[Turkey] Seizure of Swedish Assets in Turkey

[Axis12]

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Major Figures​ President Devlet Bahçeli Minister General Hulusi Akar Intelligence Commander Ayaz Ülmut Officer Kutlu Aktaş​ Prime Minister of Sweden Stefan Löfven Swedish Secretary of Defense Peter Hultqvist Swedish Roketsan Executives In Turkey ​

Seizure of Swedish Assets in Turkey- 2000 Operation Participants: Gendarmerie Forces of the Republic of Turkey Top Secret/Secure Information

Operation Background

Short Overview: Following the completely unacceptable blocking of the production of the J600T III Missiles it has been decided by the Ministry of Defense and Finance to seize all assets of Sweden within Turkey By the Gendarmerie Police Forces. This is expected to cause significant damage to Swedish shares in the companies and irreversibly damage the Swedish economy which has spent so much in Turkish Industries. The goal Of the operation will to seize offices, manufacturing plants, and Swedish civilian assets that are owned by the Swedish Government and occupy them, this will prevent the production of any of these weapons by Sweden permanently. This includes the following companies that are majority owned by Sweden: ROKETSAN, TURKISH AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES, and ASELSAN A.S. The total estimated value of Swedish stake in these companies amounts to $32,752,376,200 USD. The company faculties will be held hostage along with any Swedish Citizens working within these companies until the shares of these companies(Allows for the production of the Products) Are sold by Sweden to Turkey for little to no price, they would then be taken off the international market and re-unified with the state Defense Industries Corporation. Force is permissible for any actions against Turkish forces, and additionally Turkish citizens working within these companies will be compensated until work returns.

Deployed Forces

As of 01/05/2000 Gendarmerie Force Deployment Designation Personnel Equipment Base of Operation 5th Gendarmerie Combat Battalion 1000x 15x Condor 4x4 20x Otokar Akrep Adana (Deployed to Aselsan Faculties in Yenimahalle) 2nd Gendarmerie Police Battalion 1000x 200x Renault Police Vehicle Ankara (Deployed to Roketsan Faculties) 6th Gendarmerie Combat Battalion 1000x 30x Condor 4x4 30x Otokar Akrep Istanbul (Deployed to Turkish Aerospace Faculties in Ankara)

Logistics

Ground Details Condor 4x4 APC 45x Fully Fueled, loaded, etc 1 x 20mm Canon, 7.62 mm Gun Otokar Akrep. 50x Fully Fueled, loaded, etc 1 x 7.62 mm Gun Renault Police Vehicle 1999 200x Fully Fueled, loaded, etc N/A Infantry Details Standard Infantry 2900x Heckler & Koch G41 Assault Rifle, 3000x Glock 19 Sidearm, 100x Heckler & Koch HK21 Machine Gun, 50x McMillan TAC-50 Sinper Rifle, 9x RPG-7 Rocket propelled Grenade, Standard Smoke Grendades and Other Standard Equipment. Total Personnel: 3,000 Gendarmerie Infantry 200 MIT Command Operation Area: KM, KN Bases: Adana Military Installation, Ankara Gendarmerie Headquarters, Istanbul Gendarmerie Base

 

[Axis12]

Gendarmerie raid the company headquarters due to ‘illegal’ business practices​

The Gendarmerie forces were on the move, deploying from their bases with directives to seize all Swedish owned companies in Turkey and cripple the Swedish economy after their relentless effort to ensure the world believes that Turkey is some sort of 3rd world nation which it clearly is not.
The Troops would leave their barracks well supplied and armed to the teeth with Rifles, Machine Guns, and the standard equipment that would be used to kill or capture any Swedes hiding out in the factories or offices. Lining up in formation Eight Infatry each would enter the Akrep armored cars loaded and fueled completely, the vehicles then would then begin moving out under escort of Condor APCs which were loaded and fueled along with being crewed by 14 Infantry each. The 5th Gendarmerie Battalion was the first to roll out in a long line of armored vehicles that would drive down the highway and roads to Aselsan facilites in Yenimahalle. 370 Infantry would be loaded into the cars while the rest would remain at bases or in headquarters to manage the situation.
The same activities would occur 2nd and 6th battalions who would advance in broad daylight towards the offices.

With police lights and sirens on the Gendarmerie Infantry would surround all three of the manufacturing and office centers for the Swedish companies and point their Akrep 20mm turrets at the entrances and exits of the buildings so that none could escape. The infantry would rush out of the back of the Condor APCs and Akrep AVs and prepare to enter the buildings with their G3 Rifles loaded for combat. They would all have warrants for the arrest of all senior staff due to corruption and tax evasion charges that were clearly fabricated. Bursting through the doors of the faculties they would deploy smoke grenades(Infantry would have gas masks) and begin rounding up staff while sweeping the buildings for any Swedish Executives. Blueprints and other high value targets would be seized as long as there was no interference by the Swedish.
The buildings would all be completely secured and production halted for anything the Swedish government may be working on. Records for Swedish productions including the production of Several J600 SRBMs would be acquired and this information sent to HQ for analysis.

A statement on state TV later in the night would state that the companies have be acquired by the Turkish Government and are no longer under the control of the Swedish Government due to rampant tax evasion and illegal monopolistic tactics by the companies. All high level private Turkish citizens would sell their stock in the company and it was expected that this would bring a major stock crash for ROKETSAN, TURKISH AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES, and ASELSAN A.S who were all owned majority by Sweden on the International market.
Connor

 

[Connor]

Wipe Your Feet
March 2000

Sweden is the major shareholder for a substantial portion of the global defence market not otherwise engulfed in the Nexus or Sparrow conglomerates and as such operates a wide variety of facilities, offices and manufacturing plants around the world which includes the infrastructure surrounding day-to-day operation of Roketsan, Turkish Aerospace Industries and Aselsan A.S; all of which operate in Turkey. Naturally recent tension has put these organisations in a state of uncertainty but nonetheless their operations continue in their home state. Roketsan currently operate three separate properties in and around Ankara whilst Turkish Aerospace Industries operate three properties in and around Ankara (one of which is an education establishment) as well as a further subsidiary manufacturers in Eskişehir and two in Gebze. Aselsan A.S meanwhile also hosts a total of nineteen properties dotted around Turkey. This totalled approximately twenty eight properties to be struck, in unison.

Some of these facilities were vast in size, naturally as a result of their expansive production requirements and local legal requirements to meet defence contracts thus the arrival of the Gendarmerie infantry were met in a somewhat timely fashion with observing security officers noting their arrival at security gates, locked doors and sweeping CCTV cameras dotted throughout the facilities. This naturally caused concern and prompted a vast security lockdown procedure as Management on-site began the selective protection of all staff. It should be noted however that whilst these organisations are owned by Sweden, the Department of Defence does not overtly ship in Swedish slaves to operate the factories. For the overwhelming majority of these facilities the employment of hard working Turkish labourers from a variety of trades ensure the daily running of these facilities whilst the occasional Swedish executive would sweep by to integrate an understanding in the business which, understandably, had become much less often considering the total travel ban and diplomatic mission closures issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs newly appointed Office of Global Coordination and in conjunction with the Bureau for European Affairs.

Nonetheless, these were defence industry facilities and as such had the appropriate security requirements to meet domestic law and the reasonable protection of often highly dangerous material within them. As such a total lockdown made these buildings almost fortress-like. Doors are locked, windows are secured and offices containing documentation pertaining to national security maintained an almost impenetrable safe-like security system. Albeit with Sweden one of the most technologically advanced nations on the globe, there was unlikely to be a blueprint detailing the full Swedish defence infrastructure on a single piece of paper within a random manufacturing facility inside the nation of a country Sweden was presently not only no longer diplomatically present within but also on the brink of a declaration of war, similar to that made by members of the United Coalition.

On the arrival of the armed officers urgent calls began to be made to executives in Sweden, desperate for advice and support. It became clear that whilst the Gendarmerie had come outfit for armed combatants they had neglected to consider the fact that this was no ordinary residential house warrant and they had began the strategic strike against almost thirty defence industry facilities. This was not going to be easy.

For now the armed security officers on site would reserve a level of discretion and no hostile tactics were exercised, but they were certainly ready and in-tune with instructions by management with their radio systems.

In time attacks against Swedish defence industry would make its way to the Department of Defence whom would, in turn, relay that the commanding officer on the ground should make contact, via an encrypted line, with Stockholm immediately. It was the task of a single security officer at the front gate of the largest Turkish Aerospace Industries facility to relay this to the oppressive Gendarmerie officers whom found themselves halted at the security security fencing and box at the head of the complex, whilst nervous, he relay the message through the bullet-resistant glass to officers that presumably would seek cooperation from the staff and thus contactable face-to-face.

Axis12

 

[Connor]

Duck, Duck... Turk?
March 2000

With the unsolicited trespass of the Turkish armed Gendarmerie onto facilities of Swedish-owned corporations this matter naturally made its way to the National Security Council within the Executive Office of the Prime Minister as a result of the potential injury to the Swedish economy and natural obligations to the employees, customers, suppliers and estate. It was worth noting that whilst these corporations were under Swedish majority ownership they had at no point violated any domestic laws which begged the question which court had authorised any form of legal warrant or writ to govern this 'takeover'. With Turkey known to violate international law on an aggressively abhorrent scale, it would come as no surprise whether this raid had been sanctioned in any legal capacity whatsoever or whether this was another thoughtless act to add to the somewhat depressingly long list held in the bloodstained hands of the Turkish government. One thing was for certain however; those within these facilities were for the most part law abiding Turkish nationals whom had nothing to do with the ongoing war effort and certainly nothing to do with the Swedish economy - if anything, this raid had only put them out of work and almost completely decimated any economic benefit the remnants of defence manufacturing had to Turkey.

Upon review by the National Security Council it became clear that Turkey had recently attempted the production of products owned by two of these corporations: Roketsan and Aselsan A.S. Sanctions currently in place by the Department of Defence had already prevented their production but it drew a very clear connection to the fact that this approach to Swedish facilities was likely an intimidation tactic to spur the Swedish government into backing away from blocking these productions... obviously this was unsuccessful as the government had not only blocked the productions but also released documentation into the public domain despite their previously encrypted nature. Given the heightened risk of personnel on site coming into the cross-fire it was determined that the safest course of action was the slow, carefully managed evacuation of all sites. Documentation on site which was detrimental to data production law in Sweden was to be destroyed and computer systems were to be disconnected all power sources. Many of these sites were not isolated factories, they were office buildings, corporate stores and storage facilities, many of which were on ordinary residential streets and commercial areas into busy public areas; this would make it increasingly difficult for the officers to have a sufficient containment, especially when up to now they have made no attempt to secure the entirety of each of these properties and their staff were already running thin across the grossly unexpected number of sites.

In accordance with management instructions staff would slowly be filtered out, as and when it was safe, allowing them to make to alternate locations within the immediately populated areas; each of them were instructed to make contacted with their line manager or supervision upon their return home to confirm their safety which would later be fed back to a head office within Sweden to ensure all staff on the payroll were accounted for. Furthermore contact would be made with domestic defence industry in Sweden to see whether there were any capacity for these organisations to cease trade in Turkey and more their production to estates within the borders of the Swedish mainland; similar consideration was given to South Africa.

By this stage information would begin to seep into social media, word of mouth and local smaller media organisations which would see the surge of armed presence at these facilities.

Whilst this was ongoing the National Security Council would further encourage contact by a Turkish commanding officer, via encrypted communication steams, to the Swedish Department of Defence.

Axis12

 

[Connor]

Two by Two
March 2000

With no intervention by the Gendarmerie, the staff and senior managers at the various sites across the country would leave the facilities and return home of their own accord. Given that none of these people had actually broken the law they'd be under no suspicion that the armed officers would ever intervene in their safe passage or even require the use of manoeuvring away from any hostile reconnaissance, tails or unsolicited pursuits. Each and every one of them would escape their workplace despite the law enforcement, without warrant, forcing their normal monotony into a story which would otherwise be unwelcome. The events were scary, and undoubtedly sparked fear into families which would unexpectedly see their loved ones return home with a glazed look amongst their face. Whilst the most senior of managers left their facilities they'd ensure the doors, windows and any access points were securely locked and chained appropriate as they would be through any normal closing up procedure, but no sooner than before all sensitive material had either been destroyed or packed into their bags prior to leaving. It was not beyond the realm of possibility that the Turkish would force entry whilst the facilities were empty.

Conversations in mainland Sweden and South Africa would soon identify a number of locations where these business could eventually relocate and begin their distribution of goods once again. This was an expensive affair. Central government had two options; the complete destruction of the Turkish facilities and the redundancy of thousands of members of staff whilst facilities are bought and new staff hired abroad; or the offering of a relocation package for any members of staff with more than five years service in specialist roles which would see to their family being appropriately compensation for the inconvenience from the public purse.

With no response from requests from Stockholm, a clear message was due to be broadcast in the coming hours by the appropriate government department, issuing a stark warning to Turkey who evidently sought to attack the Swedish economy.

Axis12

 

[Axis12]

Police forces would evacuate and leave the buildings as they were and allow any and all Swedish activities within Turkey to continue. Operation Complete.
Connor