Federal Security Service

[Jay]

The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB, ФСБ; Russian: Федеральная служба безопасности Российской Федерации) is the principal security agency of Russia and the domestic counter-intelligence and security successor agency to the Soviet Union's KGB.

The three major structural successor components of the former KGB that remain administratively independent of the FSB are the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal Protective Service (FSO), and the Main Directorate of Special Programs of the President of the Russian Federation (GUSP).

The primary responsibilities are within the country and include counter-intelligence, internal and border security, counter-terrorism, surveillance and investigating some other types of serious crimes and federal law violations. It is headquartered in Lubyanka Square, Moscow's center, in the main building of the former KGB. The director of the FSB is appointed by and directly answerable to the president of Russia. Being part of Russia's executive branch formally, the FSB has significant, if not decisive, power over it

In 2003, the FSB's responsibilities were expanded by incorporating the Border Guard Service and a major part of the Federal Agency of Government Communication and Information (FAPSI). The agency is made up of 9 Divisions called Bureaus. Each is led by a director.

1. Counter-Espionage
2. Service for Defense of Constitutional Order and Fight against Terrorism
3. Border Service
4. Economic Security Service
5. Current Information and International Links
6. Organizational and Personnel Service
7. Monitoring Department
8. Scientific and Technical Service
9. Organizational Security Service

Director Nurgaliyev is an experienced member of the Russian Security Services. He served within the Soviet KGB under a number of assignment areas including in the Directorate for Karelia. Between 1981 and 1995 he was served in various capacities within the KGB Directorate and its successor the Security Ministry.

In 1995, he moved to Moscow and was appointed chief inspector of the Inspectorial Directorate of FSK (FSB) and head of a section of FSB Internal Security Department led by Nikolai Patrushev. In 2002, he became first deputy head of the FSB. In 2003, he became Director of the FSB and was appointed by President Nemtsov.

Rashid Nurgaliyev​

 

[Jay]

Unclassified Judicial Report Special Commission on Thailand’s actions regarding the re-sale of Gepard-Class Ships Public​

FILE INFORMATION​

Name:	Расследование в Таиланде
Original Classification	Confidential Investigation
Current Classification	Public Release
File Name	Thailand’s violations of Russia’s arms export controls
File Number	RFMOJ ICI-AER-01

AUTHORIZATION FOR PUBLIC RELEASE FILE (PRF): I, Senior Presidential Advisor for Legal Affairs, Natalia Poklonskaya, hereby affirm the contents of the investigation into Thailand’s illegal actions regarding the re-sale of 10 Gepard-class frigates. This report shall be released to the public at the earliest possibility and with the honest intention of making clear the actions of this Government regarding the commission's investigation and ensuring the transparency of our investigation. SIGNED, Natalia Poklonskaya, Senior Presidential Advisor for Legal Affairs of the Executive Office of the President of the Russian Federation

Preamble​ Pursuant to the authorization by Resolution No. 84 of November 21, 2003 and in consultation with the Ministry of Justice, the Federal Security Services, and the Federal Parliament of the Federation the following report has been compiled in response to the request of the State Duma. In the pursuit of justice and the upholding of the rule of law, the Ministry of Justice, guided by its commitment to fairness, impartiality, and the protection of legal rights, initiates this investigation. The following inquiry is conducted with a dedication to uncovering the truth, ensuring accountability, and safeguarding the principles that underpin our legal system. This inquiry is undertaken pursuant to the Federal Constitution, empowering the Ministry to investigate matters of public concern and in the domain of foreign affairs, under the purview of the Federal Executive. The objective is to ascertain the facts, evaluate the applicability of pertinent laws, and determine whether any violations or irregularities have occurred. As stewards of justice, we approach this investigation with due diligence, recognizing the gravity of our responsibility to society. The Ministry seeks to conduct a thorough, transparent, and unbiased examination of the circumstances in question. All parties involved will be afforded the opportunity to present their perspectives, and the findings will be based on a meticulous analysis of the evidence in accordance with established legal standards. Through this inquiry, the Ministry of Justice endeavors to uphold the principles of justice, protect the rights of individuals, and contribute to the maintenance of a just and lawful society. In pursuit of upholding national security and integrity, the Russian Federation has established a commission to investigate the unlawful resale of its naval ships by Thailand. This inquiry follows reports indicating that Thailand has engaged in the illegal transfer of these assets, which are critical to our national defense and maritime interests. Yulania Cherniac has been appointed as Chief Investigator to lead this investigation. The scope of the inquiry includes evidence gathered through intelligence operations, secure diplomatic channels, and other relevant sources. Given the sensitive nature of the subject, appropriate redactions have been applied to protect the confidentiality of individuals and the integrity of ongoing operations. The purpose of this investigation is to thoroughly examine the circumstances surrounding the alleged illegal resale, assess the collected evidence, and determine the appropriate legal and diplomatic responses. This report reflects our commitment to maintaining national security, ensuring transparency, and upholding the principles of justice and legality. All requests for access to the unredacted version of this report must be submitted through the Office of the President, in accordance with established protocols for handling sensitive information.

I. Statement of the Facts​ A. Factual Background On August 7, 1999, Thailand’s Minister of Defense, Supachai Panichpak, entered into a contract with Rosoboronexport for the purchase of ten Gepard-class frigates. The agreement explicitly prohibited the resale or transfer of the frigates without prior authorization from Rosoboronexport. Despite a formal warning issued by Rosoboronexport against any resale, Thailand proceeded with the illegal transfer of these frigates to Canada. This action was taken after Canada had expressed explicit disapproval of the sale due to its illegality. The ICJ issued an advisory opinion affirming Rosoboronexport’s position; however, Thailand has persistently ignored this ruling and failed to rectify the situation. The Russian Federation issued a final warning to Thailand, setting a 30-day deadline for resolution. Thailand's refusal to engage in meaningful dialogue or adhere to encryption standards demanded by Russia further exacerbates the situation. Following a second legal case, and diplomatic efforts, Thailand acquiesced to justly compensate the Russian Federation for $4 billion USD, issued a formal apology, and agreed on next steps. B. History The Russian Federation has pursued diplomatic and legal avenues to address Thailand’s breach of contract, including issuing warnings and seeking resolution through international forums. Thailand has repeatedly declined to address the issue in an unsatisfactory manner, opting instead to challenge Russia’s efforts under the guise of state sovereignty. C. Issues Presented to the Ministry of Justice Whether Thailand’s actions constitute a breach of the terms and conditions agreed upon in the contract with Rosoboronexport. Whether the Russian Federation has the right to seek legal redress on behalf of Rosoboronexport for violations of export laws and contractual terms. E. Findings of the Ministry of Justice The contractual terms between Rosoboronexport and Thailand explicitly prohibited the resale or transfer of the frigates without prior authorization. Thailand’s actions constitute a direct breach of these terms. The Thai Government, as the purchaser of the frigates, is ultimately responsible for the breach, irrespective of the involvement of RTRAF Sales Authority or other entities. The Thai Government’s actions are directly attributable to the State and thus subject to legal action by the Russian Federation. Under international law and the Russian Constitution, the Federal Government of Russia has the authority to intervene and pursue legal action when its corporate entities are affected by foreign actors. Rosoboronexport, while a private entity, operates under the auspices of Russian export policies and laws. The ICJ’s advisory opinion confirms that the Gepard-class frigates fall under the category of "purchased equipment" as defined by the terms of service. This opinion reinforces Russia’s position and obliges Thailand to comply with the contractual terms. F. Summer of Events Subsequent Thailand’s actions have violated Russian export laws as expressed through the terms and conditions of the contract. The illegal transfer of military equipment undermined Russia’s sovereignty and defense capabilities. In addition, Thailand's efforts to cover up the damaging efforts to subvert Russia demonstrated a serious threat to Russia's national security. The Russian Federation took diplomatic and legal measures to assert its right to seek legal remedies for the breach of contract and export laws. Article 12 of the ICJ Statutes empowers the Court to issue provisional measures and financial sanctions, which Russia sought to implement. II. Summary of the Current Situation:​ Recent correspondence between the Russian Federation and Thailand has highlighted ongoing tensions and efforts to resolve a significant legal and diplomatic dispute. The central issue revolves around a breach of contract related to an illegal sale involving substantial financial losses and a violation of Russia's export laws. The communication from Prime Minister Shinawatra demonstrates regret but does not meet the full demands of the Russian Federation for an official apology and financial restitution. The Russian Federation, represented by President Boris Nemstov, requires an unconditional apology along with financial compensation amounting to $3 billion for lost revenue before considering any further diplomatic or operational engagement. President Nemtsov's stance reflected a firm position that the prohibition on Thai access to Russian defense institutions and maintenance assistance remains in place until Thailand meets the conditions set by Russia. These conditions include not only financial compensation but also a formal apology acknowledging responsibility for the breach and subsequent issues. Russia's concerns also extend to ensuring that no additional illegal sales have occurred and addressing potential strategic risks posed by rogue actors. Minister Sathirathai's response is a positive step towards resolution. The offer of $4 billion in compensation, with the first $1.5 billion paid within six months and a phased lifting of the export moratorium, shows a willingness to negotiate and resolve the financial aspects of the dispute. The proposal includes a commitment to normalize relations contingent on a formal apology and acceptance of Thailand's accountability for the breach. Russia sought an apology from Thailand, including acknowledgment of responsibility for the sale, the breach of contract, and poor diplomatic handling of the situation. The formal apology and the proposed compensation package are seen as prerequisites for resolving the conflict and restoring diplomatic and trade relations. Thailand’s Prime Minister officially apologized for the illegal resale in an address published by the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Thailand. The address in part read: "The Thai government deeply regrets the oversight that allowed these unauthorized arms sales to occur, recognizing the negative consequences for Russia's economy and international standing. I take this misconduct very seriously. While the actions of a few were wrong, the Thai government as a whole accepts full responsibility. We unequivocally apologize for the unauthorized sale of the Gepard-class frigates, the breach of contract, and the violation of Russian sovereignty. These actions are deplorable and do not reflect the values Thailand holds dear. We seek absolution from the Russian government, nation, and its people." The Russian Federation on the recommendation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held that it should continue to enforce its current position until Thailand meets all stipulated conditions. The emphasis on a formal apology and the full financial compensation package must remain firm to ensure that the resolution is satisfactory. The Federal Security Service held that following Thailand issuing a formal apology that met Russia's requirements and began proceeding with the agreed-upon compensation terms, the moratorium could be waived. It was so ordered that the temporary denial order issued against Thailand on July 23, 2003, and subsequently renewed on November 23, 2003, and February 23, 2004, was to be dismissed. In addition Thailand's export privileges are fully reinstated, effective immediately with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to monitor closely existing Russian equipment in service with Thailand for any potential breaches. III. Findings of the Federal Security Services and Ministry of Justice:​ Rosoboronexport, a duly incorporated entity in Russia, notified the Russian Government of efforts by Thailand to illegally resell equipment purchased through Rosobornexport’s platform. The Chief Financial Officer [CFO] Igor Sevastyanov informed the Thai Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for Thailand’s Sale Authority RTAF, that Thailand through proceeding with the proposed reselling of 10 Gepard-Class Frigates would be in violation of the contract signed with Rosoboronexport. The clause in question, clause 3, is: "Nations and partners who purchase from Rosoboronexport cannot sell, trade/exchange, or donate/give away purchased equipment to third parties without expressed permission by Rosoboronexport." The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has received seven total requests for block purchases by Thailand through Rosoboronexport. The following dated transactions were made by Thai official Supachai Panichpak June 1999 Julu 1999 November 1999 May 2000 The following dated transactions were made by the Thai Ministry of Commerce June 2000 July 2000 January 2001 During this time Thailand availed itself of purchasing Russian equipment including the BTR, BMP, and T-90 ground systems. Whilst not in controversy, Thailand has had an extensive relationship with Rosoboronexport and is no stranger to its terms and services, or should not reasonably be expected to be uninformed. Furthermore, these transactions showcase Russia's broad exposure to Thailand's ability to subvert its national interests and national security through the illegal distribution of Russian equipment. In light of Thailand’s violations, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommended to the Office of the President to issue a temporary denial order denying Thailand export privileges for a period of 90 days. This order was extended on November 23, 2003, and February 23, 2004, pursuant to Section 766.43 of the Export Administration Regulations, due to concerns regarding Thailand's illegal resale of Russian equipment. The Thai Government following this decision issued a formal diplomatic protest and attempted to take legal measures to legitimize its actions. Thailand's use of lawfare, the strategic use of legal proceedings to intimidate or hinder another nation, was a significant effort by its government to legitimize its actions. Thailand’s lawfare attempted to defraud Rosnobornoexport, to conspire with other foreign nations to undermine Russia’s sovereignty, and to misappropriate Contra Proferentem. (The basis of Contra Proferentem, which, has been to protect the less risk-averse side in formulating the contract to reduce the cost of the transaction and avoid the less risk-adverse draft from refraining from manipulating the other side in the contract.) In addition, Thailand attempted to justify its action, further alleging a breach of its contract with Rosoboronexport by saying the modified vessels, in violation of Clause 4, were no longer equipment for the purposes of its contract. Clause 4 reads: "Nations and partners who purchase from Rosoboronexport cannot upgrade purchased equipment nor use purchased equipment for their own technological engineering without expressed permission by Rosoboronexport." Upon visual intelligence gathered by the Russian Security Services (FSB), it has been confirmed Thailand made no such modifications and the ships were received in as-is condition from Thailand. Thailand proceeded to ignore Rosoboronexport, lost the opportunity for an offer of a buyback, and faced a corporate service ban by Rosoboronexport then replaced by a moratorium by the Federal Government. IV. Summary of Conversation between Rosoboronexport and the Thai Government​ Initial Complaint: Sender: Igor Sevastyanov, Chief Financial Officer, Rosoboronexport Recipient: Sutin Klungsang, Minister of Defence, Republic of Thailand Content: Sevastyanov informed Minister Klungsang of a violation of the contractual terms related to the sale of ten Gepard-class frigates. Specifically, Clause #3 of the contract, which prohibits the sale or transfer of purchased equipment to third parties without Rosoboronexport's express permission, was breached. Rosoboronexport requested an immediate cessation of the sale. Thai Government's Response: Sender: Sutin Klungsang, Minister of Defence, Republic of Thailand Recipient: Igor Sevastyanov, Chief Financial Officer, Rosoboronexport Content: The Thai government contested the interpretation of Clause #3, asserting that the Gepard-class frigates were repurposed for non-military use and thus did not fall under the restrictive terms of the contract. They argued that the term "equipment" was ambiguous and their modifications were consistent with international law and their national policy. Rosoboronexport's Rebuttal: Sender: Igor Sevastyanov, Chief Financial Officer, Rosoboronexport Recipient: Sutin Klungsang, Minister of Defence, Republic of Thailand Content: Sevastyanov rejected the Thai government's interpretation of the contract, reaffirming that the terms explicitly prohibited any transfer or modification of the equipment without permission. Rosoboronexport issued a formal ban on further transactions with Thailand and demanded an immediate halt to the sale. Thai Government's Further Response: Sender: Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, Minister of Justice, Republic of Thailand Recipient: Igor Sevastyanov, Chief Financial Officer, Rosoboronexport Content: The Thai government disputed the allegations of breach, arguing that the modifications of the frigates were consistent with their initial non-combatant status and did not violate Clause #4 regarding upgrades or modifications. They condemned the unilateral sanctions imposed by Rosoboronexport as an overreach and threatened legal retaliation. Final Notification from Rosoboronexport: Sender: Igor Sevastyanov, Chief Financial Officer, Rosoboronexport Recipient: Sutin Klungsang, Minister of Defence, Republic of Thailand Content: Sevastyanov accused Thailand of breaching multiple clauses, including Clause #4 on modifications. He expressed disappointment with Thailand's defensive stance and reiterated that the ban on future transactions would remain until the issue was resolved. [REDACTED FINDINGS USING INTELLIGENCE SUPPLIED BY THE FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICES] V. Summary of RTAF Correspondence:​ Terms of Conditions for Sale by Thailand: End-Use Monitoring: The buyer agrees to allow monitoring of vessel usage to ensure compliance with international laws. Non-Aggression: The frigates must not be used against Thailand or other Southeast Asian nations. Upgrades and Maintenance: The buyer is not responsible for maintenance, repair, or upgrades. Payment Terms: Funds must be transferred via internationally recognized systems or invested in Thailand’s infrastructure and economy. Environmental Compliance: The vessels must be used in a manner compliant with environmental regulations. Crew Training: The buyer may request crew training from Thailand, subject to Thailand's discretion. Joint Exercises: The buyer can request participation in Thai naval exercises and hosting of exercises in their vicinity. Canadian Government's Bid: Sender: Alex, Canadian Government Content: Canada expressed interest in purchasing all ten Gepard-class frigates for $3 billion USD. A public announcement was made inviting other potential buyers to bid within 48 hours to which Canada was responding to. Thai Government's Response to Canada: Sender: Sale Authority of the Republic Thai Armed Forces Recipient: Canadian Government Content: Acknowledgment of Canada’s interest and request for clarification on: The urgency of the acquisition and whether Canada wants to expedite the decommissioning process. Interest in crew training and naval exercise services provided by Thailand. Assurance that the frigates will serve Canadian interests as they did for Thailand. Sale Confirmation: Sender: Sale Authority of the Republic Thai Armed Forces Content: Confirmation that the Thai Navy has agreed to sell the frigates to the Canadian government. The sale amount was publicly announced to be just over $3 billion USD. Canadian Government's Withdrawal: Sender: Alex, Canadian Government Content: Canada confirmed their willingness to purchase the frigates for $3 billion USD but subsequently withdrew their bid due to concerns about the legality of Thailand’s sale process. Thai Government’s Final Notice: Sender: Sale Authority of the Republic Thai Armed Forces Content: The Thai government confirmed that the vessels would be transferred to Canada regardless of the bid outcome, and the vessels would be delivered to a Canada [REDACTED FINDINGS USING INTELLIGENCE SUPPLIED BY THE FEDERAL SECURITY SERVICES] VI. Findings of the Federal Security Service​ The FSB's investigation into the breach of contract and illegal sale involving Thailand has concluded that the Thai Government's actions make it a hostile state actor and has active aims to destablize global affairs. Using [REDACTED] sources, it has been determined that Thailand is indeed responsible for the breach. Additionally, elements of the Thai government have attempted to cover up the incident. Based on these findings, it is recommended that the Russian Federation closely monitor all future actions by Thailand to prevent further violations and ensure accountability. Methodology​ [REDACTED] Analysis of [REDACTED] related to the suspected breach. Intelligence from [REDACTED]: Collaboration with [REDACTED] which provided corroborative data and analysis. Document Review: Examination of [REDACTED] communications, internal reports, and other relevant documents. Findings​ Responsibility for the Breach: [REDACTED] confirming unauthorized transactions and movements of Russian technology that violated export agreements. [REDACTED] supports the conclusion that Thailand’s government was directly involved in the breach. Cover-Up Attempts: Analysis of [REDACTED] that elements within the Thai government actively engaged in attempts to conceal the breach. These efforts included [REDACTED]. Additional Intelligence: [REDACTED] further corroborates the involvement of Thai officials in orchestrating the cover-up. These findings align with the satellite data, providing a comprehensive picture of the deliberate efforts to obfuscate the truth. The evidence indicates a coordinated effort by certain Thai government elements to undermine the investigation and obscure the breach of contract. The FSB has concluded that the evidence has reinforced the conclusion that Thailand is responsible for the breach and subsequent cover-up, and is guilty of attempting to defraud the Russian Government. Attachments and Exhibits​ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] VI. The Russian Federation v. the Republic of Thailand I​ The Republic of Thailand initiated legal proceedings in Russia v. Thailand I. Thailand presented three main arguments: Ambiguity of Equipment, Sovereign Rights, and the Legitimacy of Sanctions. Thailand argued that the term "equipment" in the sales agreement was ambiguous and should be interpreted in their favor, as per international contract law principles. They maintained that repurposing the Gepard-class frigates for non-military uses (humanitarian, coast guard) was consistent with their sovereign rights and international norms. Thailand also contended that it had the authority under international law to modify military equipment for non-combat purposes, as long as the contract did not explicitly prohibit such modifications Lastly, Thailand questioned the legitimacy of Rosoboronexport’s sanctions, arguing that these were an overreach and inconsistent with international contractual practices. Russia’s formal response was that modifications made by Thailand violated the sales agreement, which prohibited the repurposing of the equipment for non-authorized uses. Arguing that the frigates’ new roles breached the terms agreed upon in 1999. The Court ruled that it affirmed the principle of contra proferentem, stating that ambiguities should be interpreted against the drafter—in this case, Rosoboronexport. However, it concluded that the term "equipment" explicitly related to the purchased Gepard-class frigates and included any modifications intended to enhance their quality or usefulness. The Court's advisory opinion indicated that such modifications were not permissible under the contract’s terms. Secondly, the Court held that the complexity of balancing sovereign rights with contractual obligations exists but that the specific issue of modifying military hardware had been addressed in the context of the contractual terms. The Court did not provide a broad ruling on sovereign rights but focused on the specific terms of the agreement. This appeared as an attempt to skirt the issue completely and avoid setting legal precedent in favor of either way. Lastly, the Court held that Rosoboronexport’s actions, including the imposition of sanctions, were within the bounds of contractual freedom and applicable Russian law. The legitimacy of these sanctions was deemed a matter subject to Russia’s domestic laws, with no direct violation of international law observed. The Court’s decision underscored the limitations of Thailand’s legal arguments. Despite invoking principles of international law and sovereign rights, the Court’s focus on the explicit terms of the contract demonstrated the ineffectiveness of Thailand’s approach in this instance. VII. The Russian Federation v. the Republic of Thailand II​ The Russian Federation initiated legal proceedings in Russia v. Thailand II and has brought a legal action against the Republic of Thailand (Thailand) before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under Articles 10 and 12 of the ICJ Statute. Russia has sought financial compensation for alleged violations of the terms governing the sale of Gepard-class frigates by Rosoboronexport, a Russian state arms export agency. The application followed prior unsuccessful attempts by Russia to resolve the dispute through diplomatic means. Firstly Russia accused Thailand of breaching Rosoboronexport’s terms by selling Gepard-class frigates to Canada despite warnings against such actions. Thailand’s sale was allegedly conducted without Russia’s authorization and despite Canada's refusal to proceed due to the sale’s illegality. Secondly, Russia argued that Thailand, as the state purchaser of the frigates, is directly responsible for the breaches. Thailand’s government, not a specific Thai entity, is seen as the primary actor in the alleged violations. Lastly, Russia claimed that Thailand's refusal to engage in meaningful diplomatic discussions and its persistent disregard for Rosoboronexport's terms have led to significant financial and legal repercussions. Russia asserted its right to act on behalf of Rosoboronexport, given that the Federal Government has ultimate authority over defense exports. Rosoboronexport, while a key player in arms sales, operates under the direction of the Russian state. In addition, it showed that the terms of the sale explicitly prohibited the resale, modification, or transfer of the purchased frigates without Russian consent. Thailand’s actions allegedly violated these terms and Russia’s export laws, causing substantial financial loss. The Russian Government requested financial damages for the breach of contract and punitive measures to address the misuse of the frigates and the resulting harm and to request provisional measures to prevent further harm or escalation of the dispute during the proceedings should they arise. VII Conclusion​ [REDACTED BY THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE]

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