters of Korea's national security and hope such communications may be protected by the relevant communication safeguards and information within the United States Military and be applied to Boeing company.

The ROK Air Force currently operates four Boeing E-767 AWAC aircrafts as part of the KACAA signed between our countries and procured through ADS. In the spirit of the agreement we hope that we can discuss in openness the vision of our country and its cooperation with Boeing and the United States. They were purchase in April of 1998. Primarily that of swapping our existing fleet of aircrafts and co-production on a new factory line of aircrafts.

As part of our military modernization efforts we hope that we can swap our existing fleet of E-767 aircrafts for Boeing E-737 AWE&C Aircrafts. We are looking to swap three of our E-767 for 3 Limited Production Licenses for the E-737 AWE&C. In terms of usage the three aircrafts are little older than a year in their service with the ROK AF. The aircrafts have been used in regular training exercises and have had a flight time of close to 210 for the calendar year of 1998. Whilst we do not know to what extent the E-767 can be incorporated into the US Air Force, we would not oppose the sale of the E-767 to a third party on the conditions it is not sold to specific parties which we may designate later.

I also hope that alongside this cooperation Korea and Boeing can discuss a possible opening of a Boeing plant in Korea through KAI (Korean Aerospace Industries) to co-produce weapons for both Korea and the United States. We primarily hope to discuss how to best cooperate on specific programs such as the Boeing EA-18G Growler and Osprey VTOL for the United States as well as for Korea. At the moment we currently operate the F-16CJ/DJ Block 50 for SEAD and electronic warfare operations. We would be open on how to best arrange this possible cooperation between KAI & Boeing.

Signed with sincerity,
Han Chusok
Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Republic of Korea Armed Forces

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Republic of Korea
ROK Armed Forces
All information is protected from release by the Diplomatic Communications Security Act 1997
Authorized viewing is limited to those directly emailed, cc'd, and bcc'd​

 

[Jay]

Odinson

 

[Odinson]

[TR][TD]

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE​

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ENCRYPTED MESSAGE​

[TR][TD]

TO: Han Chusok, Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the Republic of Korea ( Jay )

FROM: Devan Morse, Secretary of the Air Force of the United States of America

Chief of Staff Han Chusok,

General Patel forwarded the message that you sent to him to me. As the civilian head of the Air Force it is normally my office that is responsible for organizing these kinds of arrangements (with permission from the Department of Defense). I have spoken to the Secretary of Defense and given him my opinion. We both agree that swap your existing fleet of E-767 aircrafts for Boeing E-737 AWE&C Aircrafts is acceptable. Presuming that the White House has no objections to this, and that the E-737 AWE&C aircraft will be held to the same requirements that the E-767s were, we would be happy to go forward with this. The Secretary of Defense and I also agree that we can come to a reasonable arrangement for the Osprey VTOL - an arrangement that I believe will cost our nations the minimum amount of money needed while physically benefiting our armed forces, assuming it is approved by the White House. Further discussions will need to take place in regard to the EA-18G Growler, as it is a Navy aircraft.

On behalf of the United States Armed Forces, I hope that the Korean government and Korean Armed Forces agree that the Untied States has worked closely with Korea in regards to the sharing of technology and equipment - perhaps closer than any other country with the exception of the United Kingdom. In continuation of this relationship the Secretary of Homeland Security, who acts in the same capacity for the Coast Guard as I do for the Air Force, has made a special request that I am now sharing with you. He would like to procure sixteen Legend-class (also known as National Security-class) cutters for the Coast Guard. For logistical reasons, the Legend-class cannot be built in United States dockyards at this time. However, American Defense Sales could give (at no cost) sixteen LPLs to Korea to build the cutters. In return, the United States would pay the base production cost of each ship to Korea. The United States would pay this amount, $11,760,000,000 in full to the Korean government, no payment plan would be required. I think it goes without saying that if Korea agreed to do this for the Coast Guard, it would have significant positive repercussions for American-Korean diplomatic relations, as well as for discussions such as this.

I look forward to hearing back from you.

Respectfully,

Devan Morse
Secretary of The United States Air Force
​

​

[/TD][/TR][/TD][/TR]

 

[Jay]

To: United States Air Force < Odinson > | < Boeing > CC: ParkHyunjin@mnd.kr.gov, LeeHyuk@mofa.kr.gov, KimMinseo@cheongwadae.gov, ParkJaehyuk@KAI.org, PakJeoseon@DaewooSB.org, KimMiseok@HHI.org

From: HanChusok@rokjtc.kr.gov

Subject: Aircraft Swap

Security: Private and encrypted Protected by the NIS and MoFA DPB

Dear Secretary Morse,

I hope this email finds you well. Thank you for your response. Thank you for your positive news on the aircraft swap between the US & Korean Air Force. We are happy to apply the conditions of the KACAA to all future procurements through a legal amendment that can be added to the treaty if that is appropriate. As for the Osprey VTOL and EA-18G Growler, we are happy to have a comprehensive discussion between our Defense Ministers pertaining to a joint-partnership in procurement and development of advanced weapons systems. One which our Blue House is eager to see come to fruition and I believe would be satisfying to the White House.

As you indicated, ROK-US cooperation on both a political and military level has enhanced and evolved greatly since the Gore-Kim administrations took power. We look forward to continuing this tradition and trend. I have included in our communications the CEO's of our leading shipbuilding companies, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Hyundai Heavy Industries. Both whom are responsible for production of our advanced Aegis-equipped Sejong vessels and other maritime vessels. We would be honored to procure sixteen Legend-class vessels for the US Coast Guard along with modifications and enhancements as directed by the US Coast Guard.

Once the necessary schematics and information have been transferred, construction on sixteen vessels may begin. As for the 3 E-767 aircrafts, we can have a formal transfer ceremony at their point of destination to the US Air Force. Is there a preferred air base for the E-767 aircrafts to land for transfer?

Signed with sincerity,
Han Chusok
Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Republic of Korea Armed Forces

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Republic of Korea
ROK Armed Forces
All information is protected from release by the Diplomatic Communications Security Act 1997
Authorized viewing is limited to those directly emailed, cc'd, and bcc'd​

 

[Odinson]

[TR][TD]

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE​

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ENCRYPTED MESSAGE​

[TR][TD]

TO: Han Chusok, Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the Republic of Korea ( Jay )

FROM: Devan Morse, Secretary of the Air Force of the United States of America

Chief of Staff Han Chusok,

Is there a specific proposal that you are prepared to offer for the Osprey and Growler? Also, I can assure you that the production of these Coast Guard vessels will greatly benefit the security of the United States and the ability of the government to enforce America's maritime and environmental laws. There may be some delay before we are able to pay for the Legend-class, therefore there will also be some delay before we would need you to produce them. However, we are prepared to move forward with any proposals you may have right now.

Respectfully,

Devan Morse
Secretary of The United States Air Force
​

​

[/TD][/TR][/TD][/TR]

 

[Odinson]

[TR][TD]

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE​

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ENCRYPTED MESSAGE​

[TR][TD]

TO: Han Chusok, Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the Republic of Korea ( Jay )

FROM: Devan Morse, Secretary of the Air Force of the United States of America

Chief of Staff Han Chusok,

I have to offer my sincerest apologies. I have new directives from leadership as to new needs of the Defense Department. We are still willing to honor the deal that we have negotiated above - as I would not want to insult you - however I respectfully ask that you please consider my alternative offer below, which I hope that you may find beneficial to your government as well as ours.

First, we will still swap the E-767 aircrafts for Boeing E-737 AWE&C Aircrafts. The official turning over ceremony can be done at Andersen Air Force Base (in Guam), if you find that location acceptable. Next, Boeing will open a plant in Korea to co-produce weapons for both Korea and the United States, including the EA-18G Growler and Osprey VTOL. This does not mean that the United States is required to have these aircraft built here of course, but that we can as long as necessary, and we will of course permit them to be built for your military here. All of the aforementioned aircraft will of course fall under our treaty, which we can amend to accommodate them. Most notably, we will not make a profit off of the equipment in this agreement - the easiest way to do this would be for American Defense Sales to issue LPLs for this equipment to Korea (at whatever quantity) for $0.00.

Next, the Republic of Korea will construct (or issue the Korean equivalent of a LPL to America) for the following:
x35 "Sohn Won-yil-class, Type 214 Variant Submarine"
x5 Sejong the Great-class destroyers

I understand that this is a notable amount of equipment and I do not want to give the impression that the United States is trying to take advantage of the strong relationship that our countries have built. So, in return for this $16,165,000,000 purchase where the United States would only be paying the production costs and Korea would not be making a profit, the United States would offer in return a "credit" for the Korean government, whereby you may purchase up to $16,165,000,000 in equipment from the United Stats (including the Growler and Osprey) that will be just at production cost - to be clear, you do not have to use this credit all at once, and can space it out as you see fit. The "credit" will remain valid as long as our treaty remains active. Because I have been ordered to offer this immediately, we would like production to begin as soon as possible. We would like to make this agreement official by amending our treaty, but I hope that we could get things rolling as soon as possible and trust each others word now as the diplomats do their work.

I hope that you find this new proposal fair and respectful of both our governments. Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns. I look forward to your response.

Respectfully,

Devan Morse
Secretary of The United States Air Force
​

​

[/TD][/TR][/TD][/TR]

 

[Jay]

To: United States Air Force < Odinson > | < Boeing > CC: ParkHyunjin@mnd.kr.gov, LeeHyuk@mofa.kr.gov, KimMinseo@cheongwadae.gov, ParkJaehyuk@KAI.org, PakJeoseon@DaewooSB.org, KimMiseok@HHI.org

From: HanChusok@rokjtc.kr.gov

Subject: [RE] Cooperative Plan

Security: Private and encrypted Protected by the NIS and MoFA DPB

Dear Secretary Morse,

Please know that your proposals and views have not caused friction nor insulted us. We are value our continued open and growing relationship and see that candid discussions between allies is a crucial component of maintaining long term relations.

One of our proposals was for Boeing to open a plant in Korea to allow Boeing to access Korean technology and materials to improve its building capabilities and vise-versa Korean companies to access American technology and materials to improve its capacities. While the plant is being built, we would recommend that Korean Aerospace Industries (KAI) be the focal point for procurement of advanced systems. In the past, KAI had worked with Boeing to construct many advanced systems and aircrafts for the services of the defense of East Asia. I am certain the same level of vigor and development can be achieved.

As per the specificity of the plant, the relevant Korean ministries and American government agencies will be needed to concur on the status of workers, labor laws, and how to allocate positions to Korean nationals and American nationals fairly. This would improve the job market in both our countries as well as allow the United States to advance its defense and offense capabilities respectively.

Regarding your proposal to acquire 40 Korean vessels, firstly the ROK Navy in our consultations wishes to thank the American navy in recognizing the capabilities of the Korean navies vessels. We would be happy to share and support the US Navy as it has done for the ROK Navy for many years. We are ready to accommodate your needs and provide these vessels. We also would like to offer complimentary training for your sailors to use the vessels which are currently deployed in the ROK Fleet. Will these 40 vessels order be completed in separations to the requested order of Legend-class? We would be willing to offer a special Procurement Production Contract (PPC) for the US to produce the Sohn Won-yil Submarine in the United States and Korea shall build the advanced Sejong the Great Vessel in Korea and transfer them to the United States due to technological limitations for producing the Sejong the Great Vessel in the United States.

The PPC on the 5 Destroyers would cost only the base production cost to cover Korean companies initial cost for constructing the vessel. No fees will be collected on the PPC for the 35 Submarines and instead would be taken in the form of credit for American Equipment.If I have mistaken this arrangement, please inform me of this misunderstanding.

As Regarding the proposed Credit for Production system, we would see the trade equally beneficial. For clarification, if the ROK were to purchase 40 F-15K aircrafts, the LPL would be issued at no cost, and the production price will be included within the $16 billion credit limit?

We are ready regardless to also bring the Ministry of Foreign Affairs into the loop to amend the ROK-US Treaty and we can offer to send a delegation to Washington D.C. for these consultations and discussions.

Signed with sincerity,
Han Chusok
Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Republic of Korea Armed Forces

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Republic of Korea
ROK Armed Forces
All information is protected from release by the Diplomatic Communications Security Act 1997
Authorized viewing is limited to those directly emailed, cc'd, and bcc'd​

 

[Odinson]

[TR][TD]

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE​

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ENCRYPTED MESSAGE​

[TR][TD]

TO: Han Chusok, Chief of Staff of the Air Force of the Republic of Korea ( Jay )

FROM: Devan Morse, Secretary of the Air Force of the United States of America

Chief of Staff Han Chusok,

We are very excited to hear that you are willing to make this agreement work. For now, because of the recent complications, it appears that we will have to put the Legend-class on the back burner. Furthermore, to answer your question, if Korea were to purchase 40 F-15K, then the United States (American Defense Sales) would issue a LPL to Korea to be able to build 40 F-15Ks. The LPLs would cost $0.00. However, Korea would of course still be on the hook for paying the production cost themselves to actually build the aircraft. That production would then be subtracted from the "credit". Essentially we will be doing what you are now agreeing to do for us: offering access to military hardware without making a profit.

I have been told that the Department of State would be happy to host the Korean Ambassador, at the Harry S Truman building, or if you prefer other representatives from the Korean government, to amend our treaty. As I said, though, we would like to begin construction of equipment as soon as possible. If you are willing to agree to a tentative agreement right now so that we can begin construction on the submarines, we would greatly appreciate it. In the meantime, the State Department is ready to begin the process of adding an amendment to the treaty.

Respectfully,

Devan Morse
Secretary of The United States Air Force
​

​

[/TD][/TR][/TD][/TR]

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Private​

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, Kitagawa Yoshimitsu, sent a secure and formal message to the Korean Embassy in Washington. He invited the Korean ambassador, or whatever representatives chose to come, to the Harry S Truman building where they could discuss amending America and Korea's fruitful treaty. The Korean representatives would be greeted at the front door by DSS special agents and then some of the senior staff of the Assistant Secretary of State. They would be escorted into the building and to one of the diplomatic reception rooms where they were offered some refreshments. Assistant Secretary of State Kitagawa bowed to his guests and welcomed them into the room. After some warm and welcoming pleasantries, they would get down to the brass tax of discussing what needed to be added and changed so that the deal could officially move forward.

 

[Odinson]

Private​

Secretary of the Air Force Devan Morse waited for a response from his Korean colleague while the Department of State in Washington awaited the arrival of the Korean diplomatic representatives who would be discussing the official amendment of the treaty. Time was of the essence; the Secretary of the Navy had already sent two secure messages to the Morse about the status of American rights to build the vessels. Secretary Morse hoped that his Korean colleague would respond to him soon.

Jay

 

[Jay]

Ambassador Lee Hyuk, a political, a military, and a legal attache would enter the State Department building to discuss amendments to the US Korea Treaty. Ambassador Lee would enter the building and greet the Assistant Secretary of State and join him in the reception room with a reciprocal bow. Meanwhile back in the Embassy, the Korean Military detachment would be reviewing specific potions of the arrangement in depth as the Minister prepared for a flight to Nigeria.

 

[Jay]

To: United States Air Force < Odinson > | < Boeing > CC: ParkHyunjin@mnd.kr.gov, LeeHyuk@mofa.kr.gov, KimMinseo@cheongwadae.gov, ParkJaehyuk@KAI.org, PakJeoseon@DaewooSB.org, KimMiseok@HHI.org

From: HanChusok@rokjtc.kr.gov

Subject: [RE] Cooperative Plan

Security: Private and encrypted Protected by the NIS and MoFA DPB

Dear Secretary Morse,

Thank you for the clarifications regarding the LPL arrangement of credit. We can agree on this arrangement, thank you for your kind terms and proactive proposal generating. I have exchanged words with Ambassador Lee over the weekend regarding our conversations and he has been kept in the loop through our exchange of emails. I apologize for the delay on our end, we have had a number of internal deliberations of sensitive matters of state. Please know, we consider these proposals as top priorities to complete.

I can also pass that the Blue House has approved the Korean Procurement Production Contract for 35 Submarines to the United States. We look forward to seeing these vessels enter service and we can arrange a formal document should your Government prefer this. However, production can go ahead to ensure that we can get ahead on the timely production of these advanced systems.

Thank you for the note on the delay of the Legend-class Vessels.
Signed with sincerity,
Han Chusok
Chief of Staff of the Air Force
Republic of Korea Armed Forces

---

Republic of Korea
ROK Armed Forces
All information is protected from release by the Diplomatic Communications Security Act 1997
Authorized viewing is limited to those directly emailed, cc'd, and bcc'd​

I have been told that the Department of State would be happy to host the Korean Ambassador, at the Harry S Truman building, or if you prefer other representatives from the Korean government, to amend our treaty. As I said, though, we would like to begin construction of equipment as soon as possible. If you are willing to agree to a tentative agreement right now so that we can begin construction on the submarines, we would greatly appreciate it. In the meantime, the State Department is ready to begin the process of adding an amendment to the treaty.

Respectfully,

Devan Morse
Secretary of The United States Air Force

 

[Odinson]

In the private meeting between Assistant Secretary of State Kitagawa Yoshimitsu, Ambassador Lee Hyuk, and the rest of the Korean delegation, Assistant Secretary Yoshimitsu offered his guests some refreshments, asked them how their day was going, and then handed over a few copies of the proposed treaty. Because the American-Korean Cooperative Arms Agreement of 1997 had no provision in it that allowed for amendments, the State Department was proposing a new treaty. "Please understand that this is a draft. Let me know what changes you may like to be made, including quantities of items you may want to purchase," he said.

American-Korean Cooperative Arms Agreement of 1999​

[TR][TD]

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CONTEXT​

The American-Korean Arms Trade Agreement of 1999 is between the nations of the United States of America (also referred to as the United States or the American Government) and the Republic of Korea (also referred to as Korea or the Korean Government). This treaty is meant to continue fostering the spirit of mutual cooperation and friendship between the American and Korean governments which has been prosperous since 1997.Contained within this treaty is an agreement to exchange products, as well as measures of cooperation between the American and Korean governments.

ARTICLE 1
ARMS EXCHANGE
​

1.1 The United States will submit a Limited Production License (LPL) to Korea for the following products (with quantities shown as i.e. x7): x40 F-15K; x3 E-737 AWE&C; and x(?) Osprey VTOL.

a. The United States is required to sell these items (or issue a LPL), or some variant of them, to the Republic of Korea within a reasonable amount of time. Also, the United States will make standard munitions for these products available to Korea.​

b. The United States will allow Korea to maintain the equipment they purchase without charge.​

c. The Korean Government will not sell, lease, lend, abandon, surrender, or give away any equipment that they purchase from the United States to any nation/entity/individual other than the United States. However, Korea may at any time scrap said equipment.​

1.2 The Republic of Korea will submit a Korean Procurement Production Contract (KPPC)to the United States for the following products (with quantities shown as i.e. x7): x35 Sohn Won-yil-class, Type 214 Variant Submarine; x5 Sejong The Great-class Destroyers.

a. The Republic of Korea is required to sell these items (or issue a KPPC), or some variant of them, to the United States within a reasonable amount of time. Also, the Republic of Korea will make standard munitions and weapons for these products available to the United States.​

b. The Republic of Korea will allow the United States to maintain the vehicles/equipment they purchase without charge.​

c. The United States will not sell, lease, lend, abandon, surrender, or give away any equipment that they purchase from Korea to any nation/entity/individual other than the Korea. However, the United States may at any time scrap said equipment.​

d. The United States may opt to have Korea build the aforementioned items for the United States instead of using the KPPC. If this option is chosen, Korea will construct and deliver the items as soon as possible.​

ARTICLE 2
BASE COST POLICY
​

2.1 The Republic of Korea will not charge the United States any money or fee for any production in this treaty that the United States builds using a KPPC (which will be issued at no cost).

a. If the Republic of Korea builds any of the aforementioned items it is issuing to the United States, Korea may only charge the base production cost of the items to the United States.​

2.2 The United States will not charge the Republic of Korea any additional fee for any product sold to Korea (outside of production cost) or any LPL issued to Korea for up to $16,165,000,000 worth of procurements.

a. The United States may still restrict what items the Republic of Korea may purchase from the United States (but must still abide by this agreement and the American-Korean Cooperative Arms Agreement of 1997 so long as it remains in place). Also, the Republic of Korea must still obtain LPLs to produce American products (or request the United States to build them outright).​

b. The products that Korea is procuring from the United States in this agreement will subtract from the $16,165,000,000 credit that is noted above.​

ARTICLE 3
TERMINATION OF AGREEMENT
​

3.1 The United States of America or the Republic of Korea may terminate this treaty after a [6] month notice has been issued. To terminate this agreement, a secure message that clearly states that this agreement is being terminated must be sent through the proper channels from the head of state of either party to the head of state of the other party. If both nations wish to terminate this agreement, no [6] month notice is needed. For a termination to be complete, the measures that follow must be taken.
3.2 If the Republic of Korea violates this agreement by violating Article 1.1.c. they will incur a $3,000,000,000 penalty that they must pay to the United States for each unit they allowed another nation/entity to obtain.
3.2 If the United States violates this agreement by violating Article 1.2.c. they will incur a $3,000,000,000 penalty that they must pay to the Republic of Korea for each unit they allowed another nation/entity to obtain.



Signed for the United States of America,

President of the United States


Signed for the Republic of Korea,

President of the Republic of Korea
[/TD][/TR]


Jay

 

[Jay]

Ambassador Lee thanked the Assistant Secretary for his hospitality and took a glasses of blueberry juice from the offered refreshments. As the negotiators took their seats, the Americans would pass around the proposed alterations to the AKCAA treaty of 1997. The Ambassador's team would keep a copy of the AKCAA of 1997 on hand as they reviewed the proposed changes.

"Assistant Secretary Yoshimitsu, thank you for the proposed agreement. We have made our own draft which we hope you could review." The Koreans would hand over a black binder with their proposed Agreement. "We believe it is more comprehensive of the AKCAA and the AKATA proposal. Including provisions on amendments, less defined arms transactions, these changes would allow the AKATA to be continued part of Korean-American relations and not needing renewals and redrafting every two years. We wish to draw to your attention however, a since dormant discussed item, regarding spy planes. It was our intention to purchase spy planes from the United States some months ago. We have added this clause in for your review and feedback. I look forward to your feedback on our draft."


Odinson

American Korean Arms Trade Agreement​

The United States and the Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as "the Parties"),

Conscious of their longstanding and strong partnership based on common principles and values, and of their important security, diplomatic and social relationship;

Recognizing the importance of strengthening their security, diplomatic, trade and social relations, in accordance with the objective of maintaining open relations in the economic, social and security dimensions, and of promoting the regular transfer of weapons, equipment, civilian products, intellectual property, and investment between them;

Mindful of the needs of the business communities of each Party, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises, and of high levels of weapon transaction standards through relevant national executive orders and legislators and the American Korean Cooperative Arms Agreement to which both Parties are party;

Recognizing that this Agreement contributes to enhancing the security and safety of the Parties through a regular exchange of assistance, intelligence, and weapon;

Realizing that a dynamic and rapidly changing global environment brought about the rise of unstable global actors presents many new challenges to the Parties;

Agreeing that the provisions of the American-Korean Arms Trade Agreement of 1999 (AKATA) shall have superiority in the court of law over the provisions of the American-Korean Cooperative Arms Agreement of 1997 (AKCAA);

Agreeing that the provisions of AKATA shall replace in totality the provisions of AKCAA and that such replacement shall not be considered as triggering of Article 3; Termination, of the AKCAA;

Agreeing that the continual supply of spare parts, munitions, training, and assistance to items purchased under the AKCAA shall be transferred under the AKATA;

In Agreement over the need to regulate in a regular fashion the exchange of weapons and equipment between the Parties to address the challenges poised to the relevant parties national security and territorial integrity;

IT IS AGREED as follows:

1. Interpretation
   1. Definitions

Terms defined in the General Terms and Conditions shall, unless otherwise defined in this Agreement, have the same meaning when used in this Agreement​

​

Military Sale means, in relation of any export, that the intended purpose of the relevant transaction is pertaining to the use of the armed forces fo the respective Parties.​

​

Export means, in relation to the transaction of the respective Parties, shall be reflective of any exchange of property, equipment, or intellectual property.​

​

Intelligence means, in relation to the information available to the respective Party, military, political, economic, and social information considered relevant to the national defense of the respective party.​

​

Credit means, in relations to the AKATA, the account statement balance remaining to the respective Party as agreed upon.​

​

Item means, in relation to military sales, any item which is transferred under the provisions of this Agreement by the respective Parties.​

​

Production License means, in relation to the agreement, the license for parties to produce domestically the intellectual property of the other party.​

​

Receiving Party, means in relation to the exchange of goods, the party receiving the production license or military sale.​

1. Export Restrictions
   
   1. Subject to the terms of the relevant parties respective Defense Exporting agencies, the Parties may from time to time make unavailable to the other Party specific items in the arsenal of the exporter in respect that such restriction is universally applied regardless or prohibited under international or national law.
      1. Shall agree that such export restrictions shall be given due consideration under the AKATA and regarding the Parties as preferential exporting partners in the sale of weapons
2. Military Sales
3. 1. The Parties agree to undertake and permit the following in regards to their respective production licenses to the other:
      1. purchase of the Limited Production License (LPL) or Procurement Production Contract (PPC) shall be made through the relevant defense procurement and exporting agency of the respective Parties and payment shall be done prior to issuing;
      2. not to sell, lease, abandon, give away the items procured under the AKATA to any non-signatory State, entity, or individual; and
      3. to terminate the license agreement with the receiving party after the completion of the agreed specific amount of procured items.
      4. The parties shall be within their right to scrap without notification of the other party, equipment procured under AKATA, but, are encouraged to notify the other party in the event they wish to buy back at a modified price items exchanged under the agreement.
4. Maintenance Rights
   1. The parties agree to make readily available for export weapons and items that will better the defensive and offensive capabilities of the other party:
      1. that the parties shall not charge any fees or duties on the right of the receiving party on maintenance of purchased items either directly or indirectly through a procurement license.
      2. each party shall be in their right to assign national companies to assist in the maintenance of purchased items and will be allowed to maintain their equipment without additional cost.
5. Delivery of Military Sales
   1. The Parties shall ensure that any purchase that requires sensitive handling shall be done within an agreed provision for the handling of information, transfer, and collection of the item provides for the delivery of the relevant items:
      1. Wherein the exporting party faces financial incurment as a result of the increased sensitivity, the procuring party shall endure the additional costs.
   2. The Parties shall ensure the ready availability of supplies, munitions, technology, spare parts, and training to the receiving party of all items purchased under the AKCAA & AKATA and that none of the provisions in this treaty shall be interpreted as
   3. The exporter shall promptly notify the receiving party when the purchased items have been delivered in accordance with the requirements of the relevant international protocols on the delivery of conventional weapons and equipment.
6. Cooperation
   
   1. The parties shall agree to assist one another in the event that the one party finds itself subject to hostile action by another non-signatory party.
      1. Shall agree to share any information deemed relevant with the other party that may assist in their war effort against a non-ally nation
      2. Shall agree to share any intelligence deemed relevant with the other party that may assist in their war effort against a non-ally nation
7. Sale of Submarines

The Republic of Korea as outlined in the aforementioned terms shall agree to the sale of (35) thirty-five Sohn Wonyil-class Submarines to the United States under the respective classification of Top Secret. The Republic of Korea shall waive the fees of exporting the (35) thirty-five submarines to the United States under the agreement of credit received for the production of (35) thirty-five submarines.​

1. Sale of Spy planes

The United States as outlined in the aforementioned terms shall agree to the sale of the Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird aircrafts to the Republic of Korea under the respective classification of Top Secret. The Republic of Korea will not be entitled to a waiver of the fees for importing of the SR-71.​

​

The United States shall agree to restrict the export of the SR-71 to Asia-Pacific region to ensure Korea’s Qualitative Military Advantage (QMA) and shall note for the purposes of this agreement that Russia & Turkey shall be included in the Asia-Pacific region.​

1. Credit Terms

The United States agrees to the credit terms for the Republic of Korea set out herein. The Republic of Korea shall be granted $16,165,000,000.00 of credit as agreed upon by the respective parties. The duration of this credit shall be indefinite and shall continue to apply to successive states of the parties. The credit shall be considered valid on any item purchased from the United States.​

​

The terms for the use of the $16.165 (billion) shall be limited to the additional fees and costs of production, and not be applied to the production cost incurred upon by the receiving party.​

​

The terms for the validity of the $16.165 (billion) shall be guaranteed by this agreement and shall not be voided by the termination, withdrawal, or failure of ratification of this agreement.​

​

The United States may prematurely repay the remaining balance of the initial $16.165 (billion) credit and shall consider the full repayment of credit available to the Republic of Korea as sufficient in the completion of the Credit Clause.​

1. Amendments and Waivers

Any term of this Agreement may be amended or waived only by way the consensual agreement between the parties and such amendment shall take effect upon signing the Amendment unless otherwise specified in that Amendment.​

1. Governing Law

This Agreement is governed by International Law and subject to interpretations of the International National law by organizes by which both parties are full members of.​

1. Enforcement

Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement and any export of items including any question regarding its validity, interpretation, implementation or termination, shall be referred to and finally resolved by an arbitration panel as agreed upon by the two parties in an ad hoc manner. The place of arbitration shall be in Hague, Netherlands and the language of arbitration shall be English.​

1. Termination

The parties may terminate this agreement after the completion of a (6) six month notice. The parties may unilaterally decide without the consent of the other to terminate this agreement through a secure message to the respective Head of State of the other party.​

​

The parties may terminate this agreement without the (6) six month waiting period if both parties consent to the termination. The termination must still be channeled through official communications between the Head of States of both parties.​

1. Financial Penalty

The parties should they violate the provisions of this agreement shall incur a (3) three billion dollar penalty which must be paid per item that violates the agreement. The payment shall be given to the violated party within an appropriate time frame.​

1. Miscellaneous

This Agreement is made in English & Korean, wherein discrepancies or disputes exist in the translation of the two agreements, an arbitrator shall determine the correct interpretation.​

 

[Odinson]

Assistant Secretary Yoshimitsu carefully looked over the proposal from the Korean Ambassador. It would be obvious that he was taking his time to read over every word to both make sure that the document benefited both parties, and also to show respect for the amount of time it must have taken to come up with this proposal. "This is a very well-written alternative to our original draft. I commend yourself and your team on your work," he said.

Yoshimitsu folded his hands and delicately said, "There is one matter I wish to address, specifically here," he said, pointing to the sentence which read, The United States shall agree to restrict the export of the SR-71 to Asia-Pacific region to ensure Korea’s Qualitative Military Advantage (QMA) and shall note for the purposes of this agreement that Russia & Turkey shall be included in the Asia-Pacific region.

"I'm afraid it may be very difficult to get President Gore and the Senate to agree to this... exact wording. However," he said, "perhaps if we made a small modification, it could still be agreeable to both sides."

Yoshimitsu took a minute to write out, in his own very neat handwriting on a blank piece of paper, the exact wording he was thinking of.
The United States shall agree to exclusively export the SR-71 to the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea shall agree to not sell, transfer, lease, rent, donate, give, or surrender the SR-71 to any other country, nation, government, company, or entity besides the United States and will not publicly disclose that Korea owns and operates the aircraft. The United States may export the SR-71 to other nations if both the President of the United States and the President of the Republic of Korea, or their designees, agree on said country and provide private written consent to the other party.

"Would your government find this alteration agreeable?" he asked.

Jay

 

[Jay]

"Firstly allow me to thank you for your kind words." Ambassador Lee joined the Assistant Secretary Yoshimitsu in reading clause 8. Ambassador Lee would then read over Assistant Secretary the proposed rewording of the text, after considering the proposed changes and consulting with the Blue House advisor, the Ambassador would respond, "Thank you for your considerations Assistant Secretary Yoshimitsu. The proposed rewording is acceptable to Seoul. We believe as you said, achieves the goal of the previously worded clause and if it can help this agreement more easily pass through our respective legislative assemblies then we support these changes."

Odinson

 

[Odinson]

"That is excellent to hear," he said with a satisfied smile. "Now I can have a draft sent over to the White House. If President Gore does not find any issues, and President Kim does not have any issues, then we White House and Blue House can exchange signed copies and we can submit them to our legislatures," he said. The Assistant Secretary of State handed off a copy of the new version, with the edits, to his chief of staff. The only difference in the American version would be formatting - such as the font, the size of the text, the letterhead, and other small details that did not have to do with the actual wording of the treaty. This copy would be sent to the White House for review by the President.

"While you are here, Ambassador, I also wanted to share some information with you. President Gore made a trip to the Pentagon today. He and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that the United States, our friends, and the nations of the Global Assembly should be prepared for any eventuality in regards to South Africa. I have been instructed to ask you if Korea would be interested in forward-deploying a fleet and ground forces or marines to the United States. This would greatly shorten an initial Korean deployment, and would allow said deployment to go with the United States if necessary," he said.

Jay

 

[Jay]

"That is appropriate with us. If we can have a copy of the US edition for archive purposes as well, that would be most useful. We will have the Blue House and Foreign Ministry start the process immediately so we can be most efficient with the signing of the agreement. I am happy to see this agreement concluded and once again the strengthening of the ROK-US relationship. I hope that Korea's efforts in Jeju will bring equal fortunes and goodwill to a better and more secure America." The Ambassador would speak with the uniformed military attache next to him as he was handed a note to read.

As for the situation in South Africa, as you are aware, our Government has indicated prior that we are ready to deploy a force to assist in the peacekeeping and removal of occupational forces as instructed by the Global Assembly resolution should it pass. However, you are right. We must prepare for any eventualities. In this regard, we can begin a request a forward deployment of the ROK Marine Corps to the United States through our national defense ministry. However, due to the situation in the Far East, which our Government is most concerned with, a sizable naval deployment is not possible at this time. We can provide an auxiliary of two Sejong Destroyers to the United States Navy. This is the most we can spare due to the current situation. The ROK Marine Corps can provide the 6th Marine Brigade, close to 4,000 strong. I will however lobby for Seoul to allow us to provide one Gwanggaeto the Great-class, one Cheonji-class, and three P-3C Orion and if possible a Dokdo amphibious assault ship. The situation in the Far East will not however imperil us from contributing to the peacekeeping force. That I can assure you."

Odinson