GEI | Operation Malacca See

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OPERATION MALACCA SEE (OMS)​ CONFIDENTIAL​ Deployment List (ORBAT)​ OMS contains multiple sub-missions, and includes aircraft from the Gandhi Indian Air and Space Force and the Gandhi Indian Navy, as well as ships from the GIN. OMS supplies multiple Indian governmental intelligence agencies and organisations with intelligence. Structure of OMS-assigned units Air and Space Staff Southern Air Command - 400 personnel​ 4 Wing - 400 personnel​ Car Nicobar AFS - 50 personnel​ No. 89 Squadron - 20 Su-30MKI - 500 personnel​ No. 107 Squadron - 6 Dhruv Mk.II - 200 personnel​ Sulur AFS - 50 personnel​ Port Blair AFS (INS Utkorsh) - 50 personnel​ No. 88 Squadron - 20 Su-30MKI - 500 personnel​ No. 108 Squadron - 6 Dhruv Mk.II - 200 personnel​ INS Baaz - 25 personnel​ Tambaram AFS - 50 personnel​ Thanjavur AFS - 50 personnel​ Thiruvananthapuram AFS - 50 personnel​ 25 Wing - 400 personnel​ No. 7 ADS - 4 SPYDER-MR batteries - 500 personnel (Port Blair AFS)​ No. 8 ADS - 4 SPYDER-MR batteries - 500 personnel (Car Nicobar AFS)​ No. 9 ADS - 5 SPYDER-MR batteries - 550 personnel (INS Baaz)​ ​ 11 Wing​ No. 401 Squadron - 4 MiG-25RB, 6 MiG-25RBK, 2 MiG-25RU - 1500 personnel (2 MiG-25RBK, 1 MiG-25RB and associated (~250) personnel, named No. 401 Squadron Detachment East)​ ​ ​ Naval Staff Eastern Naval Command​ 2nd East Naval Aviation Wing - 250 personnel​ INS Parundu (Naval Air Station) - 50 personnel​ INAS 200 - 6 Do 338-101 MPA, 200 personnel​ INS Rajali (Naval Air Station) - 50 personnel​ INAS 201 - 4 Il-38SD, 250 personnel​ ​ Commodore Commanding Submarines (East) - 100 personnel​ 2nd Submarine Squadron - 100 personnel​ IGS Sindhudhvaj - S02 - 53 personnel​ IGS Sindhuraj - S03 - 53 personnel​ ​ ​ Andaman and Nicobar Naval Component - 325 personnel​ ​ 8th Support Squadron - Port Blair - 50 personnel​ IGS Jalashwa - A01 - 407 personnel​ IGS Airavat - A06 - 156 personnel​ 3rd Frigate Squadron - Port Blair - 50 personnel​ IGS Saranath - F07 - 257 personnel​ IGS Servarayan - F06 - 257 personnel​ 3rd Missile Vessel Squadron - Port Blair - 50 personnel​ IGS Kali - M07 - 134 personnel​ IGS Kila - M08 - 134 personnel​ IGS Kula - M09 - 134 personnel​ IGS Veer - M14 - 134 personnel​ IGS Vibhuti - M15 - 134 personnel​ 4th East Naval Aviation Wing - 100 personnel​ INAS 403 - 6 Dhruv Mk.II, 125 personnel (INS Utkorsh)​ ​ 5th East Naval Aviation Wing - 250 personnel​ INS Utkorsh (Joint Naval/Air Base) - 50 personnel​ INAS 401 - 6 Do 228-101 MPA, 200 personnel​ INS Baaz (Naval Air Station) - 50 personnel​ INAS 400 - 6 Dhruv Mk.II, 125 personnel​ INAS 402 - 4 Il-38SD, 250 personnel​ INAS 404 - 20 Jagaur IM, 300 personnel​ INS Kohassa (Naval Air Station) - 50 personnel​ INAS 405 - 6 Do 228-101 MPA, 200 personnel​ ​ INS Kardip (FOB) - 50 personnel​ INS Jarawa (Log/Admin Base) - 350 personnel​ INHS Dhanvantri (Naval Hospital) - 500 personnel​ 2nd Missile Squadron (MMCB) - 3 BrahMos batteries, 550 personnel - stationed at INS Kohassa​ ​ Indian Coast Guard Andaman & Nicobar Region (A&N) CGRHQ Port Blair - 50 personnel​ DHQ-14 Port Blair - 30 personnel​ ICGS Port Blair (includes MRCC) - 30 personnel​ ICG OPV 001 - 140 personnel​ ICG OPV 002 - 140 personnel​ CGAE Port Blair - 30 personnel​ CGAS 3 - 4 Do 228-101 MPA, 150 personnel​ CGAS 8 - 5 Dhruv Mk.II, 150 personnel​

Mission Objective​ Operation Malacca See's mission objective is to conduct strategic reconnaissance and monitoring of India's eastern naval and air approaches from international or Indian airspace or waters.

Mission Details NOTICE: ALL GOOGLE EARTH LINKS ARE BUST (because google is stupid), GO OFF THIS LINK ​ Operation Malacca See would be implemented to monitor India's maritime and aeiral eastern approaches. OMS would include aircraft and ships from the Navy and Air and Space Force. The Andaman and Nicobar Command would be the primary coordinator for OMS. It would be commanded by the A&NC commander, Vice Admiral Arun Kumar Singh. The responsibilities and purposes of all units, starting from the top are as follows. No. 88 Squadron would assign 2 (two) fighters - out of 20 (twenty) - to ready ground alert in the case that an air threat is detected (loadout "ready alert fighters"). Another 2 (two) aircraft would always be airborne and circling in a race-track pattern 50km east of their airfield, RADARs on and at 350 knots at 35,000 feet (loadout "LR CAP/OCA"). Another 2 (two) aircraft would stand-by for anti-shipping (loadout "Mar. Strike"). 6 (six) aircraft would be sent south to INS Baaz in support of No. 401 Squadron. 2 (two) of those Su-30MKIs would be on ready alert at all times (loadout "ready alert fighters") with another 2 (two) on 30-minute stand-by (loadout "CAP/OCA"). No. 89 Squadron would assign 2 (two) fighters - out of 20 (twenty) - to ready ground alert in the case that an air threat is detected (loadout "ready alert fighters"). Another 2 (two) aircraft would always be airborne and circling in a race-track pattern 75km direct south-east of their airfield, RADARs on and at 350 knots at 35,000 feet (loadout "LR CAP/OCA"). Another 2 (two) aircraft would stand-by for anti-shipping (loadout "Mar. Strike"). No. 107 and 108 Squadrons would conduct SAR, maritime surveillance, transport and recce. missions 150km around their respective bases. 1 (one) aircraft from each squadron would be airborne conducting maritime surveillance or SAR at any time. It would use its RADAR actively to identify surface contacts. It would fly at 100 knots at 3,000 feet under normal circumstances. The aircraft/s would stay in/over India's EEZ. No. 7, 8 and 9 ADS would provide air defence against any detected air/missile threats that breach the Su-30MKI DCA. No. 401 Squadron would conduct ELINT and IMINT operations. Its MiG-25RB and MiG-25RBK aircraft would be forward-based at INS Baaz and would each fly once daily. The MiG-25RB would fly this (red) route, taking photos of the Malacca Strait as it passes overhead. One MiG-25RBK would fly this (yellow) route, and would collect all ELINT emissions from between 50km to 450km away from the aircraft. The other would fly this (blue) route, doing the same as the other MiG-25RBK. Each MiG-25 would, after takeoff, ascend to 80,000 feet and accelerate to mach 2.35. INAS 200, 401, 405 and CGAS 3 would fly maritime surveillance, SAR, and recce. missions within 400km of its airbase. 1 (one) aircraft from each squadron would be airborne at any time. It would use its RADAR actively to identity surface contacts. It would fly at 200 knots at 6,000 feet under normal circumstances. When applicable, the squadrons would organise flight and patrol routes between them in order to maximise patrol area. The aircraft/s would stay in/over India's EEZ. INAS 201 and 402 would conduct maritime surveillance, patrol, SAR, anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare. 1 (one) aircraft from each squadron would be airborne at any one time. It would use its RADAR actively to identify surface and low-altitude aerial contacts, and its sonobuoys to investigate sub-surface contacts. INAS 201 aircraft would take this (white) route. INAS 402 aircraft would take this (black) route. The aircraft would fly at 200 knots at 500 feet with a multirole loadout (loadout "Multi-Role"). INAS 400, 403 and CGAS 8 would conduct SAR, maritime surveillance, transport and recce. missions 150km around their respective bases. 1 (one) aircraft from each squadron would be airborne conducting maritime surveillance or SAR at any time. It would use its RADAR actively to identify surface contacts. It would fly at 100 knots at 3,000 feet under normal circumstances. When applicable, the squadrons would organise flight and patrol routes between them in order to maximise patrol area. The aircraft/s would stay in/over India's EEZ. INAS 404 would assigned to conduct ASuW, maritime recce., point air defence and recce. missions in support of other Indian forces in the Malacca Strait. 2 (two) fighters would always be on stand-by for anti-shipping tasking (loadout "Anti-Ship"). IGS Sindhudhvaj and IGS Sindhuraj jobs' are to conduct ISR and ASW missions in the Malacca Strait. All systems would be operational, and they would have the endurance to stay out for 45 days if needed. They would also have a full war load of 15 TEST-71ME-NK torpedoes, 4 DM-1 mines and 8 MANPADS. One vessel is to be at-sea at all times, with the other replenishing in Port Blair. They would use no active SONAR or RADAR systems, and limit communications to combuoys and relayed communications through short-range VHF and UHF radios to Indian aircraft. The two subs would leave their home port together, and dive and make their own way to Port Blair at 15 knots (route: NK here, yellow). Once there, they would replenish. IGS Sindhuraj would depart after being replenished and would patrol through the Malacca Strait on this (green) route. The two submarines would rotate through patrolling and down-time/replenishment in Port Blair, with one always at sea. Whist on patrol, the submarine would travel at 9 knots. They would deviate from this as needed to avoid detection. The 3rd Missile Vessel Squadron would assign one (1) of its Kora-class corvettes to constantly patrol, out to 100km, the water surrounding Port Blair. All its systems would be operational and active, it would have enough supplies to operate until all its fuel was used up, and it would have a full weapons' load. It would conduct its patrols at 20 knots. The 3rd Frigate Squadron and 33rd Patrol Squadron (now the two vessels assigned to ICGS Port Blair) would combine half of its assigned ships (1 frigate, 1 patrol vessel) to form the 1st Composite Squadron. This squadron would patrol up and down the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and around the Malacca Strait. Once the squadron had completed its route, it would rest and replenish at Port Blair, and the other 2 ships of the 3rd Frigate Squadron and the 33rd Patrol Squadron (now ICGS Port Blare) would move off as the 1st Composite Squadron to patrol the same route (here). The patrolling vessels would not have any embarked helicopters, although any Dhruv Mk.IIs in flight that need an emergency landing area can use the helicopter facilities aboard the vessel.

Date/s: June, 2005 to present

Amendments forgot to add ICG personnel to 'Personnel Quantity' in the half hour grace period, now doing - 12:55 AEST-DS 11/11 adding No. 89 Squadron - 12:23PM AEST-DS 25/11 adding INAS 40 - 3PM AEST-DS 25/11 restructuring of GIASF, +125 personnel - 5:45PM AEST-DS 4/12 restructuring of GIN, +6485 personnel - midnight AEST-DS 4/12 5/12 made an error with the GIN, fixed now, -675 personnel - 12:14PM AEST-DS 5/12 restructuring of ICG - plus 310 - 11:30PM 25/12/2024 OOC Notes GIASF personnel sub-total: 4725 GIN personnel sub-total: 10942 ICG personnel sub-total: 720 Extra map with everything on it

 

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Secret and Encrypted unless contextually possible. | NSST 1.0 Architecture​

Although the Republic Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) remained vigilant regarding national territorial integrity due to the heightened risk posed by Western regimes viewed as potential threats to Thailand’s sovereignty and social values, diplomatic relations between Thailand and India were notably positive. This mutual cooperation was underscored by the recent signing of a historic Treaty of Amity between the two nations, symbolizing a shared commitment to regional stability and friendship. Despite heightened Indian military activities, Thai radar operators stationed at ground-based radar installations and aboard naval assets in the Andaman Sea, Bay of Bengal, and Indian Ocean observed an increased frequency of Indian aerial maneuvers. This activity was monitored closely but interpreted as a sign of India’s enhanced defensive posture rather than a direct threat to Thai interests. Operational intelligence assessments suggested that, if Western forces initiated any action in the region, the extensive Indian maneuvers would likely create operational ambiguity that might be advantageous to Thailand. During this period, the Republic Thai Air Force maintained a regular schedule of combat air patrols within national airspace. Approximately several dozen RTAF CAP assets were on standby, prepared to intercept any potential incursions if warranted by command. However, under established protocol, Thai pilots retained the authority to question any engagement orders that appeared to pose undue risks to Thailand’s strategic interests or its alliances.

During a routine radar sweep, Thai radar and air defense personnel observed an unauthorized incursion by an Indian MiG-25RBK reconnaissance aircraft, which briefly entered Thailand’s territorial airspace over Phuket for approximately 35 seconds. All Thai personnel, including those stationed at coastal radar installations and aboard naval assets, monitored the event and noted the aircraft’s movement. Given the recent diplomatic exchanges and the absence of a secure communication link between the Thai and Indian Armed Forces, it was assessed that any coordination regarding this incursion would need to be addressed through the Thai Foreign Ministry. To ensure thorough documentation, continuous radar tracking systems automatically logged all aerial activity within the monitored zone, providing clear evidence of the brief incursion. The lack of direct military-to-military communications underscored the importance of diplomatic channels for managing minor boundary violations and maintaining strong bilateral relations. In official reports, the Thai Armed Forces recorded this event without escalating or misinterpreting the situation, in alignment with standing protocol to avoid unnecessary diplomatic tension. This posture reflects Thailand's commitment to regional stability and measured responses in maritime and airspace management.

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As the Indian MiG-25RBK pilot entered Thai airspace, he would note the increased RADARs tracking his aircraft before swiftly exiting Thai airspace along the predetermined flight path, still unknowing of the navigation error. The Indian pilot would not be aware that he had entered Thai airspace until he was being debriefed by his detachment commander. The detachment commander, once the pilot had been debriefed, would give the 15-man navigation and flight planning team a bollocking for their major fuck-up.

Afterwards, all flight plans and routes would be checked to ensure that no Thai airspace is breached. As such, the route of the offending MiG-25RBK would be ajusted a few kilometres to the south-west to ensure that future flights do not intrude on Thai airspace or soverign territory.

The next flight conducted on the same route (that doesn't enter Thai airspace) would feature the pilot announcing on unencrypted VHF; "This is Indian recon aircraft. The Golf-India-Alpha-Sierra-Foxtrot apologises for its airspace intrusion upon Thailand. Out."

Bossza007

 

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As part of Operation Malacca See, Indian MiG-25RBK ELINT aircraft conduct regular flights from INS Baaz. As the recce. jet conducted its regular operations, it would note the presence of NEG 4/A, and that is using all of its active systems.

To monitor the formation, Vice Admiral Arun Kumar Singh - the commander of OMS - would order that an Il-38SD out of INS Rajali in Tamil Nadu conduct a close recce. and monitoring sortie of the then-unidentified group. The Il-38SD would fly this route, at 20,000 feet before dropping down to 1,000 feet once within 55km of the Thai vessels. The Il-38SD would rely on the passive detection of the Thai vessels for guidance, as it is under full EMCON with no RADAR or communication emissions. It would have a balanced assortment of weaponry (loadout "Multi-role") slung on.

En-route to the close recce., the Indian Il-38SD would note the presence of another two groups of RADAR-emitting contacts emitting to its south. This presence would be communicated to OMS command once the Il-38 was en-route back to INS Rajali. The aircraft would orbit the vessels on the outside orbit pattern shown, and would also make three passes over the formation of vessels, noting their type and nationality. As the airmen had heard of the recent improvement in relations between India and Thailand, they backed off and simply orbited the formation of vessels as ordered once they recognised the ensign (assumingly) flying on the Thai ships (or recognised the ships themselves). The Indian MPA would RTB once it had reached bingo fuel.

Going off the previous contact report by an Il-38SD, one Do 228 MPA from INAS 11 would lift off from INS Parundu. It would fly this (blue) route at 220 knots, at 12,000 feet until it was 40km from what GIN command assumes are Thai vessels. At that time, the Do 228 would decend to 1,500 feet. This aircraft would perform two flybys over the Thai group to confirm that the group is, in fact, Thai in orgin before returning to base. It would have an EO/IR system on its centerline hardpoint to help with identification.

A day later, another sortie would be conducted. This would involve another INAS 11 Do 228 investigating the middle of the three contacts, also assumed to be Thai as the other two are. The aicraft would fly at 12,000 feet until it was 40km from the assumed neutral contacts. Then, the Do 228 would decend to 1,500 feet. This aircraft would perform a single flyby over the Thai group to confirm that the group is, in fact, Thai in orgin before returning to base. It would have an EO/IR system on its centerline hardpoint to help with identification. It would fly this (red) route.

 

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As a part of Operation Malacca See, No. 401 Squadron would base a number of MiG-25RB IMINT and Mig-25RBK ELINT aircraft at INS Baaz. The MiG-25RBK aircraft, when on patrol, would pick up all military communications and signals, including RADAR, in a 50-450km area to either side of the aircraft. As such, the signals of aircraft flying out of Prachuap Kiri Khan Airbase, Surat Thani Airbase and Hat Yai Airbase would be detected and analysed thanks to their use of - albiet encrypted - radio, both in-flight and on the ground. Any other aircraft flying over Pak Tai that used any of its active military or communications systems would also be documented. The Airbase's locations, as well as identified flight routes, would be catalogued and analysed for potential future use.

Other aircraft, including GIASF Su-30MKIs, GIN Il-38SD and Do 228s, plus surface units, would assist in intelligence gathering whenever and whereever applicable. However, most ELINT would fall to the MiG-25RBKs, and most IMINT to the single MiG-25RB.

 

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As a part of Operation Malacca See, No. 401 Squadron would base a number of MiG-25RB IMINT and Mig-25RBK ELINT aircraft at INS Baaz. The MiG-25RBK aircraft, when on patrol, would pick up all military communications and signals, including RADAR, in a 50-450km area to either side of the aircraft. As such, the transit and routes of the Pattani OPVs of Patrol Squadron One would be detected and analysed thanks to the OPV's use of their active RADAR systems. Phangnga Naval Base - their home port and base - 's location would be recorded, as all ship-based RADAR and communication signals would originate from that location.

 

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As a part of Operation Malacca See, No. 401 Squadron would operate a detachment of MiG-25RB and MiG-25RBK IMINT and ELINT aircraft at INS Baaz in the southern Andaman and Nicobar Island chain. The locations of two RADARs, one at Surat Thani Air Base and the other at Hat Yai Air Base would be recorded and the intelligence gained from the constant passive electronic surveillence of the RADAR installations allowed enhanced ECM, ESM and jamming capabilities against those systems for the Indian Armed Forces.

 

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An Il-38SD aircraft, operated by INAS 201 from INS Rajali on the Indian mainland under Operation Malacca See, would detect the three surface contacts of Principle Maritime Group One as they transited the Malacca Strait. The May would pick up the Thai vessels in between Medan and George Town, at around 50 kilometres range. The Il-38SD would turn, move closer at 300 feet and classify the three vessels as a FREMM-class frigate and two Similan-class tankers, of the Thai Navy. These would be catalogued, recorded and identified, as the May would orbit the small Thai task force at 400 feet for 5 minutes before resuming its regular patrol path.

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With the transfer of all Sukanya-class patrol vessels from the Gandhi Indian Navy to the Indian Coast Guard - and their reclassification as Offshore Patrol Vessels - the 33rd Patrol Squadron would be disbanded and its two vessels assigned to ICGS Port Blair, located at the same place 33rd Patrol Squadron was. These vessels would continue as stated before, with the only difference being that they are operated by the ICG. Their RADARs would behave as previously specified, and they would have no aircraft or helicopters operating from the two vessels.

Because the 1st Composite Squadron contains vessels from both the Gandhi Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard, both services would use designated liaison officers to improve communication between the services.