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National Security Council | 국가안전보장회의


GA Member
Oct 3, 2018
[Public Information]

Agency overview


국가 안보위원회​

Director of National Security​




12 December 1997


Government of South Korea


Blue House, Seoul, Republic of Korea


In the protection of the Korean people, republic, and values



Annual budget


Agency executives

  • Moon Jaein , Director
  • Seo Jooseok, 1st Deputy Director
  • Kim Hyungjin, 2nd Deputy Director

Parent agency

President of South Korea


Kim Dae Jung


🇰🇷 Republic of Korea​

스크린샷 2021-01-24 오후 2.51.19.png

Jo Jae Hyuk

Prime Minister

🇰🇷 Republic of Korea


Moon Jae In

National Security Advisor

🇰🇷 Republic of Korea

Kim Min Seo

Special Presidential Advisor

🇰🇷 Republic of Korea

스크린샷 2021-01-24 오후 1.16.57.pngChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Park Kyung Jil

🇰🇷 Republic of Korea Navy​

Kim Joong Kwon

Chief Presidential Secretary

🇰🇷 Republic of Korea​

Park Hyun Jin

Minister of National Defense

🇰🇷 Republic of Korea

스크린샷 2021-01-24 오후 2.50.50.png

Baek Jeong Hee

Minister of Foreign Affairs

🇰🇷 Republic of Korea

스크린샷 2021-01-24 오후 2.50.56.png

Roh Hye Min

Minister of Science and Technology

🇰🇷 Republic of Korea

Kim Pil Jil

Minister of Health and Welfare

🇰🇷 Republic of Korea


Suh Jie Won

Director of National Intelligence

🇰🇷 Republic of Korea​


The Office of National Security was established in December of 1997 following a series of global security uncertainty, threats, and attacks. Its first Director, Moon Jaein, a human rights lawyer is widely seen as a move to ensure the institute does not become an agent of state suppression and harm as previous administrations under autocrats had been used for. The areas of the Office of National Security are broad covering areas of national health, security, intelligence, infrastructure, and foreign policy. The ODS largely focuses on collecting information from other agencies and creating assessments, issuing advise and reports to the President, and a inter ministerial cooperative entity.

Security Classification: [TOP SECRET & CLASSIFIED]




  1. North Korea
Adopted State of Alert and deployment of combat divisions along demilitarized zone. Monitoring naval and air traffic in and out of North Korea as well as financial and mineral transactions across the country.
  1. Situation in Russia
Implementing provisions of GA Resolution and raising global financial investment into Russia to stave off economic ripple effects. Offer medical assistance to the Russian Government and offer deployment of medical personnel once the security situation warrants it.
  1. Situation in Ukraine
Offering political, economic, and security support to Ukraine. Offering $450 million anti-corruption package with an increase of $300 million by ROK Government.
  1. Situation in India
Approved Operation Cheollima, and issuing of warnings to Korean nationals and support their evacuation. Offering moral, political, and medical support to the Indian Government. Raise concerns over the use of violence by the government against its citizens. Further concerned over the stability of India with recent communist insurrections and urging reconsideration of ROK-India relations to accommodate pragmatic engagement to support democracy and civil liberty.
  1. Nordic Council Observer State
In favor with reservations from 2 members of council. Supporting upon the return of a normal security situation in Europe, a courtesy phone call between President Kim and his Swedish counterpart before signing Stockholm Agreement.

Reservations: ROK must maintain independence and avoid allowing Nordic Council dictations or Eurocentric-policies over the areas of our internal, science, and foreign policy. ROK must continue to maintain an observer status, or downgrade its status should it come into conflict with our multilateral approach to the global multi-polar order. Recognizing objections from Bureau of Eastern Europe and the Americas over how the perception of our observer status may indicate a shifting to pro-Nordic policies and reaffirm our commitments towards our values.
  1. United States request for Osan Base
Approved ROK-Draft Agreement for US Forces Korea to use Osan Airbase under terms listed by Foreign Minister
Approved ROK-Draft Response for US-Korea Cooperation Agreement.

Reservations issued by members of the council over ensuring the US does not utilize Korea as a springboard for external Asia operations or put Korea in a position of liability amongst regional partners. Further taking steps to not allow the US to hold the Republic of Korea in its security graphs by leveraging its arms sales against us for political or geopolitical concessions. Lastly, not signing agreements that disproportionally favor the United States and undermine Korea’s sovereignty. Thus, all agreements must not be signed wherein the terms favor America inconsiderably.



  1. Russian Cable Report
    • Japanese statements of colonialism
    • Japanese attempt to purchase of Russian eyes
  2. Military Response
    • Deployment of ROK Marine Corps to Dokdo Islands
    • Deployment of Busan Fleet to patrol Dokdo Islands
  3. ROK-Japan meeting
    • Strategy of discussion
    • Areas to gauge and get clarity
Approval made for efforts to raise defense capabilities to ensure adequate response to aggression by Imperial Japanese ambitions. Diplomatic relations lowered to ministerial-level with no option for a high level meeting with the Office of the President. Further steps to ensure Korean sovereignty to be explored through national defense review and investment in three Sejong the Great class destroyers and investment in dedicated frigates for mission service.



Emergency Situation in Bangladesh

Approval made for NIS team to deploy to Dhaka to interrogate perpetrators of the attack on the Korean Embassy in Bangladesh.


In session

Emergency Situation

  1. Russian Civil War
    • Far-Right Neo-Fascist and Neo-Nazi militias in Far East
      • Intelligence Report: Vietnam reports Russian Federation in unease agreement with Fascist and Nazi factions against Soviet Factions. American reports indicate that a wider threat to global stability poised by Communist and Fascist factions.
      • No current links to European fascist movements.
    • Far-Left Communist Insurgency in Siberia
      • Intelligence Report: Limited intelligence on capabilities and threats poised to Korea's internal security.
      • No current links to Workers Party of Korea or former top officials of the North Korean Politburo and General Staff.

The National Security Council is currently made up of 11 members with the 12th member a non-permeant member and usually reserved for special invitees, currently Minister of Environment Park Mujin. It is an entity under the Office of National Security and is chaired by the Director of National Security.
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GA Member
Oct 3, 2018
It was a chilly day in Seoul, winter had hit the peninsula much harder than years before. The Seoul Government did not anticipate the high levels of snow coming into the capital and had to scramble assets to clear roads and keep things in order. It did little to help the worries of the Seoul Mayor who had worried about the impact of weather on the New Years Celebrations. Luckily for some members of the National Security Council, they would be able to join via secure telecommunication videos. Motorcade after motorcade would enter the blue house as the various ministers were escorted into the Blue House. For its part, Seoul was under greater security monitoring, the P.S.S. had canceled all tours and had increased security for all ministers and high ranking public officials. The Korean National Police Agency had increased protection at multiple Embassies, adding extra on-duty officers and with the Diplomatic Protection Bureau, organized additional security personnel for Ambassadors and foreign officials. The planning for the Ukrainian and German Official Visits was under greater review, with additional security being added to both delegations.

At night, some in the neighborhoods near highways could hear rumbling of armored vehicles and tanks as the Seoul Citadel reinforced the Demilitarized Zone in gradual streams. While across Korea’s airspace, F-16s were on constant flight with 6 F-16s always in the air at any given time. The State of Alert meant that all troops were on-notice and would be fully mobilized and combat within 24-48 hours in the event of war.

At the Northern Line Limit, the ROK Navy patrolled the border, with reinforced patrol boats and even a frigate. The Yeonpyeong Island would be reinforced by 500 Marines, while other islands would get smaller detachments of between 50-100 Marines. The Korean Government was on edge for any sign of hostilities, especially with the President still away on foreign visits. Efforts were underway to bring the President home safely, and a massive security plan was being developed to ensure the President was brought to the Blue House safely and without complications. The plan involved using the Surion Helicopter instead of vehicle transport, while a decoy convoy would leave Incheon Airport. At the Blue House, the various ministers and secretaries arrived at different times and were led into the Presidential Emergency Security Operations Center (PESOC) where monitors showcased live reports on North Korea and global news.

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: “Thank you all for coming today. As chair of the session, I hand over the opening house items to the Chief Presidential Secretary to address them.”

Kim Joongkwon [Chief Presidential Secretary]: “Thank you Director Moon. The first item is that we require Minister Baek return to Seoul immediately. I do not need to stress the recent security concerns that have been mounting, especially in the regional proximity of your location. Not to mention…the very sensitive calls you’ve been having at the Embassy, and we’d be more comfortable with you being back in Seoul. The funeral and coronation timeline has been myriad in delays and respectfully, you must return. Vice Minister Chae may be dispatched in your place, however, we’d prefer if the delegation was kept at a minimal. The second item is that all government phones will need to be checked by the NIS today. The spam calls we suspected of being an attack may have had some adverse gradual affect. The screenings will take place while this meeting is happening, so please, make sure that your phones are unlocked and ready for scanning. The President is returning to Seoul ahead of schedule, he will not be visiting Spain as planned and will after the signing ceremony, will privately visit the Pope and then leave from Rome. Your security details have been increased and we’ve expanded coverage to include your immediate family for the time-being. We have credible intelligence of a possible attack over the coming days and all soft targets have been hardened. With this, I wish to yield to Director Moon to brief us. Thank you”

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: “Thank you Chief Kim. I will discuss firstly the credible intelligence threat. Over the past 72 hours, we’ve been monitoring communist cells built up by both foreign and north korean assets in country. The NIS has been monitoring these groups for a while now, and we believe they may be planning in the coming days some form of an attack against us here in Korea or abroad. We’ve increased security at all airports and we’ve notified Korean Air about the possibility of an attack. They will, increase inspection and have attached a liaison officer from the NIS to work with them in screening passengers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been given new guidelines to avoid issuing visas of persons suspecting of participating or supporting these recent insurrectionist and terrorist attacks across Europe and will work with local authorities in the host country to screen possible persons of interest. With that said, the first item of the agenda is North Korea. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Park, if you could please present us the current information to the council.”

Park Kyungjil [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]: “Based on the State of Alert Orders, issued by President Kim Daejung effective 12:00 AM Seoul time, the RoK Forces instituted alert status for all forward deployed forces at the Demilitarized Zone. Tours, visits, and non-essential travels were canceled to and from the DMZ. In the past 72 hours, 36,000 troops from the Citadel Defense Command were moved to reinforce the currently deployed troops. Additionally, 200 K1 tanks, 100 K9 artillery pieces, and 150 howitzers have been moved towards the DMZ to respond to an act of aggression by North Korea more quickly. With regards to air space, at Daegu Airbase, Jeju-do Airbase, and Incheon Airbase, we have 2 F-16s providing air coverage with 2 jets on the ground on alert status ready to be scrambled. TA-50s have been moved closer to the frontlines at airbase Youngsam Airbase to provide close air support to the troops there. At the Northern Line Limit, 1 Ulsan Class Frigate, 1 Gwanggaeto destroyer and 3 Gomdoksuri Corvettes have been deployed to reinforce the perimeter. 500 Marines and 20 K9 have been deployed to Yeonpyeong and the local government has been informed of the requirements to ensure all residents on the island have their bunkers in maintenance. Based on our current force posture, we are confident in our ability to detect and preemptively neutralize a first-strike against us. However, the current total assets is completely in deficit against North Korea and without allied forces…we could see initial defenses defeated within two weeks of fighting. However, we are confident in our ability to inflict high levels of casualties and take low-level of damage…on another note, we’ve begun filing pre-programmed strike locations for our Mutually Assured Destruction Policy with numerous North Korean government institutions, communication facilities, fuel depots, and bridges to be targeted by our ballistic missile arsenal. In the event of hostilities, we would be required to launch all our missiles to increase effectiveness and destroy the North’s ability to mobilize and retaliate effectively. I yield back to the chair.”

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: “Thank you Chairman. Given the high costs of not being prepared, the Presidential Order was immediately implemented. However, we have not detected any new activity from North Korea. This is unusual on previous accounts of global instability or attack. Nonetheless, preparations continue to be underway. What is does require however, is as President Kim indicated in the presidential order is a rethinking of our foreign policy and the departure of US Forces Korea. Spain has offered to deploy troops to Korea and Norway has also offered its support for temporary deployments. Minister Baek’s phone call with the American Secretary of State indicated the interest of the US to station forces in Korea. These considerations have been elevated to high priority of discussion. Moving along the agenda, we have the current situation in Russia. The situation is deteriorating constantly. Our latest update is that Spanish Forces are moving to rescue their Secretary of State and other officials inside Moscow Hotel. We anticipate at least that America and the UK will be moving forces as well. Additionally, based on the previous anticipation, it would be safe to say that the Nordic Council may move to militarize their border with Russia between Norway and Russia. Additional naval assets may be deployed to the Baltic Sea to monitor movement of shipments and goods. The NIS has strong reasons to believe that Yugoslavia holds some level of tacit support for the Soviet forces, and that sentiment would also largely be shared by North Korea and remnant powers in China. However, Yugoslavia has differed and has opposed the current violence. It could also be that their President is being held by the protestors and are making supportive statements to their cause for his safety. This is found on Section C of the NIS Report on MHC. The Ministry closed all diplomatic missions in Russia and all Korean nationals were evacuated prior to the chaos at Russia’s airports. However, from a standpoint of the security of our citizens, we are satisfied with the quick efforts to evacuate them while the crisis unfolded. Based on our recommendations, Minister Baek has issued a formal notice to the GA Ambassador to push the GA resolution through, however, official financial support to Russia will be withheld until the political situation deems it appropriate.”

Kim Minseo [Special Presidential Defense, Security & Foreign Policy Advisor]: “Adding onto the statements of the Director General, and more so combining agenda items b, c, and d. The global security situation has deteriorated significantly with the current situation in Russia. It is still…possible that the events in Ukraine were the work of ethnic Russian secessionist or domestic political actors. Whether it was the act of communist operatives is not clear. However, the power vacuum left in the wake of the assassination of the Ukrainian President will lead to possible instability. Especially with their Prime Minister in Bangkok, it is uncertain who exactly is running the show. At least with Yugoslavia, it appears their government is running according to plan and the delegation structure is keeping their government running and not incapacitated. At enormous human cost, the Indian Government has appeared to suppress the move by Indian communist party associations to take over the government. However, this we fear will only push them to be more violent. Considering the gap in India’s centralized government to governing the exteriors of its country, it is highly likely that if India conducts large-scale crackdowns an insurgency could be formed. Especially with funding and arming roles by the remnants of the Chinese Government. This situation could escalate and move from an insurrection to an insurgency and be a prolonged conflict, deteriorating the security situation. This situation will in my estimate escalate due to the violent crackdown we saw over the week.”

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: “Adding onto that statement, in the cases of Russia and India, attempts for violent suppression have been effective in the short-run. However, the stability of their governments in the post-uprisings is highly concerning. Whether in the ballot or in the streets, opposition will strike and mass protests could easily escalate into violence. We are monitoring the situation, however, in the event of a crisis, we have the option to sent the ROKAF to help evacuate Korean nationals, as well as the ROKN. The Embassy estimated 10,000 Koreans are living in India at this stage, so, we will be monitoring the situation closely.”

Park Kyungjil [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]: “Based on this current threat assessment, we would operate 4 KC-130s to evacuate 368 Koreans from high risk areas, while the Dokdo could evacuate an additional 3,000. Still, there is a high deficit in the number of people that could be rescued. Perhaps with a larger fleet, we could evacuate as high as 7,000. We discuss additional contingencies in the coming days if the situation progressively gets worse.”

Park Hyunjin [Minister of National Defense]: “We should also discuss the situation in India as a security concern. If the pendulum of communism strikes India, it could strike Indonesia next. I believe we should begin open a dialogue with the Kingdom of Rattanakosin to advance anti-communist operations in Asia. At the very least to stem the tide of aggression we’re seeing left by the global instability.”

Baek Jeonghee [Minister of Foreign Affairs]: “I disagree Minister. The Situation in India does not warrant such a level of discussion, especially indicating that we would be willing to engage militarily through ground and air assets to subdue a communist state. Not to mention as we are opening relations with Yugoslavia, it would not paint a narrative of consistency and strength. We can not ignore the communist threat to our north or one in south asia if it emerges, we must have a reasonable strategy that forces a degree of liberalization while also engaging respectfully.”

Park Hyunjin [Minister of National Defense]: “You can’t show reasonable policy with these band of insurgents and terrorists. The council should recommend to the President a forceful response. If we remain idle, we very much poise a security risk to the Korean Peninsula. One that would give the perception to the North that we are weak and incapable to act…and they will strike. The devilish bastards are not idiots, they are calculative and cold, guided by no moral compass and seek one thing, to bring terror and pain to the Korean people.”

Baek Jeonghee [Minister of Foreign Affairs]: “By reacting aggressively to the situation in South Asia we only give the North more legitimacy in its attacks against us as an aggressor power. We can not win this conflict with the North by bombing everything to oblivion. What will we unify with? The smoldering rocks?”

Park Hyunjin [Minister of National Defense]: “Better the smoldering rocks than the shackles of oppression put onto us. If they succeed in a second war.”

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: “Let’s move forward with the agenda. Based on the current situations, we will issue a travel ban to India, Russia, and advise against travel to Ukraine. We will propose the President authorize the deployment of the ROK Navy and ROK Air Force to be sent to India to evacuate Korean nationals if the situation deteriorates. Lastly, the council recommends the President speak or issue statements of support for the rights of the people to protest, speak out against their governments, but also supporting the common democratic framework in which these rights are guaranteed, condemning the violence, etc…”

The Council Members would review the statement before agreeing on them. Allowing the discussion to move onto items E & F. After a short break and being able to look into work files and get up to date, they would move onto discussing the Nordic Council Offer. At the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the North America, Asia, and Middle East Bureaus all approved, with the South America bureau opposing, and the European Bureau approving but with a position of dissent amongst the Eastern European Bureau. Primarily concerned with Korea’s ability to act as a neutral arbitrar if parties saw it as a tool of the Nordic Council. The National Security Council would now review the offer in the final review process before issuing a recommendation to the President.

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: “The next item is the Nordic Council offer. During the MoFA’s discussions with Sweden over the agenda items of visas, trade, and arms purchases, there was an unexpected offer to give Korea an observer status. Firstly, we must recognize the unique privilege given to us to join the Council, but also the political representation we could bring to Asia as a whole, and towards the outlined goals set out by this administration. Minister Baek, if you could elaborate more.

Baek Jeonghee [Minister of Foreign Affairs]: “Thank you Director. The offer was made during a call between the Vice Minister and the Swedish Deputy Secretary. As is outlined in the briefing packet, it would not come with any obligations to the Council, would allow us a representative voice in the council meetings. This of course would bridge Eurasian cooperation, raise Korea’s global standing, while minimizing the requirements and capacity of the Nordic nations to pull us into their affairs. We are considered with the optics however. Primarily, our efforts to build strong relations with Argentina and support a democratic Russia. However, we strongly believe our ability to convey our vision and thoughts respectfully within the Nordic Council as an observer will be instrumental in raising our diplomatic profile. The option for withdrawal or downgrading our status is also an option, should the situation warrant it, or if the council took steps fundamentally opposed to our values.”

Park Hyunjin [Minister of National Defense]: “In terms of security and cooperation, we would benefit from access to their high quality equipment. The strong European-Korean ties could also reassure Anglo-American partners over the mutual interest in Korea. We believe that we should at the very least pursue an observer role, and while not being a member of the council, an observer role would give us insight into the real discussions happening privately, and get larger intelligence on the situation in Europe.”

Roh Hyemin [Minister of Science and Technology]: “I am concerned with the effect this would have on our antarctic research facilities shared with Argentina. The conflict between Sweden and Argentina stemmed from the antarctic dispute. Whilst it has been resolved, I am worried about the future trajectory in both countries. It may be difficult to maintain the research agreement and support the Nordic Council…However, being in the council also could possibly open up Korea to receive technology and technical assistance from Sweden and other members…so, it is a mixed bag. We must hold our ground strongly against the opposing views, but also, ensure our ability to maintain a stable independent foreign and security policy not dominated or influenced by the concerns of Stockholm.”

Kim Minseo [Special Presidential Defense, Security & Foreign Policy Advisor]: “I agree with the assessment by Minister Roh. If we can maintain a balanced relationship with all countries, I do not see an issue with the Nordic Council. However, we must be prepared to also see hostile or uncertainty amongst some partner states over our involvement, and we must be clear to all parties. Our priorities in the Nordic Council are to develop strong multi-lateral ties, to promote Korea’s foreign and security policy, develop inter-continental relationships, and advance our diplomatic and security assets to ensure a stable global community. If these are respected, we will have no issues with any entities over our joining of the council.”

Jo Jaehyuk [Prime Minister]: “I believe this is what must be said and done. Nothing more or less. Giving a clear view of what we are expecting in the Council, but also that we do not wish to be put into a difficult geopolitical situation. Europe and America have grown distant to the troubles of the globe, and if we align ourselves closely with them…and war is to break out here. It would be difficult for them to be able to be in a position to assist us. Yet, the number of friendly powers in Europe to us slowly grows, and hopefully, by being an observer in the Nordic Council we can push future arms sales of our naval equipment and also develop cultural and political ties.”

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: “Very well. Not sending any opposition, the advise for the President moving forward, based on the discussion, we propose the President to agree to the Stockholm Treaty to enter the Republic of Korea as an observer state in the Nordic Council, however, he is to have a phone call prior to this with the Swedish Prime Minister to outline Korea’s priorities and principles of engagement. The Foreign Minister will also ensure our Ambassador in Buenos Aires and Washington D.C. are up to date with these priorities first before bringing in other Ambassadors. As they discussed, the news behind them would alert them of the Terror Attack in Norway and the situation in India. I believe…we may have to suspend our recommendation in light of these security threats gripping Europe…looking at the room, the attack in Oslo would be a source of concern for the Council to address domestic security concerns…but also if their nationals entered Korea to carry out attacks to support the communist North. At least for now, the National Security Council would not advise to sign the Stockholm Treaty. I think the situation in India makes it urgent to begin preparations for the evacuation if it turns into the next Russia. I wish to move to item f, and get it cleared before we adjourn the meeting. However before the meeting could proceed more information about attacks and seizures in India and the situation spiraling forced the council to temporary adjourn. They would reconvene after 30 minutes to gather more information and intelligence.


GA Member
Oct 3, 2018
The Korean National Security Council would reconvene after their short break, mulling over their reports and information as they discussed the latest updated information. They would proceed to discuss the situation in India, approving a rescue mission for the Korean Nationals still in the country should the situation spiral out of control. The Council would approve numerous statements for the President and recommendations on the agenda items before returning to the Nordic Council and US Negotiations. Due to the nature of the conversations, and the sensitivity of their impact, careful deliberations continued as the ministers discussed their reservations and concerns over certain policy actions. As they continued their discussion, the Chairman would update the Council on the progress of the Yeongpyeong-do Defenses, with the ROK Navy required to relocate its ships in the event of a naval rescue operation, requiring the forces at the zone to be on higher alert if destroyers and frigates would be recalled for the mission. The President was on his way back and expected to land in the next hour, and the P.S.S. had begun planning the decoy convoy as Surion Helicopters had flown into Incheon during the evening. The Presidential Emergency Security Operations Center (PESOC) where monitors showcased live reports on North Korea and global news.

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: “I believe we can get started. Moving onto the agenda item, discussing the current Nordic Council proposal, the reservations listed by Advisor Kim and Minister Roh will be entertained before a final vote on the motion.”

Kim Minseo [Special Presidential Defense, Security & Foreign Policy Advisor]: “Thank you director. With the Nordic Council, our primary concerns rest with the Eurocentric-nature of the entity. Being itself, a Nordic Council. Primarily, its member states are all Nordic, and its outlier is Germany which is still a neighboring country of similar cultural, linguistic, and political commonalities. In respect, the main concerns are that a Eurocentric foreign, security, and other aspects of policy will be enacted by the Council. By association and from my personal understanding in the meeting, the consensual aspect of the Council will make it difficult for us to argue against the three Europeans. We also believe it is unlikely at this stage they would expand in Asia, it is extremely likely the number of European states may be increased in their observer capacity or even replacing the old American-led security order of Europe and restoring the old German-led economic order. Which of course, would only further Europeanize the institution. As the Advisor continued speaking, Foreign Minister Baek received a handwritten note from an aide about discussions with the Argentines. I believe that the council sees where our reservations are. How we interact is extremely important…and who we nominate to represent us to the Council is perhaps much more important.

Roh Hyemin [Minister of Science and Technology]: “I believe Advisor Kim reflected my views in her statements. I would like to add on, when we examine our geopolitical maneuvering, we can not undermine our long-term vision. A free and prosperous Asia, from all forms of intervention and influence. One where science, commerce, and culture drive relations. Not weapons, coercion, and fear. We can achieve a lot when we widen our horizon and partners. However, if we narrow our vision to imitate the Europeans, we will find ourselves led astray from our vision for a dignified life for all. It was the Europeans who inspired the Japanese to imitate their colonial ways, and unleashed the devastation of the colonial subjugation of the Korean people. Development and Progress are good, but the values we hold must never be shaken. That was the firm belief of President Kim. I hope we all remember that.”

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: “Thank you both. Minister Baek, would you like to close the affirmation before we move to voting on the current proposal for adopting the Stockholm Treaty and recommending it to the President?”

Baek Jeonghee [Minister of Foreign Affairs]: “Thank you Director. I concur with the sentiments of both the Minister and Special Advisor. I could not agree with the closing remarks, of development and progress. However, I hope we do not forget that the global order that America strived to create has crumbled…We must strengthen the nation. We must never allow Japan to ever win against us. We must never allow Japan to have the power to subjugate us ever again. I agree with the essence of this administration, for progress and development. In the wake global individualism, we need stronger cooperation and integration. I know the Minister of Science has aggressively lobbied for our entrance into the science world in Antarctica and for the opening of new biomedical facilities to bring Korea squarely in global academic excellence. I commend her for this. I respect their reservations, however, I do know that the Argentinians have requested President Kim attend the signing of the current science and trade agreement we are close to finalizing. I believe that by sending President Kim, we can reassure the Argentines we are not a Nordic Puppet, and also show to the globe our strong multi-polar order cooperation.”

Kim Joongkwon [Chief Presidential Secretary]: “The President is very tired from the Italy trip…we shouldn’t stress him with another trip. Especially with the Seolla holidays coming up soon, let’s not make any promises.”

Baek Jeonghee [Minister of Foreign Affairs]: “Of course.”

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: “Very well. We shall vote on the proposal, with registered reservations.”

The Council would approve the Stockholm Treaty with 6 votes for, two against, and two for with reservations. Nominally adopting the provisions of the National Security Council, the President would be given a full recommendation on the procedural aspects and technical requirements for beginning the process of entering the Republic of Korea into the Nordic Council. The Korean Government would still wait before informing any external party, and would maintain secrecy over the actions to avoid any leaks to the press. After voting, they would move onto the Osan Base Request by the United States.

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: “Moving onto agenda item F, in your briefing packets page 127, the United States Proposal for the United-States Korea you both. Minister Baek, would you like to close the affirmation before we move to voting on the current proposal for adopting the Stockholm Treaty and recommending it to the President?”

Baek Jeonghee [Minister of Foreign Affairs]: “Thank you Director. With regards to the active arms purchase negotiations with the United States, we have moved towards an agreement on the final procurement of items from the National Security Advisory Group agreed during October of 1997. The American-Korean Cooperative Arms Agreement of 1997 would as terms stipulated would over the items of x24 McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle; x20 Boeing AH-64A or E variant Apache; x18 Boeing CH-47D Chinook; x10 UH-60P Black Hawk; x4 Boeing E-767 AWACS; x2 Boeing P-3 Orion; x30 M270 MLRS; x2000 M249; x300 M203 Under-barrel Grenade Launcher; x1500 FGM-148 Javelin; x100 FIM-92 Stinger; x400 M141 Bunker Defeat Munition (SMAW-D); and x50 HEMMT Vehicle. The United States has listed the following terms: Article 1 clause f, "The Korean Government will not sell, lease, lend, abandon, surrender, or give away the Sejong the Great-class Destroyer to any nation/entity/individual other than the Republic of Korea and the United States of America”, Article 2 in its entirety, and Article 3 in its entirety. Primary objective have been raised towards Article 3 over its focus on a Korean termination with the vagueness over if America were to terminate the agreement. We have proposed the following language for Article 3. b. If America terminates this agreement, the American Government waives its right to demand Korea scrap all American vehicles/vessels/weapons that they procured from the United States under the AKCAA. Further reassuring the United States that we would be legally required even in termination of the agreement of the sub-clauses over re-selling ‘i. The Republic of Korea is still under the requirement to not resell, transfer, or in any other form allow another country to utilize procured equipment from the United States under AKCAA and shall not even in the event of the termination of this agreement, breach the terms over re-selling or transferring in any form the procured equipment from the United States.’ With regards to Article 1, sub-clause f, we found it a reasonable request. Minister Park likewise concurred with the assessment and approves for removing the Sejong the Great Destroyer from active sales. I yield the remainder of my time for Minister Park to address these technical points.”

Park Hyunjin [Minister of National Defense]: “Thank you Minister Baek. “On page 135 you will find the arms purchase order between our governments. The current list is a modified proposal based on the mutual input of the American Defense Department and our Ministry on items on the list. Primarily, items (A) & (B)

Item (A)




McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle


Boeing AH-64A or E variant Apache


Boeing CH-47D Chinook


SR-71 Blackbird


Boeing E-767 AWACS


Boeing P-3 Orion



Item (B)






M203 Under-barrel Grenade Launcher


FGM-148 Javelin


FIM-92 Stinger


M141 Bunker Defeat Munition (SMAW-D)


HEMMT Vehicle

As you will notice, Item (A) has discrepancies with the AKCAA. Based on the discussions with the American Government. The U-2 Dragon Lady…which may or may not exist. Is currently not available. However, should it be available. The United States has offered to station the U-2 Dragon Lady at either Kunsan or Osan Airbase. As well as offering the SR-71 Blackbird as a replacement for purchasing the U-2, with the usage of the either airbase. The Ministry has drafted the Terms for the US deploying forces to the Peninsula…on page 172 you will find them. As outlined, we have chosen Osan Airbase for deploying US Air Force personnel. It will be difficult to get this ratified by both the US Congress and our National Assembly. However, it is crucial that to restore military parity on the peninsula, we are armed with the weapons to respond to aggression. Against the North…but also from neighboring states or hostile regimes. I believe the AKCAA requires amendments, and in the American proposal can not be accepted. Especially if we are also required to ratify it by legislative process.

Jo Jaehyuk [Prime Minister]: The US proposal would allow us to use the weapons for whatever purposes we deem appropriate and would not come with terms and conditions over application, usage, and conduct with regards to their weapons systems.

Park Hyunjin [Minister of National Defense]: “From our understandings, yes this is a correct assessment. With the limitations on application being usage by forces not apart of the AKCAA.”

Jo Jaehyuk [Prime Minister]: “I believe a lot of parliamentarians don't feel as strongly about having US forces back not he peninsula. Considering their historical role in partitioning the peninsula and the continued interference in our political affairs. Considering our geopolitical maneuvering, the provisions of the AKCAA could hold us hostage in future geopolitical spites with Washington. Not to mention, selling the Osan Airbase to the National Assembly…will require a lot of political capital. We would like to see a minimal force pretense program pointed towards air defense & surveillance purposes, guarding against offensive actions by the North versus an offensive force.

Park Hyunjin [Minister of National Defense]: “On the issue of force size, regular intervals of troops would be invited. I highly doubt the United States will want a long-term force presence on the peninsula. However, it is not certain who will run for President in 2000, nor what they will believe. Still, all troop deployments must be mutually agreed. The ability for our forces to deal a lethal blow to the North would require some degree of assistance from the United States. It would be unlikely that we would at this point and time strike a lethal blow with the current arsenal of weapons in a strategic attack. Supplemental American support would be more cost-effective and strategic.

Jo Jaehyuk [Prime Minister]: If we exclude the airbase issue, we still wouldn't be able to guarantee America would commit to the AKCAA. Not to question our old allies loyalties, but the west has largely left Asia to its own affairs. Which requires investment in domestic R&D and development of local alternatives. It is safe to say that in some aspects, the Americans are much more advance, but we should not really change our position. I must defend the concerns of some parliamentarians over a US military base and associated programs. If we felt the need to close Osan Airbase, that could affect America’s commitment to AKCAA. We are falling into a bad trap. Osan Airbase and AKCAA should not be put together or discussed in a close enough timeframe to imply they are linked. People who are against the airbase will also go against the AKCAA proposal in parliament. But the latter is necessary for deterrence as you’ve implied. These are two similar subjects that have similar outcomes to our security independence. We need to clarify what America’s intentions are, and we need to support a mutually beneficial approach. Previous agreements continued to be signed under US pressures due to their security monopolies. Osan Airbase would provide an additional deterrent. We nonetheless require a strategy for dealing with the Americans. We need a simple and understandable policy statement on it. We need a legislative and public relations game plan.

Park Hyunjin [Minister of National Defense]: “I agree with your sentiments Minister. We must fill in the gap since the United States left. However, if there is no airbase, the North may feel inclined to attack without the repercussion of US retaliation wether implied or assumed. The first strike could very much force us into an unwinnable defense conflict like we faced in the 1950s. It would be another difficult agreement to swallow. However, the draft we’ve written has a lot of safeguards. If we exclude the airbase, we wouldn't have really changed our position. It is not enough to sign AKCAA without the surveillance planes. The two points are well received, we will address this internally and see if we can propose Osan Airbase at a later date to not imply a tied linking between AKCAA and Osan Airbase.

Jo Jaehyuk [Prime Minister]: “Thank you Minister.”

Park Hyunjin [Minister of National Defense]: “I yield the remainder back to the Minister.”

Baek Jeonghee [Minister of Foreign Affairs]: “Thank you. I understand the ethical and historical considerations of inviting the United States back. I intend to raise alcohol levels, curfews, accountability for actions by US Forces while in Korea, and reducing the unintended consequences from inviting a permanent US force. However, AKCAA and the Stature of US Forces Korea does exactly what we want. I believe we should not be skeptical of an American presence, but go forward with a program of equal terms that makes the agreement beneficial to us. We can reaffirm strong pacific ties between us and Washington. Also giving us a degree of political mobility against Japan and pursue a program of pro-Korea policies by Washington. Our diplomats can do a lot of good work and get a good deal. From the standpoint of deterrence, the current proposal accomplishes the arms purchases and a physical US deployment which is good. We are on the verge of signing a stronger agreement, if we can convince the us to sign our drafts. We will be on good terms.

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: “Very well. Thank you all. Back to the floor. I have registered a number of reservations. However, I believe that we should move to the voting procedure. The Prime Minister has listed a number of concerns recorded for the President. Nonetheless, at the end of World War II, we saw a great deal of turmoil in the partitioning of Korea. However, a great deal of power politics between Japan and China precipitated this, and the United States has only replaced Japan as the power player against China. Without a strong China at this stage, it is in our favor to have a US airbase dedicated on North Korea. I highly doubt the United States Joint Staff would bring the US into a larger ground campaign in Asia at this stage. The main use to us of Osan Airbase is as a deterrent. I am inclined to think that the a Soviets resurgence and strengthening of the North’s capability would happen at greater quantities and intervals than with us with the United States. They would if determined be able to resupply the north quickly by land through Vladivostok. If they manage to take power at all. Which current trends thankfully show us that they have not. The purpose of the deterrence even if the United States does not engage in direct conflict, would be that if the North attacked us, the U.S. would support us morally and with intelligence. This would be an advantage to us significantly. We must accept a small degree of concessions to our terms. However, we can not in plainer terms sell out our national defense in defensive abilities as well as offensive abilities with Article 3 of the AKCAA. We can't destroy the multi-billion dollar investment in the US if a US administration feels inclined to pressure us. The wording gives some ambiguity at its current stage, and would be much more served by amendments. With regard to the AKCAA weapons program, its major value is strength. If this fails, then we have very modest ability to retaliate and even then, very unlikely to be sustainable. Our abilities to strike the North are in terms of limited, not total capacity. We don't know what the North have, but they are up to something. If the North were to maneuver troops, with the SR-71 and US U-2 we could monitor and respond accordingly to any missile, artillery, or ground threat. I believe the NSC should strike balance, as well as review the final draft of AKCAA and SUSFK. We must retain our present defense independence with the current advance of domestic production to reduce any dependencies.”

The Council would very slightly approve the AKCAA proposed by the Korean Ministers with 5 votes for, 4 against, and 1 abstained with reservations. This would be a very difficult adoption to proceed with. Under the provisions of the National Security Council, the slight affirmation would also be noted down for records and given to the President alongside a full recommendation on the procedural aspects and technical requirements for Osan Airbase joint-operations and AKCAA as well as legal outcomes. The NSC session would officially end as Director Moon, Chief Secretary Kim, Special Advisor Kim, and Director Kim would remain int he blue house as the others left. Having to report to the President the session outcomes.


GA Member
Oct 3, 2018
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information and Emergency Command (MOFIEC)​

At the South Korean Foreign Ministry, the eight floor housed the Ministries information and emergency command center. The I&F CC was the center for information and data compilation and was made up of a number of hard-server data centers on-site. The watchmen monitoring emergency alerts and diplomats monitoring information would be there 24/7 and on rotation. As the diplomats read through a number of cables from different embassies from Washington D.C. to Buenos Aires and from Dhaka to Canberra. The MOFIEC was an integral part of the digitization efforts of the Ministry. The command center would be operating as usually, being updated on the situation in India as the Embassy sent secure stabled detailing the situation in Mumbai's gravity and that under-prepared and outnumber Korean Force. The Embassy in Dhaka would transmit election results and predictions. Meanwhile the Embassy in Stockholm would transmit data on Nordic Council-shared systems and the process of discussion.

The Watchmen would get an emergency alert from Dhaka. Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Dhaka under security threat and assault. Quickly raising the alarm to their seniors who transmitted it to the National Security Council and Blue House as the Foreign Minister's Chief Secretary was informed. The Watchmen would immediately set up the Dhaka Crisis Committee and the Bureau Director of South Asia Affairs Kim Seongrhee, Regional Security Director at the ROK Embassy in New Delhi Kim Seongmin, ROK Army Embassy Security & Protection Group Commander Kim Jimin, and 1st Vice Minister Kim Taewoo would be assembled. The Dhaka Crisis Committee would be monitoring the situation on local news. What was clear was that an ongoing battle was ensuing across the Korean & German diplomatic missions with an unknown number of Germans injured and with 5 Koreans injured and one critically. The news did not report anything about the US or Canadian Embassies, however, it was just as likely they were under attack as well. The Korean Embassy was transmitting information from the Ambassadors residence all of which was simultaneously transferred to the Dhaka Crisis Committee. After a number of deliberations, the committee would be prepared to brief the N.S.C. and concluded their session while the Vice Minister was requested to attend a meeting with the Regional Bureau Director. The two would call in via-telecoms as the this session would be held entirely virtual as the Prime Minister was in Sejong City, the Science Minister in Cheongju, and the Foreign Minister in Honolulu. The team would call in and greet their superiors before explaining the situation. Director Moon would welcome the men and quickly expedite the formalities and proceed with the session.

Kim Taewon [1st Vice Minister]: "Thank you Director Moon. At 10:44 the ROK Embassy in Dhaka transmitted an emergency alert to the MOFIEC that they were under attack. As of...he checked his watch...10:54 the assault is still on-going. Four diplomats have been injured, three suffered hearing pain and injures from the blast while one diplomat suffered an impact injury when debris hit the diplomat in the left arm. One Embassy guard is in critical conditions with glass shards and debris impacting and penetrating his body. Personnel with medical training are trying to stabilize him. At this time, the Bangladeshi Security Forces have been wiped out at the Embassy alley and it appears the German Embassy is also under attack. We believe this is a coordinated strike against diplomatic missions and the Bangladesh Government. footage would be shown of the bombing of the League's Rally in a Square near the Embassies. The attackers launched a series of at least four explosives targeting the expected victors of the 1998 other words, the attackers have struck both the opposition and the diplomatic alleys. At this time it does not appear the Japanese, Chinese, or Canadian Embassies are under assault. The Italian and Swedish Embassies on the other side are also not under attack. Whether this was an act of convenience or their main target is the American Embassy is unknown. However, the exterior security is overrun and the interior security is unable to hold off a major attack. The two groups of defenders are at the Main Annex which conducts visas interviews and consular affairs for Koreans and the Ambassador Complex inside which is for the Ambassador's residence and meeting space. At this time, the Ambassador and all Korean diplomats are safe. However, we expect the casualty list to increase. We do not know the actual situation aside from delayed transmissions."

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: "Thank you Vice Minister. I believe the situation warrants an immediate allocation of resources necessary to provide security and medial attention. I believe we should put our Embassy in New Delhi on alert as well. Raising the security level across South Asia in its entirety. Secondly, how long would it take our Special Force unit in New Delhi to arrive in Dhaka? He looked at the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs "

Park Kyungjil [Chairman of JTC]: "Approximately 2 hours and thirty minutes by air. They would not be able to respond to the situation immediately. We will have to rely on the Bangladeshi Security Services...however, I believe if we get them airborne now, they could provide secondary support. The attackers...based on our understanding do not seem to be storming the complex instead launching attacks from the exterior...pointing to the imagery on the screen as you can see, the smoke appears indicate the use of explosives."

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: "We should get them airborne immediately. Additionally, Madame Foreign Minister, what is the situation as you are aware. Have the Americans shared anything with you yet?"

Baek Jeonghee [Minister of Foreign Affairs]: "No Director Moon. We have not actually met yet, we are still at the hotel. I am trying to get in contact with the Americans team here to see what they know...the Embassy attack is most concerning. I believe we should take extra measures and close our Embassy in Mumbai for the day and move staff out of the premise. I also support the use of force by special forces to deploy into Bangladesh. If they get in the air now, they can at the very least relieve the Embassy should the attacks prolong. My main concern is if these attackers use a large explosive devise against the Embassies. A detonated explosion in-front of the US Embassy would take out the front of both the German and Korean other words we could see a high number of causalities."

Kim Daejung [President of the Republic of Korea]: "Director...You have my authorization as Commander in Chief to launch the UDT Seals in New Delhi. As a precaution, we should close the diplomatic missions in India for the day...thank god the Embassy was light staffed due to the elections. What can we tell about the situation for the Bangladeshis, the footage so far of the quite disturbing."

Kim Taewon [1st Vice Minister]: "Kakao, the situation in Dhaka is complex. We don't have a complete picture...but we know the causalities are in the hundreds. The Prime Minister and President have not issued any formal statements as of now. The League's leadership status us unknown as well...for now we are playing the waiting game."

Kim Daejung [President of the Republic of Korea]: "No we are not Vice Minister. Send in the Seals...let's get them airborne. Get me a line to the Bangladeshi President...and Chairman. I want the medical team in India to be put on lockdown. No one leaves or enters. Tell them their rules of engagement are to engage all suspected hostiles and not only identified hostiles."

Park Kyungjil [Chairman of JTC]: "Sir. I am worried that if we move the forces out of New Delhi, they would not be able to respond to the situation Mumbai. The Indian report was false. Fighting is active in the city. In essence, we have two situations in Mumbai where communist insurgents are attacking the Indian police and army with our medical personnel in-betweenand the situation in Dhaka where our Embassy is under assault in an internal conflict over elections. In other words, by deploying the Special Forces now we risk leaving the Embassy and Mumbai Force at risk."

Kim Daejung [President of the Republic of Korea]: "The situation in Dhaka is taking priority here. Admiral, get them airborne now. Minister Baek, I want a complete review of our diplomatic missions to find vulnerabilities and security issues. Quickly people. We can't sit here."

The Emergency Session would be adjourned for the time being with all staff and members required to be able to respond to a meeting notice within five minutes as the situation was constantly changing. The Dhaka Crisis Committee would go back to reading and updating its information to brief the council if it was required. At the Korean Embassy in New Delhi, 12 members of the Special Forces Unit would gear up and get ready to be airborne. At Dhaka, diplomats not at the mission would lock their doors and barricade themselves as it was unknown if they were being targeted/hunted and ordered not to open the door. In Delhi the Embassy would prematurely closed. Applicants inside would be asked to leave as the Embassy went into hard closure and the front-gates raised and Army security guards armed and patrolling the premise while the diplomats inside were sent to the residential annex inside the complex.


GA Member
Oct 3, 2018
It was a warm summer day in Seoul, the winters that had hit the peninsula were no longer present. The shining sun and warm air would be felt as the National Security held their session inside the National Security Council room inside the Blue House where the sun shined through the windows. The Blue House was quieter than usual as the President was in Argentina for the Korean-Argentine Summit. At this rate, the NSC would be connecting from across the globe with the Foreign Minister in Honolulu, the President in Argentina, the Prime Minister in Australia, Deputy Prime Minister Park Mu-jin would be the most senior official in Korea at this time. Those abroad would be joining via secured telecommunications whereas those in Seoul would arrive to the Blue House. Most notably absent was the Chief Presidential Secretary. The P.S.S. had reimposed the increased security for all ministers and high ranking public officials.

Director Moon and Deputy Director Nam would be greet the different members of the council and staff as they walked into the room. Director Moon and Deputy Prime Minister Park would talk about some of the issues over the highly confidential matters of the reunification proposal, specifically the idea of making the demilitarized zone a conservation and a peace park. Both the Director and Deputy Prime Minister would be brought into the loop about the ongoing discussions between Seoul and Pyongyang. Director Moon and Minister Park both hoped for the possibility and made sure to do their best while in the Blue House with the other ministers apart of the inter-Korean summit task force would prepare for the summit. Before they could do that, they had to deal with the situation in India which was growing more concerning.

Kim Daejung [President of the Republic of Korea]: “Thank you all for coming today. I know we’ve been having these meetings on short notice, and being abroad in Argentina is not helping with coordinating different items and important issues. However, I thank you all for the diligence in getting up to speed and thinking of solutions. Director Moon should have shared the documents presented to me with regards to the situation in India. The situation is very concerning and I given the global situation warrants a meeting towards deliberation on a solution. Director Moon, please, if you can brief the council."

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security Office]: "Yes Mr. President. Based on the security situation in India, the Joint Chiefs have requested an additional deployment of troops to ensure the safety and wellbeing of the Cheollima task force. This is based on the growing violence which unlike the initial reports of the city being secured and stable showcases the need for greater security arrangements. This has expedited the adivse to leave India, of the nearly 10,000 Korean citizens in India, 98% have left the country as advised. At this stage there remain 200 Korean citizens and their dependents scattered across the country. Our primary issues are that the situation has been so destabilizing the Indian Government is going to motion for an immediate intervention by the Americans. They are already in discussion with the Americans over this request and are preparing to raise the issue to the Global Assembly. The security risks poised to Korea are extraordinary should India fall to a communist regime. Not only does it embolden the North, it offers them a support line to their crumbled economy which is on the verge of collapse. This lifeline would overturn the progress on inter-Korean relations and put us on the defensive against this communist Axis. Chairman Park can elaborate on the security implications."

Park Kyungjil [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs]: “Mr. President. Our primary concerns with the current situation is the ability to extract the medical team. We have arrange an extraction via naval vessels extracted via a naval fleet deployed to the region. We do not anticipate any naval resistance from the Indians. They do not poses any credible stand off weapons against our ships and units to risk the naval fleet's safety. Our intelligence indicates the Indian Navy consists of at least 4 vessels, three surface vessels, destroyers and one sub-surface vessel, a submarine. The intelligence came from our unit in the New Delhi Port. The four vessels are anchored in the Naval Base in Mumbai. They are unmanned and the personnel at the base are unable to operate the vessels. They would not be able to obstruct our evacuation. To be able to extract the unit, we would advise deploying a task force of destroyers and frigates, and extracting the small team through helicopters and RHIBs back to the vessels. If we enter the port area, we leave ourselves exposed to land-based artillery and heavy equipment damaging our vessels. Smaller RHIBs are more maneuverable and difficult to target while the helicopters and nearby ships will provide anti-missile and air defense. The remaining 200 Korean nationals will be difficult to extract without knowing their locations and sending ground troops into the area. This of course, is complicated if the government of India collapses and different factions erupt across the country. The major interest we have is to ensure the Indian military and government can hold off against an insurgency. If we don’t crush the signs of communism abroad, your hopes for reunification will dwindle Mr. President. If the Communists get a foothold in India, and are able to resupply themselves with food and fuel and export resources to the North, we would be required to either destroy this supply line and risk a ground war with the North or allow the North to re-stabilize themselves. I believe the situation poses a grave national security risk to our country. The dormancy in Chinese can easily reverse and with a communist India, an axis across the rest of Asia would be dangerous for our security situation."

Kim Daejung [President of the Republic of Korea]: “The situation is concerning. We should have the naval ships nearby be able to react quickly, unfortunately we do not have any secure bases to which we can launch from in the region. In times like these, the Indonesia or Tanzania base proposals would've come in handy....Foreign Minister, what are you sensing from the Americans. Do you think they will intervene?"

Baek Jeonghee [Minister of Foreign Affairs]: "It is difficult to tell Mr. President. Their policy planners may wish to avoid a Vietnam-like scenario with a ground conflict that drags on. However, the Americans have indicated that they wish to restore a form of American deployments to Asia mostly through Korean bases, which, if alluded to the deployment to India proves favorable. However, it is equally true the US won't be able to send a token force but would require a large deployment of troops.

Kim Daejung [President of the Republic of Korea]: “If the Indians asked Chairman, could we deploy combat units to assist the Americans and support the GA mission?"

Park Kyungjil [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs]: “Mr. President. If we were to deploy a combat brigade, it would be around 10,000 troops alongside armored vehicles, tanks, anti-air, and artillery systems. It would be expensive. We have the logistical means to transport these units, however, we would need help to move all 10,000 with our current naval transport fleet. However, the main issue is that if we divert troops it would risk our ability to react quickly to the North's collapse. In which case we would not be fully prepared to secure the North with a naval and ground forces deployed abroad."

Baek Jeonghee [Minister of Foreign Affairs]: "Mr. President. I am certain we can support the G.A. vote, and work to raise global support and contributions, however, the deployment of Korean troops as the Chairman said would be difficult to arrange. Perhaps a smaller force of 2,000 troops alongside equipment could be deployed?"

Park Kyungjil [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs]: "It is doable, however, 2,000 troops would not be a large enough force to combat this insurgency from which we understand has tens of thousands of armed followers. We will run scenarios and simulations and report what is the optimal amount of troops to deploy abroad without weakening OPLAN-52.

Moon Jaein [Director of National Security]: “Mr. President. The situation also comes as...our financial situation is expected to take a hit. Alongside other global economies, the backlog and low spending last month has led to higher spending and Finance Minister Shin has raised the alarms we are entering unsustainable levels of debt. This operation would be costly as well.”

Kim Daejung [President of the Republic of Korea]: “Thank you Director Moon. We can not ignore this issue neither can we challenge it head on. Director, I want you to be in Delhi to work with the Indians and see what we can do to make sure the humanitarian mission can work. If we can't secure the unit, they will have to be withdrawn. If they are asking for the Americans, it must be bad. Minister Baek, keep an eye on the Americans and see if they make any gestures about their plans for India. The main vision should be to contain this threat and not let it impact inter-Korean dialogue. The NIS report on spam calls that were suspected of being an attack originated in India if we are correct. We should make sure our intelligence and security systems are active and capable to defend against a possible attack again. The NIS should work hard to keep the cyber and telecommunication space clear and defended. The Indians want to consult their congress and government before allowing us to send troops to defend our people, let's make sure we have these plans ready Chairman. I know we all have meetings and have a lot of things to handle, so, let's stay focused on the bigger things. Don't let this dominate our agenda and Director, in your meeting with Hwang...make sure they agree."


GA Member
Oct 3, 2018

It was another chilly day in Seoul, winter was hitting the peninsula much harder than years before. However, the snow last December ensured the Seoul Government was ready. Assets were clearing the road early in the night and late in the morning as commuters traverse the city. The motorcades carrying government officials were escorted to the Blue House after an emergency meeting was called. The P.S.S. cleared the facilities and did their regular sweeps as precautions were normal. The City was at relative ease as people planned for the New Years celebration. Behind the Ministers and Joint Chiefs their respective aides and secretaries sat. At the corner of the room, Blue House staff would record the meeting notes and use them to create the minutes after the meeting.

Meanwhile in the Blue House, the New Years celebrations for the top policymakers in Korea would be shadowed by the looming threat of a humanitarian crisis and civil war in Russia. Overnight the Foreign and Defense Ministers were kept up late and scrambling personnel to the Ministry as American, Vietnamese, and other foreign governments contacted Korea. The ROK Armed Forces discussed entering a State of Alert to deploy troops to the border zone immediately. It was almost a year since the Russian Financial Crisis caused a similar scare, putting the Armed Forces on a State of Alert as war with the North looked inevitable. As India descended into chaos and Koreans across South Asia were attacked, the threat posed by instability was cognacenst in the minds of Korea’s top policymakers. At the Blue House, the NSC members arrived close to each other over the course of fifteen minutes where they were led into the National Security Council Chambers. Cameras would take photos for pr purposes and once that was complete, they would leave the room as the

President Kim: I would like to discuss the situation and our strategy with the current situation in Russia. If there is a conesus to act we must make an appropriate plan of action. Director Moon please bring us up to speed on the current situation.”

Director Moon: “At this moment this is still related to the Far East. I would like to bring your attention to minute notes from the Foreign Ministers meeting with the Vietnamese Vice President. It is our implicit understanding that the Vietnamese Government harbors some passive acceptance to the Communist factions. This passive acceptance should not, to our analysis, be interpreted as running contrary to their support for the Administration of President Putin. The conversation took place over the course of an hour and the two discussed the situation as well as plans for a Vietnamese intervention.

It is our understanding that Vietnamese officials are planning an intervention and are backed by Thailand and possibly other Southeast Asian States. They do not to our knowledge have the backing of any other country. It also appears that based on the intelligence shared by Vice President Nguyen, there is an uneasy agreement between the fascist and neo-nazi factions in the Far East with the Government in Moscow.

This agreement ultimately means that Vladivostok and the Far East are in the effective control of the Far East Resistance. At this time they are not necessarily actively rebelling against Moscow or attempting to create a secessionist regime. It is likely that these factions have access to Soviet-era arsenals from long-range missiles, surface to air missiles, armored vehicles, and advanced personal arms. As of this meeting, no maneuvers have been detected along our border, however, an inadequate defensive position is a major concern as raised by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The Americans are planning their own intervention, with attempts to court members of the ‘Free World’. This intervention will consist of multiple ships and amphibious assault craft. The American presence would likewise use Korea as a staging ground for an intervention. That is our current assessment Kakao.”

President Kim: Two issues were highlighted by the meeting notes and in the meetings between Minister Baek and Park. The stationing of large quantities of foreign troops and equipment desiring to station in our country. Such deployments would constitute to my understanding our passive engagement in the conflict. Which to non-state actors might as well be active engagement.

Air Bases, naval ports, and critical infrastructure may become targets in such reprisal attacks. This was the assessment of the NIS in their briefing, under section D. It seems to me with many consultations that we need an option that involves our own independent strategy to neutralize the threat posed by these extremists. An option that is tailored to achieve specific goals. Primarily securing the border, containment of the flow of arms, and protection of civilians fleeing violence. The SCP Framework would involve a high number of contributions and ultimately make us more involved and an active party to the conflict.

At the request of the Chiefs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will regardless like to see the plans that have been designed for a number of kinetic strike options. Minister Park has reviewed these plans as part of our initial discussions from the Operational Command Meeting earlier today. Before we begin the discussion on the KSO portion of the SCP, General Han wished to present OPLAN 622 to the council for review and affirmation. If you could brief the council on OPLAN-620 General Han."

General Han: “OPLAN-620 is a critical part of the SCP arrangement and a precursor to any KSO or DMI planning. It is a fundamental principle in our ability to effectively create an appropriate military task force to secure the 18 to 22.1 km border we have with Russia. The reconnaissance mission calls for a moderate force of approximately 155 personnel excluding ground crews.

The mission has a total time of 7 hours divided into two phases each three hours and two hours respectively with an additional two hours of non-mission activities such as refueling, defense grid scrambling, etc... Currently our plan consists of an electronic surveillance of the coastline of the Far East alongside two reconnaissance missions taking photos across a wide space of over 600 km. With regards to the SCP Framework. All our plans act in a symphony to acquire the intelligence needed to ensure our ability to secure the border, take direct action to contain the threat, and provide relief and assistance to protect civilians. You can review the plans and area of operation under Annex I of the OPLAN-620 File.

In regards to exposure, it is, depending on the arsenal of equipment, unlikely either of our operations will be detected. Aside from which, should our aircrafts be detected or pinged by air defenses, we would be able to launch precision guided munitions to neutralize them. It should be noted that regardless, these actions are being done in line with the principle of our right to defend our territory and the increased risks posed by non-state actors jeopardizes our national security.”

Minister Park: “I do agree we should consider the OPLAN-620. If the militias start to move, we need to be able to track and identify specific targets. I believe our position on the SCP Framework should include our willingness to use aerial power to directly target and neutralize non-state actors that pose a threat according to our SCP Framework. We have ways of stopping them from moving heavy equipment into the border towns. But they can infiltrate it with small arms and use it to launch attacks across the border. We have to calculate the risks of involvement with the long term risks of non-involvement. With regards to the intelligence operation, do we do it alone? Or do we wait until the Americans get here and jointly conduct reconnaissance missions with them?

It is still my opinion that the longer we wait, the worse it gets. If the fascist attempt to take the border and believe we will not act, they will push further and further. We must do what is necessary, and respond faster as opposed to later. An additional source of concern is if the Siberian communist factions achieve success and drive the fascists out of the region. Having a Soviet presence could inspire and radicalize the communist sentiments on the Peninsula.

If the communists can get into the region, they can create a supply corridor to supply and assist communist insurgencies on the Peninsula. If we want to assure that no corridor is created, we would have to become involved in the conflict. Ultimately all the paths we take lead us to some form of involvement. We would have to knock out their roads, trains, and depots. The question then becomes can we knock them out if they become armed with heavy ordinance such as the Buk Surface to Air Missile?

Minister Baek: “The feeling I have gotten from the meeting with the Vietnamese Vice President is that they want to remove the fascist militias but are indifferent to the communist militias. If we allow the Vietnamese and Thai to launch an attack, they may achieve the removal of the fascist militias, however, as Director Suh outlined in the report, with a vacuum the communists could surge. Putting us in a dangerous course of action with the risk of accidental conflict with Vietnamese and Thai forces if they use communist irregular forces. They have already asked if the KPA had personnel to use for a possible volunteer force. It would not be difficult to imagine that inspired Communists join the struggle they feel a part of in fighting fascists and supporting their proletariat brothers and sisters. Based on the minute notes from Minister Park’s conversation with Secretary Glass, the American position is to eliminate both factions. Which would be an optimal course of action. Given our levels of relations, we may however, be compelled to contribute our own ground personnel and participate in a ground offensive. But…if the Americans manage to convince their European allies to participate, we may be able to contribute to a wider coalition. Regardless, both attempts showcase foreign intervention and would ultimately increase the possibilities of a prolonged insurgency which would cause long-term instability in the region.

Regardless with all these options, the issues come with the impact on our ability to have a stable relationship with China and Russia. If we host foreign troops to intervene in the situation in the East it would give them the impression of their prior fears of reunification being a springboard for foreign countries into their frontiers. While we should not downplay the risks of either a fascist or communist expansionist regime on our doorstep. It was the Far East Republic and their fascist dogs that attacked and attempted to annihilate our liberation struggle. And a possible communist zone on our border could help create and fund an insurgency on our Northern border region.

None of the options we have at our table are good in all honesty. We must act based on the conditions set upon us. Kakao. I believe that our current course of action should be maintenance on the legitimacy of the Administration of Vladimir Putin and make it clear that any attempt by any non-state actor attempt to take control of the town of Kraskino, Kamsyhovy, Khasan we would intervene militarily to secure our border. In essence a 45km exclusion zone. Which would also allow us to act as a humanitarian point of entry, with supplies brought to Rason and then delivered to the exclusion zone protected by our forces. By acting in coordination with Moscow, any long-term risk posed by our support for an intervention would be mitigated. Primarily through Moscow’s political approval and support for these actions.

The other part of the rationale is to justify our actions. On one hand we would be doing so on the basis of our right to self-defense and outlining our right to take the necessary action as deemed appropriate and proportionate. On the other hand, we would also be able to justify our actions as a humanitarian basis on the basis that there is a genuine need to intervene to protect civilians. Primarily in line with the Right to Protect, a principle of the Global Assemblies predecessor the United Nations.

Pres. Advisor Kim: “Kakao. This approach is a different method that I would support. We are all in agreement that anyone other than the Russian Federation would pose a security risk to our border. This principle must be the foundation of the SCP Framework. I would support as part of our 45km exclusion zone the deployment of Russian Federation troops, a contingent no bigger than a battalion, supported by Korean troops as needed. We would provide logistical support and ensure that the 45km exclusion zone is protected. I would be delighted if they accept this proposal but I don't believe they will. Primarily because it would renege on possible agreements with the fascists, or, it would stretch limited personnel. I also think that the Russians want to avoid foreign troops to avoid looking weak or being taken advantage of.

At this point, the civil war is more of a social breakdown. Foreign troops would give different parties a rallying cry for illegitimacy and in a way, hurt the pride of the Russian Government. But even if they turn it down, we can in good conscience say that we tried and that we did not engage in rogue unilateral action without discourse. On that note, I also support the idea to implement OPLAN-620 with no modifications. These fascists are not a legitimate entity. Our actions constitute a response to the failures of neighboring States. I believe that if we are to have talks with the Russians on the situation, we should make it clear, of our red line. If they are working with the fascists then they can put some constraints on them. We will have to wait and see until then.

Director Moon: On this subject, we cannot go to Moscow unless we have a collective stance with the Americans and other nations. We’ve seen fractured opinions amongst the international community. Between Vietnam and America alone, ideas on what the intervention should accomplish are starkly different. This early on it is highly likely many parties do not want to pick a side and see them on the losing side.

That considered we cannot afford to have global community members being reluctant to act and give support to Moscow. We should present everything as a united front of support and avoid breaks in our support to Moscow. At the foundation, both the Americans and Vietnamese support Moscow. We can use that as our starting point on global support. If countries such as Brazil and Vietnam can bridge the gaps between the different moderate factions, then those remaining can be dealt with through a united Russian effort.

I have serious reservations about going under a foreign coalition and intervening. In the end the coalition will leave the region. We can not. We will be stuck with the effects of their actions. If instability continues, we will have to deal with the consequences. But, more devastating. It would continue to cause discomfort and harm to the lives of our Russian neighbors in the region.

I would also suggest we plan a maritime inspection point to conduct inspections of cargo vessels travelling to Vladivostok to inspect them for weapons and dual-use weapons. Primarily to ensure the basis of containment under the SCP framework. However, there are some arguments against such a proposal for its tedious and ineffectiveness. I would disagree with that sentiment. The inspection point would be useful to stop the flow of arms and with the Americans in the region we could share the burden of the maritime inspection zone.

Pres. Advisor Kim: “I would like a little time to look this over. Then we can discuss with the navy and planning elements on the operation as opposed to an immediate answer. Chairman Park, as former Chief of Naval Operations could you give us some insight on the possibilities of a naval inspection zone?”

Chairman Park: “I would likewise look to the navy to discuss this as opposed to respond immediately. There are also geopolitical impacts to consider if we enforce a maritime check as you alluded to earlier. While we plan without considering this, as the NSC, it would be relevant to explain that a naval check could pose a serious risk of inflammation. However, the navy has the capabilities of a deployment of corvettes and destroyers to create an inspection zone.

The Americans may be willing to do certain things beyond a naval check or may seek to avoid being a part of it all together. It depends on the mood of Washington. I do believe that the Americans can’t afford those in control of Vladivostok to acquire weapons from foreign suppliers. However, if we go to Washington with this before we have a plan of action or renege on an agreed plan of action we could jeopardize our security cooperation relations. I must be open, Mr. President. The naval inspection would be another form of active participation. One which we must be ready to accept and execute as firmly as possible”

Director Suh: “We can open informal dialogues with the Americans. But. As the minutes from Minister Park indicated. It is likely the Americans are planning to gather public support for their intervention at this stage. A naval checkpoint would necessarily be aligned with that. We can’t postpone any portion of OPLAN-620 or other discussions on the chance we see a change in plans.”

Director Moon: “We wouldn’t be postponing anything. However. Cooperation as an integral part of our foreign and security policy is crucial. I think we should, as Pres. Advisor Kim said, coordinate with the navy to come forward with a comprehensive plan for possible global approval for implementation. If the NIS comes with specific credible threats such as missile launchers or long-range weapons, we should act quickly and respond as needed. We all have lived through the experiences of the Korean War. We all know the hostage situation our country was in during the aggression period by the North. I don’t believe anything in any way is suggesting otherwise. We must ensure we do not become hostages again in our affairs.

Director Suh: “I concur with that. We must ensure that whatever actions are taken we are apart of the discussion. Ministers Park and Baek outlined that through their minutes. We have considerable attention. With OPLAN-620 enacted we can provide crucial data and increase our resourcefulness as a contributing member of the global community. I think regardless of the consequences, the mission would be a crucial and important act.”

Minister Baek: “Except the possible long-term implications on hour our neighbors see us. I agree. The plan is important and we should take it. However, let’s not downplay what else is being asked of us. Will we become a staging point for say American reconnaissance missions? Will the Vietnamese use us an airport to funnel troops and weapons to their communist militias and fight the Fascists? In the end. Every option before us proves one thing. Intervention is the outcome of all our actions. Are we accepting this as the basic premise of our SCP framework?”

Director Suh: “As we have seen. It was easy for foreign powers to meddle in Korean affairs for centuries. If we aren’t taken as a serious player, we will be taken as a moveable piece to play. I see no harm in this long-term implication of our capacity to alter the course of regional events. Perhaps then our neighbors will stop undermining us in every situation. The toughest situation for us is non-intervention. The SCP framework achieves all what we need in a limited involvement fashion. The alternative is having no plan to act upon. It is important we have a course of action with clearly defined red lines which we are ready to act upon.”

Minister Park: “There is a Russian border town directly in front of one of our cities. There are over twenty thousand Korean citizens working in Russia, not even the 150,000 ethnic Koreans in Russia. Involvement or not. We are going to be impacted. I agree with you, Minister Baek. We should not become a pawn. A pit stop for foreign fighters coming. Intervention is one thing on one hand. Maintenance of the post-intervention situation is another. Unilateral and unplanned action will get us destabilized situations as we've seen across the world.

The border zone is a crucial element we can not ignore. The flow of weapons is something we can not ignore. The proliferation of communists on our border is something we can not ignore. Yes. I understand all of these things require us to act. But. They require us to act as any legitimate state would. We’re not talking about the Soviet Union as a state as our neighbor. We’re talking about them as terrorists. We’re talking about them as fanatics.

The Russians want positive and strong relations with Korea. Let’s use that to our advantage and achieve the policy issues we’ve been hoping to discuss. Let’s build a common framework through the SCP with Russia to better manage the situation here. A civil war is bad. Really bad. If we can avoid it, let us avoid it. But. Let us not act with ignorance and run into any situation. Let’s know what we’re dealing with.”

Minister Roh: “Shortly after early morning, our electronic reconnaissance aircraft will begin its operation I understand. At least eight support aircrafts primarily escorts, will be in the air. The latest data indicates that the Naval and Ground Forces in Vladivostok have defected to the fascists cause. Do we know if they have aerial assets and if they can target our reconnaissance or escort planes?"

General Han: “No Minister. We are not aware of any aerial aircrafts deployed. However. The mission will clarify all their assets and capabilities. The E-767 can determine if they have access to SAMs, Missiles, Long-Range Ballistic Missiles, or any military platform with electronics. Although they could be turned off at the time of our operation. Aerial reconnaissance by MiG-25s will provide high quality images to examine their capabilities.

On the second point. Although the far east militias could have access to equipment to target our aircrafts. They lack the skills and training, in most cases to operate them. It is likely some of their forces are made up of experiences Russian soldiers and so, we can not underestimate their capabilities. They may intend on keeping them hidden and out of sight, or be moving them in preparations for an offensive against the communists. In either case, our dual-focus intelligence gathering mission will be effective in identifying and acquiring data as needed.

So far, the Russian government has not made a public statement regarding the defections and what was stolen. It is possible all government assets were stripped and shipped to the west where there are greater fears of escalated violence or foreign intervention. In the event of a military clash, our rules of engagement allow our pilots to engage and neutralize all aerial assets belonging to non-state actors. Our intelligence indicates they have limited means of reacting efficiently. For contextualization Minister. Our AIM-120C AMRAAM missiles have a range greater than 150km travelling at Mach 4 speed. Our AGM-88 HARM missiles have a range of 150km travelling at Mach 1.84. The probable air defense deployed, the Buk Surface to Air Missile system has a range of 50km. Although other assets exist, our KF-16s with their ALQ-119 Electronic Jamming Pod can scramble and limit the effectiveness of longer-range systems posing a threat."

President Kim: “General. Can you put everything into action quickly if we confirm it?”

General Han: “Yes sir. At this point the air space and naval space is not very active. We can get in, get out, within five to seven hours of launching.”
Director Moon: “If there are no objections. We can proceed with approving OPLAN-620 and conclude the NSC meeting on this topic for now. The situation will continue to evolve. As it does, the NSO will continue to update you as needed.”

The Council Members would review the OPLAN one last time before agreeing in consensus to approve the operation. General Han and Admiral Park would get up and excuse themselves to begin moving pieces into place. At the Operational Command, the integrated forces command would begin bringing together relevant subordinate commands for OPLAN-620. At the Blue House, the NSC concluded their final remarks and proceeded back to their regular tasks as the Ministers got back to responding to the emails. Minister Park would speak with President Kim privately, concerned with the situation and seeing it as a moment in which history would look back at them. Failing to act would be an act they could all live to regret. With high risks to civilians. President Kim laughed, in almost a victorious way as he looked at Minister Park and told him he had finally become an idealist like him. The Minister smiled and nodded his head. President Kim reassuring him he had no intention of letting a crisis of this magnitude be relegated to back burner discussions.


GA Member
Oct 3, 2018

As the Russian Civil War intensifies and renewed fighting broke out after a series of Communist successes, the Korean National Security Council would convene and emergency session with its top army officials. With the road to Vladivostok opened, the possibilities of a major victory for the Communists on the border was a startling development. Just a year after unification, such a victory could reinvigorate a dying communist struggle in the North of the country. Without many options, the Korean Government would have to take a course of action that was appropriate given the situation. Just months ago during the New Years celebrations, the Korean Government was met with the same challenge. In their experiences, they manage to prepare a clear solution.

Once again, the cities of Korea remained alit and at ease as in the dark, the Korean Government met to discuss once again a calamity of significant proportion. At the Blue House, members of the NSC arrived one after the other in a series of convoys. President Kim in Jeju was informed of the developments and would be given hourly updates. The march on Vladivostok complicated the matters. At the ROK Armed Forces Operational Command building, a line was opened with the Russian Government as the two sides discussed the situation in depth. Meanwhile, in Hanoi and Abuja, the Ministers of the NSC relevance were informed of the important discussions. National Security Director Moon Jaein would begin he sessions, after cameras took photos, the Blue House media team would leave the room and the closed session would begin.

Director Moon: “Thank you for attending this meeting. I wish to note for the record that as part of this meeting, senior officials of the ROK Armed Forces are present in the chambers to better assist the National Security Council in its deliberations on the current situation in Russia. Upon invitations, the five members of the ROK uniformed military will participate in the meeting. As per the NIS' latest intelligence, the Russian Government has lost effective control of the Far East. The NIS' assessment was confirmed in a private meeting between Chairman Park and the Russian National Defense Minister. It was confirmed that the Russian Government does not have the troops or resources to hold Vladivostok. With a few hundred armed militiamen without formal training, it is expected that once Communist forces regroup, they will push towards the city.

In their push, a number of issues will become prevalent. Primarily, a humanitarian catastrophe will hit the border. Approximately half a million people will be displaced from the violence. The region overall is home to 8.1 million residents. Under the previously approved SCP framework and the agreement between Russia and Korea regarding the safe zone, the possibilities of an intensive intervention is not currently possible. However. The rise of China and a corridor to be used for the flow of arms and weapons into the communist side proves a difficult challenge.

We have looked at the possibilities of a low-intensive conflict. Using special forces and airport to assist the defenders of Vladivostok in the defense of the city. Deploying armed fighter jets and a brigade of special forces, we would be able to keep a minimal footprint with low risks and help stall the fall of the Far East. The collapse of the main port in Vladivostok would be catastrophic. Our intelligence confirms that in the West, the Russian forces have made significant progress in pushing back the communists. However, this leaves the east exposed to continued assault. Director Suh, if you could please elaborate on the consequences of the fall of Vladivostok?"

Director Suh: "Thank you Director Moon. Should the situation in Vladivostok continue to dilapidate, the fall of the Far East is guaranteed. With the capture of Sino-Russian border crossings, the Korean-Russian border crossing, and the capture of Vladivostok, the Soviet resistance will be able to access three crucial points. It will be able to establish a corridor on land and sea. By land it will be able to resupply and launch a series of attacks against the Russian Government. It will also be able to use the thick vegetation and mountainous terrain to its advantage, limiting the use of Air Power and armored warfare which the Imperial Government has a significant advantage on. On sea, resupply could be achieved and much larger quantities of aid can be delivered to support the militias causes. Overall, the fall of Vladivostok would benefit which ever side captured it.

Under the following scenarios, the ROK Armed Forces would be required regardless to intervene. Primarily, to ensure that the border crossings are free from the control of non-state actors. Secondly, to quarantine the shipment of goods into Vladivostok to limit the proliferation of arms and lethal aid. Thirdly, the Korean Government would have to house approximately 400,000 to 1.2 million refugees. Our current capacities are aimed at 600,000 refugees. Half of our conservative estimate. Further camps may need to be constructed accordingly to house the fleeing populations. Thank you."

Director Moon: "Thank you Director Suh. I invite General Kim of the Forward Operational Command created under the SCP. General."

General Kim: "Thank you. As you can see, a preventive strategy is the best option at hand. Under the SCP framework, we can create a large enough space for a buffer zone and repulse any armed aggression on the site. However, it is not permanent. With the arrival of China, the SCP framework becomes flawed. The ability of communist insurgents to bypass the secure zone and rearm and resupply alone the Sino-Russian Border creates logistical challenges for the goals of the SCP, to contain, and secure. We believe that a low intensity option, deployment of 600 special operators and the use of F-15K and MiG-29 aircrafts is an appropriate size. Supported by 200 Air Force operators and rescue personnel, 500 maintenance and intelligence officers, and 2 advanced warning aircrafts and 2 advanced reconnaissance aircrafts. The task force would be able to assist and advice the Russian Government's defenders.

Under Operation Shikjo, we would be limiting overall exposure, limiting our involvement, and providing reasonable assistance to the Russian Government. Allowing the defenders of Vladivostok to resupply and rearm and stay in the fight gives the Russian Government more time to continue their offensives in central Russia. We can not change the course of the war without a significant deployment, but, we can help change its trajectory."

Deputy Prime Minister Park: "General Kim. Do you believe that resupplying via air and sea the Imperial Forces will be a viable option and limit our combat exposure accordingly?"

General Kim: "Deputy Prime Minister, under the SCP framework, Korean Forces will be physically inside the Russian Empire's territory. The deployment of a separate contingent would be bring further exposure correct. However it would not limit the overall combat exposure necessarily. Yes, using air and sealants to resupply Vladivostok is helpful, however, more than that, the forces guarding the city need training and moral. The mass routes across the region will have an impact."

Deputy Prime Minister Park: "How long do you believe we can hold Vladivostok General. Under this plan?"

General Kim: "Sir. We could with the requested troop count and AirPower help hold off the rebels for a period of six months to a year. Given the tide of the civil war, stalling their advance here would give momentum to the advances of the Russian Government in the West. We can help put a bandage on the wound, not heal it. I do not intend to imply we can solve this crisis, neither should we. While we can offer humanitarian assistance, our combat assistance will likely inflame sentiments. As a result, we proposed this plan accordingly and with a light footprint required."

Director Moon: "Thank you General. The situation requires a calm and collected response. To not do anything only endangers the lives of many. To do something also endangers the lives of many. What we know is that we have to act. The fall of Vladivostok must be adverted. For symbolic, strategic, and political reasons. We can coordinate an appropriate response with the Russian Government to better assist and prevent the fall of the city. However, President Kim's priority will be helping the people. Setting up the refugee camps and providing a safe zone is the priority. Fighting the rebels is a secondary."

General Ah: "We do agree with you Director. However, General Kim's points are reflective as you said, of the reality of the fall of Vladivostok. As well as the fears here of an insurgency growing in the North. Vladivostok may be a Russian city, but, it is a symbolic representative of the ongoing struggle. Which, we must all accept as a reality. The Chairman is currently discussing the SCP framework with the Russian Government, we would like to bring up the situation in Vladivostok and offer our military assistance. As you said, the priority should be helping refugees. By keeping the fighting away from the city, we will help people in many more ways."

Advisor Kim: "I do agree with General Ah's points. I think that we should try every option available. The symbolic defeat of the Empire would be catastrophic to our Government. Much less under the fragile circumstances. We are sandwiched between the Communist Chinese and Imperialist Japanese, instability in any part of the Peninsula is in none of our interests. I would recommend we ask the President to approve a modified plan for a smaller contingent of forces and with the option of air power at a later date. Our direct involvement will cause issues for Russia. It will put political pressure on the regime. We must be considerate of this as well. If we can get the Russian Government to approve, a force should be sent as soon as possible. I would recommend a smaller platoon of 230 men, supported by CCT and SART personnel from the Air Force. Additionally, we should consider a naval patrol to be deployed in the East Sea. As a preventive measure."

Director Moon: "If there are no objections, this will be our recommendation to President Kim." With no objections, the meeting would be concluded. Notes would be securely transmitted to the various ministers abroad and the President would be informed in real time regarding the developments. Meanwhile, in the Watchroom, the ROK Government monitored news and live feeds of the region to keep up to date. With the situation improving for the Russians, the Korean Government would continue to do its part and supply the Russian Armed Forces.