[Sweden]: Operation Rutile

[Connor]

OPERATION RUTILE SWEDISH ARMED FORCES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

---

OFFICIAL OPERATION ORDER
JANUARY 2000
TOP SECRET​

---

Situation Report
Over a period of several months the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters, following instruction from the Department of Defence, has actively been monitoring the situation in the Middle East particularly involving Turkey, Israel and Palestine but also encompassing that of Saudi Arabia and Congo. The situational report, whilst hostile, has consisted primarily of threats rather than real action however this has changed. The rapidly evolving violence of the Turkish Armed Forces has now began to infringe on democracy, rule of law, human rights and global peace and security thus prompting the requirement for Operation Rutile. Whilst in it's infancy the operation will primarily be surrounding contingency planning and intelligence gathering, it will forever remain the primary operation for a Swedish response in the Middle East should the situation continue to escalate.

Belligerents

Kingdom of Sweden State of Israel United States of America United Kingdom Canada Commonwealth of Australia Russian Empire

v.

Republic of Turkey Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Objective(s)
OR/1/PP/00 - COMPLETE - Primary maintenance tasks, pre-deployment ammunition provision and supply of essential services/assets.
OR/1/TR/00 - COMPLETE - Tactical relocation of assets, designated as part of the Preliminary Intelligence Strategy, to the Mediterranean Sea.
OR/1/TS/00 - COMPLETE - Deployment of transit security assets from the Baltic Task Group to prevent interference with the aforementioned tactical relocation.
OR/2/TR/00 - CANCELLED - Tactical relocation of assets, designated as part of the Ballistic Missile Preparedness, to the Mediterranean Sea.
OR/1/AD/00 - ACTIVE - Coordination with planned and actively deployed assets of the United Coalition via Headquarters in Washington DC, United States.
OR/1/IN/00 - ACTIVE - Monitoring of potential aerial, surface and subsurface threats in the Mediterranean Sea alongside interception of hostile SIGINT.
OR/2/TS/00 - ACTIVE - Preliminary security of intelligence gathering assets in the Mediterranean Sea by means of phase one frigate.
OR/3/TR/00 - CANCELLED - Tactical relocation of aerial assets to RAF Akinori.
OR/4/TR/00 - COMPLETE - Tactical relocation of 1st Carrier Battle Group from Operation Omphacite governance to the Mediterranean Sea.
OR/2/TS/00 - COMPLETE - Deployment of transit security assets (replenishment) from Marion Island Naval Base to support prolonged operations.
OR/5/TR00 - ACTIVE - Recall of deployed assets to homeport or base following conclusion of ongoing operations.

Casualty Report
Nothing to report

Campaign Register
Preliminary Intelligence Strategy (Jan '00 - present)
Ballistic Missile Preparedness
Carrier Battle Group Operations (Feb '00 - present)

---

Deployment

3rd Naval Warfare Flotilla [Berga NB] Naresuan-Class Frigate 150-2​ HSwMS Ekathotsarot​ [150x] Active Personnel [2x] RHIB​ Dupuy-de-Lôme Intelligence Vessel 108-1​ HSwMS Tyr​ [108x] Active Personnel [1x] RHIB​ X X

---

Copyright © Swedish Armed Forces, Kingdom of Sweden
All information is subject to the Swedish Document Classification and Security Act 1995​

 

[Connor]

TOP SECRET
Bon Voyage
January 2000

Recent talks between the Israeli Ministry of Defence and the Swedish Department of Defence has subsequently granted access to live feed HUD camera footage showing Israeli Air Force aircraft having intercepted a non-compliant incommunicable Turkish Air Force fighter jet making use of weapons systems in international waters and later crossing into Israeli airspace. The decision by the Israeli Air Force to shoot down the aircraft was a ballsy one, especially considering their reservations to escalate the use of force against the potentially hostile aircraft; nonetheless this decision was respected by the National Security Council whom convene at the instruction of the Prime Minister of Sweden to oversee the Middle East Conflict, identify threats to the national interests of Sweden, her partners and allies as well as to strategise for the most appropriate response. One thing was for certain however, and that was the likelihood of Turkey using the downing of it's fighter jet as casus belli for a planned and sustained attack against the State of Israel.

Operation Rutile, in conjunction with the United Coalition, was a go.

Berga Naval Base was the home port of the phase one deployment for this operation: HSwMS Tyr, a Dupuy-de-Lôme Intelligence Vessel, and HSwMS Ekathotsarot, a Naresuan-Class Frigate. Both of which would begin the preparation phase of their deployment which would see them fully refuelled for their voyage as well as stocked with essentials for crew welfare and safety. In addition each vessel would undergo a complete 'top-to-bottom' assessment of all onboard electronics, mechanics, systems, sensors, countermeasures and weapons systems; they would not be permitted to leave port unless they were signed off as fully competent for hostile operations.

HSwMS Ekathotsarot would see an ammunitions delivery fully supplying the onboard 127mm Mk45 Mod 2 naval gun, two 30mm MSI-DSL DS30MR automated small calibre guns, the eight cell Mk41 VLS, eight SSM launchers and two torpedo tubes. A supply room would also be fully stocked. HSwMS Tyr would also see an ammunition delivery fully stocking the two 12.7mm M2 Browning machine guns, with a small stock room similarly stocked.

Despite there being no intelligence to suggest a Turkish presence in the Baltic Sea or even on the planned phase one transit route, the Baltic Task Group, Task Unit Hotel would be deployed for the security escort of the vessels through to the North Sea. This Task Unit consists of eight CB90-Class Fast Assault Craft which would leave the Port of Nynäshamn to coincide with the vessels deployment.

Operational objective OR/1/TR/00 and OR/1/TS/00 were moved into operation. Ships companies would be called onboard and the vessels would depart via transit routes JP > JO > IN > IM > JM > KM. The Israeli Ministry of Defence are informed that Operation Rutile, a deployment as part of the United Coalition, had been deployed however the specifics were redacted and remain TOP SECRET in line with the Swedish Document and Security Act 1995.

As a gesture of good intent the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence is informed of the deployment which will see it pass through the English Channel and Gibraltar; they too would be informed of Operation Rutile and it's integration to the United Coalition however the specifics also redacted. A request was made to the British for the vessels to be permitted opportunity to refuel in Gibraltar; if accepted, their class and type would be disclosed.

Zak Jamie

 

[Connor]

TOP SECRET
Land Ahoy
January 2000

The journey to the Mediterranean Sea went largely without a hitch, throughout the journey the crew would enact various training drills such as the identification and response to hostile aircraft, sensor monitoring, fire alarm and suppression, system failures and tactical navigation. Most of the journey would take place through international waters however should there be a requirement to pass through foreign territorial waters they would do so in a peaceful manner in conjunction with the Law of the Sea. The vessels themselves would work well in unison, making use of encrypted communications in order to stay in contact. With the British offering replenishment to coalition forces via the Pentagon, Washington DC, the vessels would take advantage of Gibraltar to refill their tanks and stocks before continuing to their rendezvous point.

This was the first time HSwMS Tyr had been deployed in a genuine intelligence gathering capacity however this was not the first time the Swedish Royal Navy had taken part in similar missions in the past, with Operation Boron being the centre piece laying the foundation of tactics used during missions of this kind. The personnel would all, throughout the long journey around continental Europe, receives numerous up-to-date briefings on the threats surrounding Operation Rutile as well as refreshed directives from the Department of Defence laying out the cabinets expectations.

Given the substantial threat to coalition maritime forces in the Mediterranean Sea the crew of both vessels would maintain a heightened level of security pending the deployment of further combative assets. In the meantime HSwMS Tyr would remain fairly stationary whilst in range of the Turkish coastline in order to begin the collation of intelligence from aerial, surface and subsurface identified assets - in the command centre the teams would proactively monitor systems for any anomalies.

 

[Connor]

TOP SECRET
Braving the Waves
February 2000

On the rise of the sun Durban Naval Base in South Africa rapidly became a hive of activity as the temporarily stationed Carrier Battle Group 1, stationed at the facility as part of Operation Pyrite requirements in the region, were given new orders by the Department of Defence; their commitment to operational objective OR/4/TR/00. The strike group was extensively outfit to be a highly material asset to the ongoing efforts in the Middle East to coincide with deployments by the coalition. The Carrier Battle Group, the only one of its kind within the Swedish Royal Navy, consisted of a Kitty Hawk-class Aircraft Carrier (HSwMS Carl XVI Gustaf (A01)), two Naresuan-class Frigates (HSwMS Naresuan (F01) and HSwMS Songtham(F02)), a Sachsen-class Frigate (HSwMS Sachsen (F16)), four Brandenburg-class Frigates (HSwMS Hesse (F08), HSwMS Saxony (F09), HSwMS Saarland (F10), HSwMS Hamburg (F11)), a Koster-class Mine Countermeasures Vessel (HSwMS Ven (M01)) and the newest addition to the fleet; a Collins-class Submarine (HSwMS Stefenson (S15)).

As part of usual preparation measures all vessels would receive a full system, sensor and weapons analysis prior to deployment to ensure everything was in safe working order for the mission ahead. Each vessel would be adequately stocked with the required essentials to maintain basic crew health and safety on deployment; this was in addition to a full ammunition and missile stock to ensure all outfit weapon systems and countermeasures were in an operational condition.

HSwMS Carl XVI Gustaf would also be joined by Carrier Air Wing One consisting of a grand total of thirty McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, ten Northrop Grumman EA-6B Prowler, five Grumman C-2 Greyhound, twelve Sikorsky MH-60R Seahawk and seven Sikorsky MH-53M Pave Low IV. The aircraft carrier would also be stocked with adequate amounts of ammunition and missiles to outfit the aircraft onboard with a variant of compatible armaments and countermeasures dependant on the dynamic situation once in position within the Mediterranean Sea. All aircraft are also fully fuelled and checked as part standard flight protocols to ensure all equipment is in safe working order.

With HSwMS Naresuan and Songtham leading the Carrier Strike Group the fleet would make their way towards the Suez Canal for the first phase of the campaign; a show of force to Saudi Arabia following their recent declaration of war with the intention to display the might, power and outreach of the coalition. Whilst traversing the Suez Canal was completely lawful in its current state and the intention was not to antagonise a response from the Saudi Arabian military it was almost certainly a declaration of Sweden's intention and commitment to the coalition in the Middle East. HSwMS Carl XVI Gustaf would remain surrounded by the remaining frigates and closely followed by the submarine and mine countermeasures vessel forming part of the group. Together they would traverse the Indian Ocean towards the Arabian Sea via transit route KG > LH > MI with the intention to refuel in Diego Garcia.

Alongside this deployment Etna-Class Replenishment Oiler and Logistic Support Ship, HSwMS Vesuvius (O02), would also see deployment from Marion Island Naval Base towards Diego Garcia of the same transit route; prior to which she would also see the same stock and system checks as the rest of the fleet.

 

[Connor]

TOP SECRET
Fierce Bottle Neck
February 2000

A fleet eleven strong would make quite the front as they rapidly approach the Suez Canal via transit route LJ > LK > KL > KM. By this point the vessels would not only be testing the response from Saudi Arabia but sailing right past their coastal border with one of the largest Swedish Royal Navy deployments ever to traverse the canal. Needless to say the sensors and systems of each and every essential vessel would be actively monitoring surface, sub-surface and potential aerial threats which may compromise the integrity of the mothership; HSwMS Carl XVI Gustaf. On their way through the Arabian Sea the aircraft carrier would burst into life on the flight deck as preparations for the deployment of three aircraft from within the Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron 11 begins. The aircraft would quickly be wheeled out to the appropriate VTOL position whilst engineers conducted the necessary pre-flight checks of systems, sensors, weaponry, countermeasures and the airframe itself prior to the air crew taking their seats. Personnel would begin the full refuelling of the aircraft which had been assigned call signs ALADDIN-ONE to THREE for their mission. Within a matter of moments the aircraft would be boarded by their crew of four.

Following permission of the ATC onboard the aircraft carrier and the support of the ground crew, one the helicopters were fired up a groundsman would begin to raise his arms into the air, almost as if he here summoning the devil onto the deck of the aircraft carrier. To the pilot however this was his permission to begin takeoff, bringing the aircraft slowly off the deck of the aircraft carrier and into the air where it would remain until further instruction was given. Once the groundsman had checked the air surrounding the ship the aircraft would be given permission to bank off to the left and out into the sky where it would fly through the rest of the Carrier Battle Group towards the Suez Canal on reconnaissance. This would be repeated twice more with the second and third aircraft making their way to Saudi territory waters to identify potential threats to the fleet way before they'd ever get to them. All aircraft would be contactable by foreign forces via the usual channels however internal communications amongst themselves remain encrypted.

VBCFan

 

[Connor]

TOP SECRET
Ready and Waiting
February 2000

Having successfully navigated the Suez Canal without being impeded or even contacted by potential enemy forces the Carrier Battle Group would continue onwards to rendezvous' with the British and United States assets already in position within the Mediterranean Sea. Throughout the movement through the contested waters the teams on board would actively monitor sensors, systems as well as visually obtained intelligence in order to gain a better picture on the military assets deployed into the essential waterways, of which there appeared to be none.

The aircraft deployed under the callsigns 'ALADDIN' would be immediately recalled upon successful transit through the canal where ground crews would carefully guide the aircraft back into a suitable VTOL position on the carriers deck before securing the airframe to the ground and enabling the complete shutdown of the aircraft before the crew alight for debrief within the appropriate rooms. Whilst awaiting further instruction from the United Coalition, all intelligence surrounding the Suez Canal would be forwarded to the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters for appropriate dissemination.

 

[Connor]

TOP SECRET
OR/2/FB/00
March 2000

With the sanctions announced and actively in place with the Swedish Department of Defence, Defence Business Administration, which actively prevents the distribution of defence materiel (including products, parts, systems, sensors and radars) provided by both domestic Swedish organisations and foreign organisations presently under majority Swedish ownership, evidently lot limiting the attempts of Turkey to continue funding their war effort the decision was made to activate OR/1/FB/00. This objective was a highly classified planned operation for sustained attacks against key Turkish targets alongside ongoing efforts by both the British and United States. These targets are specifically chosen to target military installations which directly effect the integrity of Swedish interests and that of her allies, friends and partners. Cyprus was a key concern for the Department of Defence given the far superior strategic advantage this would give the Turkish and the extensive history suggesting an invasion of British-held territory was almost certainly on the table. This decision was also coupled with the clear attempts by the government in Turkey to damage the reputation of Sweden with their prolonged propaganda via social media, attempts to unlawfully raid organisations of Swedish majority ownership following the announced embargo as well as the continued attempts to endlessly produce military-grade equipment despite crippling debt effecting their people.

HSwMS Carl XVI Gustaf remain ready and waiting and ground crews on the carrier begin the lining up of McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet which remain a key part of the deployable air assets onboard. A total of ten Hornet's from Strike Fighter Squadron 11 were due to be deployed. All aircraft prior to takeoff would undergo a full safety inspection as well as the checking of systems, sensors and countermeasures to ensure they were fully operational, this included the checking of hard points and inbuilt defence systems; they would all be fully fuelled and ready for prolonged active flight. Every aircraft would be equipped in exactly the same manner with two AGM-84H/K Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response cruise missiles and two AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles on the wingtips. The only differentiation would be the equipping of four aircraft with two AGM-84 Harpoon missiles whilst the remaining six were equipped with two AIM-7 Sparrow missiles. One at a time each of these aircraft would make their way to the catapult where, with the precision deployment of the onboard Air Traffic Control tower and personnel on the ground, would ensure that each of these aircraft, crewed with their appropriate complement of trained fighter pilots, would soar into the air where they would make best speed towards their first targets from the Coalition Coordination Center gathered intelligence; Adana and Incirllik Air Bases. All of these facilities were not only of strategic importance to any attack of Cyprus but also a potential risk to the integrity of Israeli national security. They would travel carefully and cautiously within the KM sector.

Given intelligence suggesting an extensive Turkish defence structure over the south coast, which sits as part of Phase I of the coalitions efforts, the deployment were heavy in their monitoring of onboard systems and sensors whilst also making directly to their first target in Adana. The travel time was fairly short from the aircraft carrier to the first target and throughout the journey the ten aircraft would fly in a staggered triangular formation giving each of them the opportunity for evasive manoeuvres which they had undoubtedly rehearsed countless times in the part in preparation for a real wartime scenario. It was no secret that the Turkish Navy were out in force and intelligence gathered by the Department of Defence showed clear intent for the further production of an extensive fleet of modernised frigates which hosted a potential risk to the airborne fighting force thus their altitude was maintained high enough for fuel efficient flight but also that of detectable range for incoming missiles or threats.

The journey was short ands primarily over international waters which was fortunate for the pilots governing the movement of the aircraft. It was abundantly obvious that any Air Force Base would have some form of defensive capability even with the position having been targeted by coalition forces prior to the Swedish deployment. Nonetheless as the aircraft drew closer five of the armed aircraft would begin descending in altitude as they approached the position of the Adana Air Force Base at a distance of approximately 200km to ensure they were within the range of capable missiles equipped to the hard points but also at a distance to not only detect incoming fire but also giving the pilots the time to deploy countermeasures.

The ten aircraft would split in two seamlessly for the first target, governed by two separate callsigns, remaining in constant communication amongst themselves and with the aircraft carrier via heavily encrypted channels.

Once in range of Adana Air Force Base the aircraft would release a barrage of a full total of ten cruise missiles all with slightly different coordinates governing their planned landing spread across the aircraft of the base and identified hangars of key interest which were strewn across the southern and northern ends of the runways end. Within literally minutes an unsuspecting deadly rain of explosions would litter the base, further destroying the air strip and causing devastating damage to the remaining infrastructure on the base. This would come as an unexpected further bombing raid on the base and cause significant military casualties as presumably there would be ongoing attempts to remove the base from the initial bombing raid conducted by the British.

Meanwhile the further five aircraft would have continued onwards to Incirllik Air Base where a similar attack would take place, these strikes again being made at a strategic distance whilst causing a devastating impact of key coordinates - the focus again being the airstrip and this time the vast apron on the southern end of the airfield which undoubtedly hosted a wide selection of military aircraft.

Immediately following their attacks the aircraft would, to the best possible speed, build the altitude once again and make at best possible speed for the aircraft carrier where they would make their landing and conduct the necessary post-lfight checks and refuelling. All crews would conduct the necessary debriefing process whilst they awaited a damage analysis. Information of the strike would be sent to the British in the hope their intelligence assets could complete this analysis.

Axis12 Jamie

 

[Axis12]

F-16CJ of the 16th Joint Strike Wing from Incirlik AFB would advance against the incoming threat.
​

Following the take off of the 91st Squadron which were en route to intercept the British Jets, twenty F-16CJ Block 50D from the 16th Joint strike wing which were preparing to take off to assist the Chengdu J-10As in their mission to eliminate the suspected British fighters would be diverted to a new target.
Southeastern Aerial radar with a range of 470km would begin to pick up at least ten combat aircraft detected coming from the south with trajectories indicating a likely path to be South eastern Turkey. The 16th Joint strike wing aircraft after being checked over several minutes after the launch of the 91st Elite Fighter Wing would still have time to respond to the incoming unidentified threats which were not in range for any known cruise missiles or other long range missile systems.

Each of the deploying 20 F-16CJ would be armed with 4x AIM-9 Sidewinders, 4x AIM-120 AMRAAM, 1x 20mm M61A1 Vulcan cannon, 1 x AN/ALQ-131 ECM Pod, and a SUU-42A/A flare system. The Squadron would take off two at a time for a minute before forming up into four finger four formations which would begin condensing into an offensive stance with about a 1,000 feet upwards difference between the two squadrons. The F-16s would arm their AN/ALQ-131 and prepare to look out for any long range air to air missiles as they approached the unknown 10 Aircraft which would suddenly split into two groups at about 100km away from the 16th Squadron which would under orders from command break off into two squadrons which would maintain two finger four formations with two f-16 on the outside of the group in a combat spread to defend against attacks from above if any.

The F-16CJs now closing in on the F-18s of of the Swedish Air Force would continue until the F-16s were at a distance of 75km and in range with their AIM-120B Missiles. The F-16s of each group would unload two AIM-120B For each F-18 and then within 10 seconds fire another salvo of AIM-120 Missiles at each of the Swedish fighter jets after they would use their suspected countermeasures to defend against the first attack. Since its not stated that the aircraft are equipped with ECM pods which take up a hard-points which are instead being used by missiles at this time, the only defenses the Swedish F-18s would have are their flares which can only hold so many decoys before they run out. After the firing of the first two salvos from A and B squadrons the F-16s would maintain their current heading at a distance of 50km and well out of range of any air to air weaponry the Swedes have and fire a final two AIM-120B missiles at the Swedish F-18s to finish them off. If their were continued signals from the enemy squadron the F-16s would continue to advance with their ECMs still on and prepare for a dogfight. In the case that there were no continued signals from the aircraft the F-16s would return to Incirlik AFB and refuel/reload with the same armament and begin takeoff procedure to assist in any attacks on Turkey.

Back on the mainland the 4x HQ-9, 1x S-300, and 1x MIM-104 Block 2 Patriot systems would await for any possible missiles fired from any of the unknown aircraft advancing from the south. Each system would overlap and fire two missiles at each incoming target if seen to ensure not a single missile could get through to damage the extremely important airfields which were being presently evacuated to farther inland bases to ensure cruise missile attacks are out of range.
Connor

 

[Connor]

TOP SECRET
OR/2/FB/00
April 2000

Intelligence gathered by the coalition was by this stage extensive and it was clearly noted that the southwestern radar facility noted, which was presumably 'ADR 8' was not only operating with no structured personnel in position but also operating with no structured radar. On this basis it would be impossible for the intercepting Lockheed Martin F-16CJ Block 50D aircraft from the 16th Joint Strike Wing to have ever detected the aircraft flying over Cyprus and ultimately lower Turkey for their hostile run over the desired targets. Given the lack of detection the aircraft deployed would continue without interference or interception however it should be noted that the operated McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet has in-built electronic countermeasure capability albeit with the capability to equip ECM pods to a hard point as required.

the bombing run would be considered a substantial success as the cruise missiles would now render the facility almost unusable with the substantial majority of the hangars and airfield now completed destroyed in conjunction with efforts made by the United States and Great Britain. The basis combined hosted at least twenty Lockheed Martin F-16CJ/DJ Block 50D/52D, thirty five General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark, thirty FMA IA 58 Pucará, two McDonnell Douglas KC-10 Extender, two Embraer 145 AEW&C, twenty five Mil Mi-17 and fifteen Eurocopter Tiger HAD that without credible intelligence or ongoing operation deployment would be none-the-wiser of the vast incoming bombardment and would see considerable losses due to be reported by the Turkish Armed Forces.

Immediately following their attacks the aircraft would, to the best possible speed, build the altitude once again and make at best possible speed for the aircraft carrier where they would make their landing and conduct the necessary post-flight checks and refuelling. All crews would conduct the necessary debriefing process whilst they awaited a damage analysis. A complete aircraft safety check would be completed of each of the aircraft in order to identify any damage incurred as a result of the hostile mission which may damage the integrity of the aircraft for ongoing planned missions. Each aircraft would again be reloaded with the same armament: two AGM-84H/K Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response cruise missiles and two AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles on the wingtips. The only differentiation would be the equipping of four aircraft with two AGM-84 Harpoon missiles whilst the remaining six were equipped with two AIM-7 Sparrow missiles.

Axis12

 

[Connor]

TOP SECRET
New Dawn
May 2000

Following the collapse of the Turkish regime and discussion within the United Coalition Coodination Centre, orders would be made by the Department of Defence to recall all but essential assets back to their homeport or base in accordance with ongoing commitments. This would essentially include all deployed assets, excluding those of the 3rd Naval Warfare Flotilla whom will remain as part of an ongoing task force to ensure the appropriate appointment of a democratically appointed government in line with international law to ensure the longevity of a new Turkey.

Operation Rutile will remain active until the task force are stood down.

 

[Connor]

TOP SECRET
Operation Termination
September 2000

Order issued by the Department of Defence would see the immediate disbanding of Operation Rutile, noting its' substantial success in securing international borders, human rights and democracy. All and any remaining materiel would be ordered back to home port or alternate operation deployment in accordance with any subsidiary orders. Following a review the operation will remain at 'TOP SECRET' classification in accordance with the Swedish Document Classification and Security Act 1995.