[Australia]: Message to New Zealand [SEC=TOP SECRET]

[Owen]

​

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SECURITY​

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET (ENCRYPTED)​

10 November 2004

Dear Director-General of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, Right now the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation is becoming increasingly concerned with espionage threats in our region. I propose a high-level and top secret meeting between ourselves in Wellington to discuss arrangements for intelligence sharing, efforts towards joint counter-terrorism and counter-espionage capabilities and to convey the concerns of our agency that we have towards the threat of espionage in New Zealand which will inevitably impact Australia, particularly as we have moved to an open borders arrangement. The latter is a decision I have made by myself, independent of government, in line with the independency of our agency. They are unaware of the concerns I will be raising. The former are matters which do need Cabinet approval to move towards and the Cabinet has given approval for me to make this trip to establish those frameworks. I look forward to your response. Yours sincerely, Mike Burgess.

Ben Chifley Building, CANBERRA, ACT 2600 Telephone: 1800 020 648​

Protective Marking:	Business Impact Level:	Compromise of Information Confidentiality:	Required to be Encrypted:
UNOFFICIAL	No Business Impact	No damage. This information does not form part of official duty.
OFFICIAL	Low Business Impact	No or insignificant damage. This is the majority of routine information.
OFFICIAL: Sensitive	Low to Medium Business Impact	Limited damage to an individual, organisation or government generally if compromised.
PROTECTED	High Business Impact	Damage to the national interest, organisations or individuals.
SECRET	Extreme Business Impact	Serious damage to the national interest, organisations or individuals.
TOP SECRET	Catastrophic Business Impact	Exceptionally grave damage to the national interest, organisations or individuals.

basedcnt

 

[Basedcnt]

Encrypted, Secure - TOP SECRET

Recipient: Director-General of ASIO, Mike Burgess < Owen >
Sender: Director of NZSIS, Richard Woods < dirnzsis@nzsis.gov.nz >
Date: 11 November 2004
Subject: Joint Meet ASIO-NZSIS Wellington

Thank you for contacting me. We would be very willing to participate in a joint discussion in New Zealand, about mutual threats to our nations. When would you prefer it to take place at?

The RNZAF has a VIP transport squadron equipped with Boeing 757 aircraft, that can transport you and any others you wish to bring.

Thank you.

Richard Woods, NZSIS
Commonwealth of New Zealand

 

[Owen]

​

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SECURITY​

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET (ENCRYPTED)​

20 November 2004

Dear Director-General of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, I will be travelling on a commercial aircraft from Australia. Unfortunately as a public servant I do not have privileged access to RAAF jets at tax-payers expense. This also helps with lowering the profile of my visit. An RAAF jet flying to Wellington is suspicious, particularly with no scheduled Cabinet ministers travelling and makes a grand presence. I will be departing shortly. I ask that these meetings take place in the High Commission of Australia. Yours sincerely, Mike Burgess.

Ben Chifley Building, CANBERRA, ACT 2600 Telephone: 1800 020 648​

Protective Marking:	Business Impact Level:	Compromise of Information Confidentiality:	Required to be Encrypted:
UNOFFICIAL	No Business Impact	No damage. This information does not form part of official duty.
OFFICIAL	Low Business Impact	No or insignificant damage. This is the majority of routine information.
OFFICIAL: Sensitive	Low to Medium Business Impact	Limited damage to an individual, organisation or government generally if compromised.
PROTECTED	High Business Impact	Damage to the national interest, organisations or individuals.
SECRET	Extreme Business Impact	Serious damage to the national interest, organisations or individuals.
TOP SECRET	Catastrophic Business Impact	Exceptionally grave damage to the national interest, organisations or individuals.

The Director-General would fly from Canberra to Sydney on a QantasLink flight before boarding a short Qantas flight across the Tasman to Wellington. Once in Wellington he would be greeted by a chaffeured driver hired by the High Commission to take him to the High Commission in Wellington. He wasn't particularly concerned about being discovered, despite being the only known and publicly acknowledged person within ASIO, as his likeliness was hardly noticeable by the average Australian in Australia, let alone by Kiwis in New Zealand.

basedcnt

 

[Basedcnt]

Encrypted, Secure - TOP SECRET

Recipient: Director-General of ASIO, Mike Burgess < Owen >
Sender: Director of NZSIS, Richard Woods < dirnzsis@nzsis.gov.nz >
Date: 20 November 2004
Subject: Joint Meet ASIO-NZSIS Wellington

Certainly. Please, give me a time and I will come to the High Commission then.

Thank you,

Richard Woods, NZSIS
Commonwealth of New Zealand

 

[Owen]

​

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SECURITY​

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET (ENCRYPTED)​

20 November 2004

Dear Director-General of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, I am there right now awaiting your arrival. Yours sincerely, Mike Burgess.

Ben Chifley Building, CANBERRA, ACT 2600 Telephone: 1800 020 648​

Protective Marking:	Business Impact Level:	Compromise of Information Confidentiality:	Required to be Encrypted:
UNOFFICIAL	No Business Impact	No damage. This information does not form part of official duty.
OFFICIAL	Low Business Impact	No or insignificant damage. This is the majority of routine information.
OFFICIAL: Sensitive	Low to Medium Business Impact	Limited damage to an individual, organisation or government generally if compromised.
PROTECTED	High Business Impact	Damage to the national interest, organisations or individuals.
SECRET	Extreme Business Impact	Serious damage to the national interest, organisations or individuals.
TOP SECRET	Catastrophic Business Impact	Exceptionally grave damage to the national interest, organisations or individuals.

basedcnt

 

[Basedcnt]

Once he would recieve the message, Woods would walk the 500 meters from the NZSIS building in Wellington to the Australian High Commission building. He would walk through the entrace and up to the reception, where he would ask, "Hello, Director Woods to see Director-General Burgess at his request."

Owen

 

[Owen]

As there would be a gate entry, it would be assumed that Director Woods pressed on the intercom. A security guard from inside the building would see him on the CCTV and would open the front gate remotely to allow him in.

"Certainly, please come right through."

A clerical worker inside the High Commission would welcome the Director at the front door to the High Commission and would lead him through to a meeting room where Director-General Burgess was. Once inside the room the Director-General would approach Director Woods to shake his hand, he would slide off his glasses before doing so.

"Director Woods, it is a pleasure that we can finally meet each other for the first time during our tenures in these roles. Please take a seat.." He would gesture to the meeting table.

"I hope you don't mind the abrupt nature of this meeting but there are some pretty pressing and serious issues at hand. I'm sure you are fully aware and investigating the protests and incidents that took place at the new Socalist... whatever it is, building in Auckland."

He would walk back up to the meeting room door and firmly shut it.

"Yes... look normally we wouldn't comment on internal security matters inside New Zealand but I want reassurances that whatever is happening is being handled by your agency and won't have any knock on affects for our agency in the work we do, particularly given the new Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangements between us."

basedcnt

 

[Basedcnt]

Woods would firmly shake Burgess' hand. "Thank you, it a pleasure to meet you also."

Woods would chuckle quietly and say, "Yes, we are definetly aware of that."

His expression would grow quite serious after hearing Burgess' last sentence. "I can assure you that it is being handled, yes. There is a counter-terrorism team within the NZSIS assigned to deal with far-right organistations like the NDP. We are also monitoring all of the NDP's approximate wereabouts constantly, and will notify you if any travel to Australia." He would pause for a second. "For example, we know that their leader and deputy travelled to Bangkok last month. Is there anything else you wished to discuss?"

Owen

 

[Owen]

"Well as you may be aware the travel arrangements allow for any New Zealand citizen to enter Australia indefinitely and have full right of abode. It doesn't necessarily require that they enter from New Zealand. We would like access to a list of these suspected members and collaborators of the NDP so we can upload them to Border Force's systems so they can quickly identify them and deny them a visa to enter Australia. If they travelled to Bangkok then they are more than capable of going onwards to Australia and attempt to destabilise things here."

The Director-General would be taken aback that the Director asked if there was anything else to discuss, like he didn't want to be there despite the fact the meeting just started.

"Well certainly there are a few things to discuss, namely areas of cooperation. I think just by this discussion here I can see we need a framework for information sharing and collaborating on counterterrorism and counterespionage issues that face both of our countries. We propose the establishment of an Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee to co-ordinate counterterrorism capabilities, crisis management, command and control, intelligence and investigation functions and shall be composed of representatives from the Australian Government, Australian state and territory governments and the New Zealand Government. As well as signing a more formal intelligence sharing agreement, specifically aimed towards more signals intelligence and foreign intelligence."

basedcnt

 

[Basedcnt]

"Yes, they are." He would think for a second. "I will have the head of the right-wing counter-terrorism team send your department a list of those people, for your use."

The Director would have a meeting with an NZDF cyber security officer soon, and since the Director-General had more or less sprung the meeting on to the Director, he would want to either prepare for the meeting or delay it.

After hearing the list of things the Director-General would want to discuss, Director Woods would walk outside and call a NZDF number and re-organise a meeting. He would then walk back inside, sit down and say, "Sorry, just had to re-schedual a meeting so we may talk about the topics you have just presented." He would take a deep breath and say, "I largely agree with your assessment on the lack of inter-service cooperation between our organisations. As such, would you like to start drafting the outlines for a formal document between our organisation here and now?"

Owen

 

[Owen]

The Director-General would slide the agreement towards the Director.

"This is the agreement that all Australian Governments have signed off on as a national counter-terrorism arrangement. It is an update that explicit states that New Zealand is not a part of Australia's National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements but does provide for New Zealand membership in the Committee, which is embedded in the arrangements and allows for the opportunity for New Zealand to expand its cooperation with the Commonwealth Government and the State and Territory governments of Australia."

Intergovernmental Agreement on Australia's National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements

INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT ON AUSTRALIA’S NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM ARRANGEMENTS​

This Agreement is made on 26 November 2004 between: The Commonwealth of Australia​ New Zealand​ The State of New South Wales​ The State of Victoria​ The State of Queensland​ The State of Western Australia​ The State of South Australia​ The State of Tasmania​ The Australian Capital Territory, and​ The Northern Territory of Australia.​

1. PREAMBLE​

Following the bombing of the Hilton Hotel in Sydney in 1978 the Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth/State Cooperation for Protection Against Violence (SAC‑PAV) was established to respond to terrorism. SAC‑PAV held its first meeting in 1979 and the National Anti‑Terrorist Plan (NATP) was subsequently developed in 1980, based on cooperation between the Commonwealth, States and Territories. On 5 April 2002, the Prime Minister and State and Territory Leaders agreed that a new national framework was needed to meet the new challenges of combating terrorism. The Leaders also reaffirmed the importance of effective cooperation between the jurisdictions and the need to build on existing arrangements in adding elements that would respond quickly and effectively to these challenges. The original Intergovernmental Agreement on Australia’s National Counter‑Terrorism Arrangements (the IGA) entered into force on 24 October 2002. A Intergovernmental Agreement on Counter-Terrorism Laws (the Laws IGA) was entered into on 25 June 2004. The Laws IGA followed the enactment by the Commonwealth of Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code and the enactment by State Parliaments of legislation referring power to the Commonwealth in accordance with paragraph 51 (xxxvii) of the Commonwealth Constitution. The State references ensured the comprehensive national application of provisions contained in Part 5.3 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code. The Laws IGA also sets out a process for obtaining the States’ and Territories’ agreement on Commonwealth counterterrorism legislative reform. The IGA was subsequently amended on 26 November 2004 to include New Zealand within these arrangements to ensure the closest possible coordination and cooperation on counter-terrorism matters. To reflect this change in membership, the National Counter-Terrorism Committee was renamed the Australia‑New Zealand Counter‑Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC).

2. AGREEMENT​

2.1 The Commonwealth, State and Territory governments now enter into the following intergovernmental agreement on Australia’s national counter‑terrorism arrangements to optimise Australia’s counter-terrorism efforts, including updated Terms of Reference for the ANZCTC. 2.2 The Commonwealth, States and Territories are parties to this agreement. Purpose 2.3 The Commonwealth, States and Territories agree: (a) the Purpose of this agreement is to establish an arrangement to enhance the effectiveness of Australia’s counter‑terrorism efforts through a cooperative partnership between all jurisdictions, together with communities and the private sector, to protect lives as an absolute priority and deal with terrorist acts through the criminal justice system; and​ ​ (b) the arrangement will enable nationally consistent approaches to countering terrorism, with an emphasis on interoperability, across the prepare, prevent, respond and recover spectrum, including through:​ ​ i. a comprehensive and complementary legal regime across all jurisdictions; and​ ​ ii. effective cooperation, coordination and consultation between all relevant agencies in all jurisdictions.​

3. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES​

Shared 3.1 The Commonwealth, States and Territories recognise: a) countering terrorism is the responsibility of all governments;​ ​ b) their joint responsibility in contributing to the development of nationally consistent approaches to countering terrorism;​ ​ c) consistency between jurisdictions to maximise opportunities for mutual support between jurisdictions is a core principle of Australia’s approach to counter-terrorism;​ ​ d) their joint responsibility in improving Australia’s counter‑terrorism intelligence capability and developing effective means for sharing intelligence to enhance operational and strategic decision-making;​ ​ i. to assist in this, applying appropriate standards and arrangements for the protection of national security information; and​ ​ e) the importance of cooperating fully to ensure that the Purpose is met.​ Commonwealth 3.2 The Commonwealth, States and Territories recognise: a) the Commonwealth has an important national role and responsibility to counter-terrorism;​ ​ b) the Commonwealth will maintain Australian Government counter-terrorism related strategies, policies and legislation;​ ​ c) the Commonwealth will maintain counter-terrorism capabilities within the Commonwealth agencies; and​ ​ d) Commonwealth agencies will support the States and Territories as appropriate.​ States and Territories 3.3 The Commonwealth, States and Territories recognise: a) State and Territory governments and their agencies have primary operational responsibility for responding to terrorist acts in their jurisdiction;​ ​ b) counter-terrorism is a core part of policing responsibilities and State and Territory governments have responsibility for maintaining counter‑terrorism capabilities; and​ ​ c) State and Territory governments and their agencies have responsibility for maintaining counter-terrorism related policies, capabilities, legislation and plans within their jurisdictions with a view to promoting national consistency and interoperability.​ Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee 3.4 The Commonwealth, States and Territories recognise: a) the ANZCTC is the primary forum for developing and coordinating nationally consistent approaches to countering terrorism, through:​ ​ i. the provision of timely expert strategic and policy advice to Prime Ministers, Premiers, Chief Ministers and other relevant ministers; and​ ​ ii. emphasising interoperability of counter-terrorism capability;​ ​ b) the ANZCTC comprises senior representatives from the Commonwealth, States and Territories and New Zealand;​ ​ c) the ANZCTC is also responsible for developing and managing national counter‑terrorism coordination strategies, plans and other documentation; and​ ​ d) the terms of reference for the ANZCTC at Annex A.​ New Zealand 3.5 The Commonwealth, States and Territories recognise: a) New Zealand as a member of the Committee to encourage closer strategic dialogue on matters of bilateral interest relevant to counter-terrorism;​ ​ b) New Zealand representatives will report independently to the New Zealand Government;​ ​ c) unless explicitly stated, all decisions and documents produced by the Committee apply only to Australia’s counter-terrorism arrangements; and​ ​ d) New Zealand will not contribute to, or receive from, the special fund administered by the Commonwealth.​ National Terrorist Situation 3.6 The Commonwealth, States and Territories recognise: a) in the event of a terrorist incident, the Commonwealth and the directly affected State (States) and/or Territory (Territories) may agree the incident constitutes a National Terrorist Situation, relecting a shared understanding of the benefits of national coordination;​ ​ i. a National Terrorist Situation could be considered when a terrorist incident(s) impacts Commonwealth interests or has national implications and requires broad policy and strategy coordination by the Commonwealth;​ ​ ii. a National Terrorist Situation could, for example, involve Commonwealth targets, and/or multijurisdictional terrorist act, and/or threats against civil aviation or maritime interests, and those involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials;​ ​ b) the Commonwealth will consult and seek agreement from the directly affected State (States) and/or Territory (Territories) before jointly deciding the incident is a National Terrorist Situation;​ ​ i. States and Territories agree not to withhold unreasonably such agreement; and​ ​ c) arrangements for a response to a National Terrorist Situation will recognise the operational integrity of, and will not inhibit effective response or consequence management by, State and Territory governments and their agencies.​

4. LEGISLATIVE ARRANGEMENTS​

4.1 The Commonwealth, States and Territories will: a) take whatever legislative action is necessary to ensure that their legal frameworks allow for terrorist incidents to be prevented, disrupted, investigated, responded to, and/or prosecuted; and​ ​ b) review their legislative arrangements to ensure they are effective in responding to changes in the national security environment.​ 4.2 States and Territories will consult each other and the Commonwealth on possible areas of State and Territory counter‑terrorism legislative reform. Model principles or legislation will, where possible and appropriate, be developed to support national consistency. 4.3 The Commonwealth will also consult States and Territories on possible areas of Commonwealth counter-terrorism legislative reform.

5. ACCOUNTABILITY​

5.1 ANZCTC members are to provide regular and timely reports to their ministers on the ANZCTC’s priorities and activities. 5.2 The ANZCTC will report directly to the Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief Ministers through the Council of Australian Governments by way of an annual report and through additional advice when necessary. 5.3 There will be a review of the national counter-terrorism arrangements every three years.

6. FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS​

6.1 Australia’s counter‑terrorism capability is developed through use of the: a) policing, emergency management and policy capability funded by the States and Territories; and​ ​ b) operational and policy capability of relevant Commonwealth agencies funded by the Commonwealth.​ 6.2 The Commonwealth also provides and administers a special fund to support a program of training, development and counter terrorism exercises, the purchase of specialist counter terrorism equipment, and forums, workshops and meetings which support the development of national policy and capabilities. The Capability Steering Group (CSG), reporting to the ANZCTC, guides the development of Australia’s counter-terrorism capability. a) Annual appropriations from the Commonwealth to the special fund may be earmarked for specific purposes consistent with the fund’s objective.​ ​ b) ANZCTC, potentially on the advice of the CSG, can allocate non-earmarked funding towards identified priorities consistent with the fund’s objective.​

7. INTERPRETATION​

Definitions 7.1 In this Agreement, unless a contrary intention is apparent: Agreement means this document and includes all Schedules, and Annexes;​ ​ Annex means an annex to this Agreement;​ ​ ANZCTC means the Australia-New Zealand Counter‑Terrorism Committee;​ ​ Jurisdiction means the jurisdiction of any of the Parties;​ ​ Party means any of the Commonwealth of Australia, states or territories that is a party to this Agreement;​ ​ Purpose means the Purpose set out in Clause 2.3;​ ​ Terrorist act means an act, or a threat to act, that meets the criteria as set out in Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code Act 1995;​ ​ Terrorist incident means a terrorist act as defined in the Criminal Code Act 1995; and includes preventative investigative activities; response to incidents; investigation of incidents; recovery from incidents; and the preparations to support these activities.​

8. CONSTRUCTION​

8.1 In this Agreement, unless expressed to the contrary: a) words importing the singular include the plural and vice versa;​ ​ b) if a word or phrase is defined cognate words and phrases have corresponding definitions; and​ ​ c) a reference to:​ ​ i. a statute, ordinance, code or other law includes regulations and other statutory instruments under it and consolidations, amendments, re-enactments or replacements of any of them;​ ​ ii. an obligation includes a warranty or representation and a reference to a failure to observe or perform an obligation includes a breach of warranty or representation; and​ ​ iii. a reference to a clause is a reference to a clause of this Agreement.​

9. COMMENCEMENT​

9.1 This Agreement commences to operate immediately upon its execution by the Parties.

10. VARIATION OF AGREEMENT​

10.1 This Agreement may be varied from time to time by the unanimous agreement of the Parties. 10.2 A variation pursuant to this clause will be in writing, signed by all Parties to this Agreement, and notice thereof will immediately following such signature be given to all the Parties.

11. WITHDRAWAL FROM AGREEMENT​

11.1 A Party to this Agreement may, by written notice to all other Parties, withdraw from this Agreement and such notice will take effect six months from the date of that notice.

12. TERMINATION​

12.1 This Agreement may be terminated at any time by agreement in writing by all the Parties and under any terms and conditions as agreed by all the Parties.

SIGNED FOR AND ON BEHALF OF EACH OF THE PARTIES BY:​

The Honourable Julia Gillard MP Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia Prime Minister of New Zealand The Honourable Kristina Keneally MP Premier of New South Wales The Honourable Jacinta Allen MP Premier of Victoria The Honourable Lawrence Springborg MP Premier of Queensland The Honourable Geoff Gallop MLA Premier of Western Australia The Honourable Mike Rann MP Premier of South Australia The Honourable Jim Bacon MP Premier of Tasmania The Honourable Terry Mills MLA Chief Minister of the Northern Territory Katy Gallagher MLA Chief Minister of the Australian Capital Territory Date:

ANNEX A​ AUSTRALIA-NEW ZEALAND COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE TERMS OF REFERENCE​

MISSION​

1. The Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC) is to contribute to the security of both countries: a) through the coordination of a cooperative arrangement to counter-terrorism and its consequences;​ ​ b) by promoting nationally consistent approaches to countering terrorism, with an emphasis on interoperability, across the prepare, prevent, respond and recover spectrum; and​ ​ c) by enhancing the existing relationship between Australia and New Zealand specifically in relation to counter-terrorism.​

OBJECTIVES​

2. The ANZCTC will: a) provide a forum for strategic dialogue on matters of bilateral interest relevant to counter‑terrorism between Australia and New Zealand; and​ ​ b) provide timely expert strategic and policy counter-terrorism advice to Prime Ministers, Premiers, Chief Ministers and other relevant ministers.​

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES​

3. To meet these objectives, the ANZCTC will: a) enable effective counter‑terrorism coordination through inter‑jurisdictional and inter‑agency cooperation;​ ​ b) review current and emerging domestic and international trends in terrorism;​ ​ c) identify risks and appropriate mitigation activities;​ ​ d) review, monitor and advise on the adequacy of Australia’s counter‑terrorism legislation and recommend legislative changes where required; and​ ​ e) develop strategic and policy advice on Australia’s counter-terrorism efforts.​ 4. In regard to Australia and New Zealand's counter-terrorism arrangements, the Commonwealth of Australia, States and Territories and New Zealand will pursue consistent approaches to countering terrorism through emphasising interoperability of counter-terrorism capability. This will be done by: a) developing strong cooperative relationships between all parties;​ ​ b) maximising opportunities for mutual support between jurisdictions;​ ​ c) pursuing effective arrangements for the sharing of intelligence;​ ​ d) providing advice on the administration of the Special Fund, and prioritising funding for:​ ​ i. the ANZCTC’s highest priorities and strategies;​ ​ ii. activities that support shared doctrine, consistent training, shared exercising and effective information-sharing; and​ ​ iii. technologies and equipment that are outside jurisdictions’ respective core counter-terrorism policing responsibilities; and​ ​ iv. developing evaluation and reporting methodologies where required.​ 5. The ANZCTC will develop and manage national counter-terrorism strategies, plans and other documentation to coordinate Australia’s counter-terrorism efforts, including: a) Australia’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy;​ ​ b) Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Plan;​ ​ c) the National Counter‑Terrorism Handbook; and​ ​ d) guidelines, manuals and other documents created by the ANZCTC.​ 6. The ANZCTC will maintain its counter-terrorism documentation to ensure currency and consistency, and that appropriate legal protections are maintained.

ACCOUNTABILITY​

7. ANZCTC members are to provide regular and timely reports to their ministers on the ANZCTC’s priorities and activities. 8. The ANZCTC will report directly to the Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief Ministers through the Council of Australian Governments by way of an annual report and through additional advice when necessary.

MEMBERSHIP​

9. The ANZCTC comprises senior representatives from the Commonwealth, States and Territories and New Zealand. 10. Members will have at least a SECRET Australian national security clearance or the New Zealand equivalent. 11. The Commonwealth will co‑chair the ANZCTC with a representative of the States and Territories and New Zealand on a rotational basis. The Commonwealth co-chair will chair the Committee for matters requiring urgent and/or out-of-session consideration.

GOVERNANCE AND PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS​

12. The ANZCTC is to develop any procedural and governance arrangements that it deems appropriate to fulfil its mission and objectives. 13. The Commonwealth will provide secretariat support.

basedcnt

 

[Basedcnt]

After looking through the document, Director Woods would say, "I would be happy with this agreement, however it must be presented to the Prime Minister before I can say anything in regards to its signing. Would you mind sending a version of it - saying Commonwealth of New Zealand - is sent to me, to present to her?" Woods would then sit back in his chair. "Also, could I trouble you for some water?"

Owen

 

[Owen]

"Well as you can see in the agreement, it does require the Prime Minister of New Zealand to sign off on the agreement."

The Director-General would ask for an aide to get the Director some water.

"Anyway.... You're more than welcome to present the agreement to the Prime Minister and to get her signature for it. Australia's official protocol is to refrain from using "Commonwealth" to refer to New Zealand in official agreements or bilateral treaties to avoid confusion when there are references to "the Commonwealth Government", those being in reference to the Australian Government. So New Zealand is simply used instead."

basedcnt

 

[Basedcnt]

The Director would nod slowly at the Director-General's first statement. Once he had recieved the water, he would thank both the Director and the aide. He would drink half of tha glass and sigh, then would listen to Director-General Burgess' next statement.

"Understood. However, is it possible to replace 'New Zealand' with 'Commonwealth of New Zealand' in just the initial Agreement section? Or, another possible solution is adding a note under Section 7 saying that all references of 'New Zealand' refer to the Commonwealth of." At that, Woods would sit back in his chair and take small sips of his water, waiting for Director-General Burgess' reply.

Owen

 

[Owen]

"That's not my call unfortunately..."

The Director-General would pause.

"A lot of the agreements between us do not necessarily need to be in writing. It can just be a respected protocol between our nations to share best practice and to share necessary amounts of intelligence between our nations. The Office of National Intelligence in Canberra is willing to embed a liaison office here at the High Commission in Wellington in order to fulfil that. We do expect that intelligence will flow more from Australia to New Zealand, but there are probably some vital pieces of intelligence that New Zealand can access through more cordial relations with our adversaries than we may have. If you wish to sign a more formalised intelligence sharing agreement we can, but it may not cover all aspects of intelligence sharing and thats why we ask that some things are done simply as a norm rather than a requirement."

Basedcnt

 

[Basedcnt]

Woods would nod at the Director-General's first words. Then, he would leave forward to listen and subsequently talk.

"Certainly, that is a fine plan. I shall do the same with the New Zealand High Commission in Australia, in order to share New Zealand intelligence directly with you."

Owen

 

[Owen]

The Director-General would slide the agreement over to his New Zealand counterpart.

Australia-Canada-New Zealand-United Kingdom-United States Communication Intelligence Agreement

TOP SECRET​

Australia-Canada-New Zealand-United Kingdom-United States Communication Intelligence Agreement "Five Eyes"​

3 January 2005​

Outline of Australia-Canada-New Zealand-United Kingdom-United States Communication Intelligence Agreement​ 1. Parties to the Agreement 2. Scope of the Agreement 3. Extent of the Agreement - Products 4. Extent of the Agreement - Methods and Techniques 5. Third Parties to the Agreement 6. Channels between Agencies 7. Dissemination and Security 8. Dissemination and Security - Commercial 9. Previous Agreements 10. Amendment and Termination of Agreement 11. Activation and Implementation of Agreement​

1. Parties to the Agreement​

The following agreement is made between the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (representing the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Defence and all other Australian Intelligence authorities which may function), the United States National Security Agency (representing the United States Department of Defense and all other U.S. Intelligence authorities which may function), the United Kingdom Government Communications Headquarters (representing the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the Ministry of Defence and all other United Kingdom Intelligence authorities which may function), the New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service (representing the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ministry of Defence and all other New Zealand Intelligence authorities which may function) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (representing the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, Department of National Defence and all other Canadian Intelligence authorities which may function).

2. Scope of the Agreement​

The agreement governs the relations of the above-mentioned parties in Communication Intelligence matters only. However, the exchange of such collateral material as is applicable for technical purposes and is not prejudical to national interests will be effected between the Communication Intelligence agencies in/or between all countries. For the purposes of this agreement the United Kingdom is understood to mean all British territories, New Zealand is understood to mean all components of the Realm of New Zealand, Australia is understood to mean all Australian territories and the United States is understood to mean all United States territories. Throughout this agreement Communication Intelligence is understood to compromise all processes involved in the collection, production and dissemination of information derived from communications of other nations.

3. Extent of the Agreement - Products​

(a) The parties agree to the exchange of the productions of the following operations relation to foreign communications: (1) collection of traffic​ (2) acquisition of communication documents and equipment​ (3) traffic analysis​ (4) cryptanalysis​ (5) decryption and translation​ (6) acquisition of information regarding communication organisations, practices, procedures and equipment​ Throughout this agreement foreign communications are understood to mean all communications of the government or of any military, air or naval force, faction, party, department, agency or bureau of a foreign country, or of any person or persons acting or purporting to act therefor, and shall include internal communications of a foreign country which may contain information of military, political or economic value. Foreign country as used herein is understood to include any country, whether or not its government is recognised by the parties to this agreement, excluding only the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. (b) Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken except when specifically excluded from the agreement at the request of either party and with the agreement of the other. It is the intention of each party to keep such requests to the absolute minimum and to exercise no restrictions other than those reported and mutually agreed upon.

4. Extent of the Agreement - Methods and Techniques​

(a) The parties agree to the exchange of information regarding methods and techniques invlved in the operations outlined in paragraph 3(a). (b) Such exchange will be unrestricted on all work undertaken, except that upon notification of the other party information may be withheld by either party when its special interests so require. Such notification will include a description of the information being withheld, sufficient in the opinion of the withholding party, to convey its significance. It is the intention of each party to limit such exception to the absolute minimum.

5. Third Parties to the Agreement​

All parties will regard this agreement as precluding action with third parties on any subject appertaining to Communication Intelligence except in accordance with the following understanding: (a) It will be contrary to this agreement to reveal its existence to any third party whatever.​ (b) Each party will seek the agreement of the others to any action with third parties and will take no such action until its advisability is agreed upon.​ (c) The agreement of the others having been obtained, it will be left to the party concerned to carry out the agreed action in the most appropriate way, without obligation to disclose precisely the channels through which action is taken.​ (d) Each party will ensure that the results of any such action are made available to the other.​ Throughout this agreement third parties are understood to mean all individuals or authorities other than those of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

6. Channels between Agencies​

The agencies mentioned in paragraph 1 will make no arrangements in the sphere of Communication Intelligence with any other agency of a party except through, or with the prior approval of, the agency of that party listed in paragraph 1.

7. Dissemination and Security​

Communication Intelligence and Secret or above technical matters connnected therewith will be disseminated in accordance with identical security regulations to be drawn up and kept under review by the agencies mentioned in paragraph 1 in collaboration. Within the terms of these regulations dissemination by any party will be made to party recipients only as approved by the agency of that party mentioned in paragraph 1; and to third party recipients only as jointly approved by all agencies mentioned in paragraph 1.

8. Dissemination and Security - Commercial​

The agencies mentioned in paragraph 1 will ensure that without prior notification and consent of the other parties in each instance no dissemination of information derived from Communication Intelligence sources is made to any individual or agency, governmental or otherwise, that will exploit it for commercial purposes.

9. Previous Agreements​

This agreement supersedes all previous agreements between United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand authorities in the Communication Intelligence field.

10. Amendment and Termination of Agreement​

This agreement may be amended or terminated in part at any time by mutual agreement or withdrawal of one party. It may terminate completely at any time on notice of all parties should all parties consider its interests best served by such action.

11. Activation and Implementation of Agreement​

This agreement becomes effective by signature of at least two duly authorised representatives of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, the United States National Security Agency, the United Kingdom Government Communications Headquarters, the New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Thereafter, its implementation will be arranged between the Communication Intelligence authorities who have signed, subject to the approval of their relevant governments.

For and in behalf of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation: For and in behalf of the United States National Security Agency: For and in behalf of the United Kingdom Government Communications Headquarters: For and in behalf of the New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service: For and in behalf of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service:

"As you can see Director-General, it includes nations beyond just ours for agreement. This is because we are eager to see the establishment of an intelligence sharing regime between Anglosphere nations. Nations which share similar values and threats. It is a government priority to see the establishment of a "Five Eyes" and not just in intelligence sharing but in many other areas of cooperation and interoperability. I hope you will consider this proposal seriously. If you have any issues with Canada, the United Kingdom or the United States, let me know now.

Director-General... I can see that your government has signed a new strategic partnership with Thailand. Are you aware of or worried about any foreign influence being exerted on New Zealand Government Ministers as a result of this partnership? As you are aware, my agency operates independently.... if it suspects foreign interference or influence upon or by a government minister, we will investigate. Our powers do not stop at the doors of Parliament. In my own personal opinion, I am worried about the amount of influence that Thailand is exerting on domestic politics, not just in New Zealand but elsewhere, including in Australia."

Basedcnt

 

[Basedcnt]

Director-General Woods would pick up the document and presuse it as the Australian was talking. He would respond with, "Certainly. Your previous comment gives me the impression that at least you wish for the reestablishment of the AUSCANNZUKUS, ASCC and ABCANZ organisations. Is that correct?"

Director-General Woods would think for a second before replying. "I understand your concern. I share it. It definitely is a worry, but there are some measures in place to stop that, and more cyber-related countermeasures will be introduced soon. In the meantime, we are monitoring some key government officials deemed to be at-risk or with unreliable loyalties."

Owen

 

[Owen]

"It is definitely the policy objective of the Australian Government to further enhance cooperation between the five main Anglosphere nations. We share common values and culture and we are naturally in a position to cooperate. Their first objective is to get the intelligence agencies of those five nations to sign off on this intelligence sharing agreement to be a springboard for further cooperation in other areas of defence interoperability, defence science and technology, intelligence, law enforcement, border protection and immigration and even passports under the collective name of "Five Eyes".

While some nations in that group of five have very close relationships, like the United Kingdom and the United States, Australia and the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom... there are still some gaps. Canada in particular has been a diplomatic nightmare, constantly going in and out of civil war and unrest for the past 10 years. But the situation there is stabilising and we see opportunities again. New Zealand also needs to step up and enhance its relationship with those other three nations."

Basedcnt

 

[Basedcnt]

The Director-General would nod as he listened to his Australian counterpart.

"If I am being completely honest, I think this current government wishes to integrate more with Thailand than with her traditional allies. And still, my friends in the New Zealand Police tell me about some of their major reforms, aimed at increasing the political loyalty of the high-ranking officers and specialist units to the Labour government."

Owen