National Intelligence Organization

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National Intelligence Organization Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı)​

Information presented in the General Overview seen below is considered public, something that would be found on a wikipedia article. The only exception is personnel size, which is listed publicly as being "greater than 262,000", but with overall numbers remaining classified; all classified information is listed at LEVEL 6 "Сварог" and LEVEL 7 "Чернобог", in particular information regarding concurrent operations or operations not having been declassified is under strict LEVEL 7 classification. Exceptions will be listed with a |DECLASSIFIED| statement.

General Overview

Headquarters

KALE, Etimesgut, Ankara

Agency Executives

Director (Teşkilat Başkanı): İbrahim Kalın First Deputy Director (Birinci Başkan Yardımcısı): [Not publicly disclosed] Near East Division (NE) East Asia Division (EA) Europe and Eurasia Division (EUR) South and Central Asia Division (SCA) Africa Division (AF) Americas Division (AD) Deputy Director – Operations: [Not publicly disclosed] Technical Collection Operations Cover and Tradecraft Ground Branch Maritime Branch, Air Branch Deputy Director – Foreign Intelligence (Dış İstihbarat Başkan Yardımcısı): [Gizli / Açıklanmadı] America Mission Center Russia Mission Center Greece Mission Center Weapons and Counter-Proliferation Center Transnational and Technology Threats Center Deputy Director – Counterintelligence (Karşı İstihbarat Başkan Yardımcısı): [Gizli / Açıklanmadı Counterterrorism Operations Counterintelligence Covert Action Programs

The National Intelligence Organization (Turkish: Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı), also known by its Turkish initials MİT, or colloquially as the Teşkilatı, is an intelligence agency of the Turkish government tasked with gathering information of national interests. It gathers information for the Presidency and the Armed Forces about the current and potential threats from inside and outside against all the elements that make up Türkiye's integrity, constitutional order, existence, independence, security, national power, and takes precautions when necessary.

The Teşkilatı is under the provision of the Presidency. It works closely with the Turkish diplomatic missions overseas. In addition, it is an ad hoc participant in Council of Ministers meetings. The Organization is headed by a Director-General, who is appointed by the President of Türkiye. The Director-General is typically a career intelligence officer with vast experience in intelligence and security matters

The organization is divided into various departments and units, each specializing in specific areas of intelligence, counterterrorism, and analysis. These units include the Counterterrorism Department, Foreign Relations Department, Signals Intelligence Department, and more.

The Teşkilatı is in charge of collecting intelligence on existing and potential threats from internal and external sources posed against the territory, people, and integrity, the existence, independence, security, and all the other elements that compose the constitutional order and the national power of the Republic of Türkiye. The Teşkilatı is in charge of communicating this intelligence to the President, the Chief of the General Staff, the Secretariat of the National Security Council, and other relevant state organizations as necessary.

The Teşkilatı is in charge of counterintelligence activities in Türkiye. Legally, it cannot be given any other duty and cannot be led to any other field of activity than collecting intelligence concerning the security of the Republic. The MİT engages in cyber warfare. The Turkish Ministry of National Defence considers cybersecurity as the country's "fifth frontier" after land, air, sea, and space. The Teşkilatı uses local cybersecurity solutions mostly developed by companies like HAVELSAN and the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Türkiye.

SECRET​ National Intelligence Service Operations Personnel

MİT Field Operatives	Trained Personnel: 50
vCounterintelligence Analysts & Intelligence Operatives	Trained Personnel: N/A
SVR SIGINT Analysts & Intelligence Operatives	Trained Personnel: N/A

Foreign Intelligence Service Spetsnaz Personnel

SVR Spetsnaz Operators

Trained Personnel: N/A

 

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Classified After Action Report Operational Plan 883 Confidential Secured and Encrypted​

FILE INFORMATION​

Name:	Расследование в Таиланде
Original Classification	Classified After Action Report
Current Classification	Classified After Action Report
File Name	Operational Plan 883, Operations in Ukraine
File Number	RFSVR OP-883 UA-E-05

I, Acting-Director of the SVR, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, hereby affirm the contents of the After Action report into joint SVR/GRU operations in neighboring country's elections. This report contains an after-action assessment of the operation including the undesired post-election outcomes and the challenges the SVR faced. SIGNED, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, Acting Director of the Foreign Intelligence Services

Preamble​ Pursuant to the authorization by the Federal Security Council, the SVR and GRU conducted joint operations aimed at disrupting Ukraine's national elections. In light of the continued de-Russification of Ukraine's political elites beginning in 1995, the Ukrainian Government has persistently undertaken actions that undermine Russia's ability to retain regional hegemony over Eastern Europe. In the pursuit of the general views of the Federal Security Council resolution 8834 of 2001, the preservation of Russia's hegemony and national security in the post-Soviet world, the SVR and GRU undertook several actions to support pro-Russian politicians and political parties. All requests for access to the unredacted version of this report must be submitted through the Office of the Director of the GRU, in accordance with established protocols for handling sensitive information.

I. Overview​ Objectives: To manipulate the 2005 Ukrainian presidential election through cyber and HUMINT operations, securing a pro-Russian victory for the Party of Regions, and destabilizing pro-European political factions. Operational Period: November 9, 2005 - November 15, 2005 Outcome: Initial Success for Party of the Regions and other pro-Russian factions followed by unforeseen post-election volatility Executive Summary:​ The operation sought to influence the 2005 Ukrainian presidential election in favor of pro-Russian interests, specifically the Party of Regions. It involved a two-pronged approach: cyber operations aimed at discrediting pro-European political factions and physical HUMINT operations involving ballot manipulation. Initial phases of the operation successfully disrupted the political landscape, with targeted disinformation campaigns influencing public discourse and ballot stuffing skewing electoral outcomes in favor of the Party of Regions. However, post-election protests (Orange Revolution) led to widespread dissent, resulting in the invalidation of the manipulated results and the rise of a pro-Western government. Ultimately, while the operation was successful in the short term, external interference, which the SVR assumes came from Western sources, and internal Ukrainian volatility undermined Russia's strategic goals. II. Assessment and Phase Operations​ Phase I: Cyber Operations and Initial HUMINT Deployment ​ Objectives: Amplify pro-Russian narratives on social media, messaging apps, and news outlets. Discredit pro-European parties, especially Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. Deploy HUMINT agents to monitor and gather intelligence on election procedures. Execution: Cyber teams launched coordinated disinformation campaigns targeting Ukrainian political discourse, using bots and fake accounts to spread pro-Russian narratives and destabilizing content. Bots focused on promoting fear and instability tied to Ukrainian nationalism, while framing pro-European factions as corrupt and influenced by Western powers. HUMINT agents were strategically placed to observe polling stations and identify opportunities for ballot manipulation. Agents also initiated contact with local election officials to influence the process. Results: Initial cyber efforts succeeded in amplifying pro-Russian voices with the Party of the Region winning the first election. HUMINT teams made significant headway in identifying key polling stations for future ballot stuffing, using local proxies to gain insight into voting patterns and schedules. Phase II: Escalation of Operations​ Objectives: Intensify disinformation efforts, particularly in high-stakes regions where the Party of Regions faced close competition from pro-European candidates. Execute physical ballot stuffing in targeted polling stations. Execution: Cyber operations scaled up, with targeted disinformation and accused opposition parties of ballot stuffing in a bid to undermine election credibility. Bots pushed fake stories to sway undecided voters towards the Party of Regions. HUMINT agents engaged in widespread ballot manipulation by inserting pre-marked ballots favoring the Party of Regions in key regions known for supporting pro-European candidates. Results: Disinformation campaigns successfully distorted public perception of the opposition, with increasing doubts cast on the integrity of pro-European parties. Ballot stuffing operations were conducted with relative success, with the insertion of false ballots in multiple targeted regions, despite some resistance from local authorities. Phase III: Conclusion and Post-Election Evaluation​ Objectives: Monitor online sentiment and assess the success of cyber operations. Address any potential risks of exposure and minimize the risk of direct linkages to Russian operatives. Execution: Following the election, the cyber teams intensified their monitoring efforts, analyzing social media and news platforms for sentiment related to the election results. Efforts were made to maintain the appearance of a legitimate electoral outcome, despite the substantial manipulations. HUMINT teams ensured that physical evidence of ballot stuffing was minimized. Agents prepared for extraction, ensuring all covert activities remained undetected. Results: The initial victory appeared to favor the Party of Regions, as manipulated votes and cyber narratives shifted the electorate. However, the aftermath of the election saw widespread protests, culminating in the Orange Revolution, fueled by accusations of electoral fraud and Western interference. The pro-European factions, particularly under the leadership of Viktor Yushchenko, managed to overturn the manipulated results, with significant external support from Western governments, especially France. The immediate success of the operation was overshadowed by the subsequent political turmoil and the invalidation of the election results. Assessment and Lessons Learned​ Successes: The operation succeeded in manipulating public opinion through targeted cyber disinformation, contributing to a shift in voting behavior that initially favored the Party of Regions. HUMINT operations, including ballot stuffing, were successful in several regions, ensuring a pro-Russian bias in the vote tally. Coordination between cyber and HUMINT operatives allowed for effective synchronization of efforts. Challenges: The post-election volatility, driven by the Orange Revolution, significantly undermined the operation’s long-term goals. The rise of pro-Western political factions, particularly Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency, indicated a decrease in Russia's ability to influence Ukrainian political processes. The external interference from the West, particularly from Western intelligence services and media outlets, proved difficult to counter, leading to the invalidation of manipulated election results. Recommendations: Future operations must account for increased resilience in Ukrainian political structures, particularly the growing resistance to Russian influence in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution. Given the higher risk of exposure through digital channels, future operations may require more sophisticated methods of disinformation that target both online and offline narratives, and address the growing role of Western-backed civil society movements. Greater emphasis on counteracting external interference from Western powers is necessary, as the ability to manipulate Ukraine's political environment may be constrained by international pressure and Ukrainian nationalism. Conclusions: While OPLAN-883 was initially successful in shaping the election outcome in favor of pro-Russian interests, the broader political context—particularly the influence of Western governments and the subsequent Orange Revolution—led to the undoing of these efforts. Russia’s influence in Ukraine, particularly in the western regions, has significantly diminished. A new strategy, one that accounts for the heightened nationalistic sentiment and Western involvement, is necessary for future operations in Ukraine. All agents and operatives have successfully returned to Russia. All online presences have been deactivated and remain untraced to Russian sources.

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