PKK | Operation Sun

[Jay]

OPERATION SUN
Security Classification: TOP SECRET

SITUATION REPORT

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OVERVIEW Over the past year, intensified surveillance and cross-border operations by Turkish forces have steadily constricted the maneuver space available to fighters of the People's Defense Forces and their associated formations. Persistent drone patrols, satellite monitoring, and periodic air strikes have disrupted traditional smuggling routes and safe transit corridors that once allowed personnel and matériel to move between mountain districts with relative ease. These pressures have forced commanders to reconsider how supplies are brought into operational areas. Weapons, explosives, and communications equipment that once flowed through long-established routes in the Qandil region now move more slowly and with greater risk. The problem is not merely logistical; it also affects the long-term sustainability of armed networks operating across several borders. If movement becomes predictable or confined to a single direction, adversaries can focus resources and eventually sever those routes entirely. Against this backdrop, regional leadership has sought to broaden its network of partners and staging areas. One potential partner lies across the Iranian frontier: the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), a Kurdish militant organization active inside Iran and historically linked to the same ideological and organizational ecosystem as the Kurdistan Workers' Party. While relations between the groups have existed for years, cooperation on logistics has remained inconsistent and limited by geography and mutual caution. Both sides operate under heavy pressure from the states surrounding them, and collaboration requires a degree of trust that is difficult to establish without shared operations. The Benar Valley plan is intended to address this gap. By creating a temporary disruption at an Iranian border outpost, commanders hope to open a brief but viable corridor through which weapons and supplies can be delivered directly to PJAK representatives. If successful, the operation would establish a proof of concept for future transfers and demonstrate that the two movements can coordinate across the frontier when necessary. In practical terms, it would also reduce reliance on routes currently exposed to Turkish surveillance.

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BELLIGERENTS

BLUFOR	OPFOR
Kurdistan Worker's Party HPG YJA-STAR Supported By: Kurdistan Free Life Party YRK	Kingdom of Èran Armed Forces of the Kingdom of Èran

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ORDER OF OPERATIONS

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• People's Defense Forces (HPG)
  • 32 fighters
    • Command Group
      • x 4 fighters
        • x 2 AKM
        • x 1 AK-74
        • x 1 AKS-74U
        • x 2 Portable radios
        • x 2 Medical backpack
        • x 1 Binoculars/map equipment
    • 1st Squad
      • x 9 fighters
        • x 5 AKM
        • x 2 AK-74
        • x 1 PKM
        • x 1 RPG-7
        • x 9 30mm VOG-17 pattern grenade
    • 2nd Squad
      • x 9 fighters
        • x 5 AKM
        • x 2 AK-74
        • x 1 PKM
        • x 1 RPG-7
        • x 9 30mm VOG-17 pattern grenade
    • 1st Recon Team
      • x 5 fighters
        • x 2 AKM
        • x 1 AK-74
        • x 1 AKS-74U
        • x 1 Dragunov SVD
        • x 4 30mm VOG-17 pattern grenade
    • 2nd Support / Weapons Team
      • x 5 fighters
        • x 3 AKM
        • x 1 PKM
        • x 1 AK-74
        • x 10 30mm VOG-17 pattern grenade
• Free Women's Units (YJA-STAR)
  • 24 fighters
    • Command Group
      • x 3 fighters
        • x 2 AKM
        • x 1 AK-74
        • x 2 Portable radios
        • x 2 Medical backpack
        • x 1 Binoculars/map equipment
    • 3rd Squad
      • x 7 fighters
        • x 4 AKM
        • x 1 AK-74
        • x 1 PKM
        • x 1 RPG-7
        • x 7 30mm VOG-17 pattern grenade
    • 4th Squad
      • x 7 fighters
        • x 4 AKM
        • x 1 AK-74
        • x 1 PKM
        • x 1 RPG-7
        • x 14 30mm VOG-17 pattern grenade
    • 2nd Recon Team
      • x 5 fighters
        • x 2 AKM
        • x 1 AKS-74U
        • x 1 Dragunov SVD
        • x 10 30mm VOG-17 pattern grenade
    • 4th Support / Weapons Team
      • x 3 fighters
        • x 2 PKM
        • x 1 Dragunov SVD
        • x 6 30mm VOG-17 pattern grenade

All fighters are fully loaded and equipped, carrying two weeks' worth of supplies and ammunition.

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CONFIDENTIAL MISSION OPERATION​ The operation centers on a limited-duration strike against an Iranian border outpost positioned along the approaches to the Benar Valley. The position serves as a lightly fortified observation and control point for the Kingdom of Eran Army, monitoring cross-border movement and acting as an early-warning node for Iranian forces operating along the frontier. Its isolation, limited reinforcement options, and dependence on a small garrison make it a viable target for a short, high-intensity engagement. The objective of the assault is not to permanently seize or destroy the installation but to temporarily disrupt its ability to monitor and respond along the sector. A coordinated attack by fighters from the People's Defense Forces and the Free Women's Units (YJA-STAR) will fix the outpost’s defenders in place and draw any nearby quick-reaction elements toward the engagement area. During this window of distraction, a separate infiltration element will move through the northern approaches of the valley to secure a prearranged drop site where weapons and explosives will be staged. Once the drop site is secured, representatives from Kurdistan Free Life Party will receive the materiel and begin transferring it to their own networks operating deeper inside Iranian territory. The corridor created by the attack is expected to remain viable only briefly; therefore, the exchange must occur quickly and without additional movement that could draw attention. The engagement itself is intended to be decisive but short. Heavy weapons and explosives will be used to overwhelm the outpost’s defensive positions and communications infrastructure, creating the impression of a larger offensive action while limiting the duration of direct contact. The assault force will disengage once the transfer has been confirmed and the infiltration team has cleared the valley. Following disengagement, all participating elements will withdraw along preplanned routes back toward the border regions where terrain and established movement corridors provide concealment. No attempt will be made to pursue Iranian forces or escalate the confrontation beyond the immediate objective. In strategic terms, the mission is designed to achieve several outcomes simultaneously: to establish a reliable cross-border logistics channel, to deepen operational ties with PJAK forces, and to demonstrate that coordinated action across multiple Kurdish militant networks remains possible despite increasing surveillance and military pressure in the region. BI NEPENÎ MÎSYONA OPERASYONÊ​

SECRET​ Operation Parameters​ Operational Window: 7 days Participating Forces: Elements of the People's Defense Forces and the Free Women's Units (YJA-STAR) Strategic Objective: Temporarily disrupt an Iranian frontier observation post operated by the IKingdom of Eran Army to create a short-duration logistics corridor for materiel transfer to the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). The operation is designed as a coordinated, multi-directional action conducted at night and intended to remain limited in duration. Units will move through the Benar Valley area in dispersed formations, approaching the objective from separate axes to divide the defenders’ attention while a supply transfer is completed nearby. The emphasis throughout the approach phase is stealth, discipline of movement, and avoidance of contact until the planned moment of engagement. Force Organization Strike Group 1 Assembly Point: 37.20244, 44.75759 Composition: 1st Squad 1st Recon Team 2nd Weapons Squad Role: Northern maneuver and containment element. After staging at the designated coordinate, Strike Group 1 will move east and then south along the ridgeline north of the target position. Recon elements will advance ahead of the formation to monitor patrol routes, confirm the outpost’s activity cycle, and identify any observation posts or early-warning sensors along the approach. Once in position north of the objective, this group will establish firing positions and remain concealed until the designated attack signal. At zero hour, they will initiate suppressive fire on the northern defensive positions and any elevated observation points, preventing defenders from maneuvering or withdrawing toward the higher terrain. Strike Group 2 Assembly Point: 37.16354, 44.77811 Composition: Command Squad 2nd Squad 4th Weapons Squad Role: Primary assault and logistics element. Strike Group 2 will approach the objective directly from the west along the most accessible valley route. Movement will occur slowly and primarily after nightfall to minimize detection by aerial observation or local patrols. The 2nd Squad will carry the weapons and supply packages designated for transfer to PJAK representatives. These materials must remain secured and concealed until the corridor is opened. The command element embedded with this group will coordinate timing between all three strike groups and monitor radio silence protocols. At zero hour, Strike Group 2 will conduct the main engagement against the outpost’s primary structures and communications nodes. The purpose of this attack is to fix the garrison’s attention and create the conditions necessary for the supply transfer team to move briefly into the designated handoff point. Strike Group 3 Assembly Point: 37.1469, 44.78339 Composition: Command Squad 3rd Squad 4th Squad 2nd Recon Team Role: Southern blocking and reinforcement element. Strike Group 3 will move north from the staging coordinate and establish concealed positions south of the objective. Their purpose is to observe the southern approach routes and prevent reinforcement from nearby patrols or checkpoints. Recon personnel will maintain surveillance of nearby roads, footpaths, and any vehicle movement. This group will not initiate contact until Zero Hour unless discovery is unavoidable. When the engagement begins, Strike Group 3 will open fire on southern defensive points and interdict any attempted withdrawal or reinforcement from that direction. Movement and Approach All groups will conduct movement exclusively under cover of darkness, halting during daylight hours in concealed terrain. Routes will avoid known villages, roads, and patrol paths whenever possible. Communications will be kept to the minimum necessary for coordination. Radio transmissions should be brief and coded; runners will be used where feasible to reduce signal exposure. Avoidance of contact remains a priority during the infiltration phase. Engagement prior to zero hour risks alerting the outpost and compromising the logistics transfer. If patrols are encountered during approach, units are instructed to bypass or withdraw rather than initiate combat unless escape is impossible. Engagement Phase The attack will commence at a prearranged Zero Hour once all three strike groups confirm that they are in position. The action is expected to be intense but brief. Strike Group 2 will initiate the main assault and suppress the communications infrastructure. Strike Group 1 will deliver supporting fire from the north to restrict defensive movement. Strike Group 3 will engage southern positions and secure the lower approaches for exfil. During this period, the logistics team will move the supply packages to the transfer site where PJAK representatives will receive them. The engagement will last only long enough to complete the transfer and disable the outpost’s ability to immediately pursue. Withdrawal Once confirmation of the supply exchange is received, all units will disengage and withdraw along preplanned routes back toward their staging regions. Withdrawal will occur in phases to prevent the appearance of a large retreating force. Fighters will maintain dispersion during exfiltration and regroup only once clear of the valley and observation corridors. Contingency Measures If the operation becomes untenable due to unexpected troop movements, aerial surveillance, or local detection, participating units are instructed to abort the engagement and disperse. Personnel may temporarily blend into nearby civilian settlements or agricultural areas to avoid pursuit. After the situation stabilizes, fighters will move individually or in small groups back toward base camp using established clandestine routes. Under no circumstances should the engagement escalate into a prolonged battle with Iranian forces. Preservation of personnel and the secrecy of movement corridors takes priority over completing the attack. Operational Timeline Day 1–2: Movement from base camps toward staging areas and reconnaissance of approach routes. Day 3–4: Establishment of forward hide sites and confirmation of outpost activity patterns. Day 5: Final coordination between strike groups and positioning around the objective. Night of Day 5 or 6: Execution of the assault and logistics transfer at zero hour. Day 6–7: Dispersed withdrawal and return to operational base areas.

END OF DOCUMENT DAWIYA BELGEYÊ​

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CAMPAIGN REGISTER

Operation	Objective	Status
Phase I	Move from base camps toward staging areas; conduct initial reconnaissance of approach routes; avoid detection; prepare for forward positioning.	In Progress
Phase II	Establish concealed hide sites near objective; confirm outpost activity patterns; finalize coordination and positioning for Zero Hour assault.	Planned
Phase III	Execute coordinated attack at Zero Hour; fix outpost defenders; suppress communications; complete supply transfer to PJAK; maintain multi-directional pressure.	Planned
Phase IV	Disengage and exfiltrate along preplanned routes; avoid contact; disperse if necessary; return to base camps.	Planned

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