- Jul 23, 2018
- 4,370
| Department of Defence Statement by Secretary Mikael Odenberg |
"Ladies and Gentlemen,
I can confirm the accuracy of recent reports regarding the transfer of product ownership away from Turkish Aerospace Industries. This move has been taken with the full knowledge and oversight of the Swedish Government, and whilst some may have been surprised by its timing, the truth is that this decision has been the product of very careful assessment by my team. Our priority has been clear from the start - to protect Sweden's defence industrial base from risks that, if left unaddressed, could have compromised our national security and that of our allies. This is not an act of hostility towards Turkiye or its aerospace sector. We recognise and respect the engineering expertise, the technical heritage and the manufacturing capacity that the Turkish industry has constructed over decades. But recognition does not require complacency. We cannot ignore the reality that, in a shifting global security environment, the boundaries between commercial risk and strategic threat are not just blurred, they are disappearing. Sweden will always act to secure its sovereignty over technologies of national importance, no matter where there technologies were first developed.
Our intelligence community has, for some time, been monitoring a series of developments within TAI that raised concern at the highest levels of government. This included the sale of a minority stake of the organisation from an internationally-accredited European defence industry back to an organisation within Turkiye with little-to-no international reputation. Another of the most critical cases was the proposed sale of an advanced unmanned aerial vehicle to a country where the deployment of such a system could have directly challenged the very core of Swedish ethics and values. Swedish export control mechanisms blocked the transaction, but the story did not end there. We began to see clear indications that the additional sale of unacquired stock was being considered from within. Efforts that could have altered the shareholdings in such a way that would erode Swedish influence over export licensing decisions. Such a shift would have left us with diminished capacity to prevent similar transactions in the future. That is not a risk wer are prepared to accept.
This recently intercepted sale may have been the flashpoint, but the underlying concern has always been broader: a recognition that once control over strategic technologies slips beyond our reach, it becomes exponentially harder to regain. The consolidation of our control over TAI ensures this will not happen.
We must also acknowledge the wider economic context. Turkieye is currently in the grip of one of the most severe economic crises in our international setting, carrying unsalvageable levels of debt and facing prolonged instability. These conditions place extraordinary pressure on its defence sector to generate revenue by any means available. Whilst this is an understandable survival instinct from a business perspective, it introduces a dangerous strategic risk: the sale of advanced weapons systems to actors unconstrained by the standards we and our allies uphold. This is not theoretical. We have already seen an appetite among certain firms to explore markets that fall outside the bounds of responsible export policy. Sweden cannot afford to allow its controlled assets, whether intellectual property, manufacturing capabilities or export rights, to be leverages in that way. By moving from majority shareholder to full operational and strategic control of TAI, we have placed all decisions on design, production and sales firmly under Swedish jurisdiction. Turkish facilities will remain active under Swedish licencing at present - but their future direction will be determined here in Stockholm, not elsewhere.
This policy will not be limited to Turkish Aerospace Industries. The same approach will apply to all Turkish-origin defence companies in which Sweden holds a majority stake. This includes Aselsan AS with its advanced sensor and electronics capabilities, and Roketsan, a leader in missile and rocket systems. Both of these firms possess technologies that, if misused, could alter regional balances of power. The same vulnerabilities exist here: the same pressures to sell to buyers of questionable alignment, the same risks of proliferation, the same potential for strategic compromise. We will not leave these risks unmanaged.
The Prime Minister will, in the coming hours, sign an Executive Directive that formalises this ownership consolidation policy, granting the government clear authority to act decisively when the security of strategic assets is at stake. But the groundwork has already begun and out national security is firm.
Sweden's defence industry as built its reputation on responsibility, quality and trust. These are not abstract values, they are strategic assets in themselves and they underpin our ability to maintain strong alliances, secure contracts and protect our citizens. The consolidation control over TAI and soon over other firms where similar risks exist, is an act of stewardship. We will continue to work with Turkish partners where our interests align and where cooperation strengthens our security. But we will never sacrafice the safety of our people or the integrity of our alliances for short-term commercial gain.
That is the choice before us, and we have made it. Thank you."
I can confirm the accuracy of recent reports regarding the transfer of product ownership away from Turkish Aerospace Industries. This move has been taken with the full knowledge and oversight of the Swedish Government, and whilst some may have been surprised by its timing, the truth is that this decision has been the product of very careful assessment by my team. Our priority has been clear from the start - to protect Sweden's defence industrial base from risks that, if left unaddressed, could have compromised our national security and that of our allies. This is not an act of hostility towards Turkiye or its aerospace sector. We recognise and respect the engineering expertise, the technical heritage and the manufacturing capacity that the Turkish industry has constructed over decades. But recognition does not require complacency. We cannot ignore the reality that, in a shifting global security environment, the boundaries between commercial risk and strategic threat are not just blurred, they are disappearing. Sweden will always act to secure its sovereignty over technologies of national importance, no matter where there technologies were first developed.
Our intelligence community has, for some time, been monitoring a series of developments within TAI that raised concern at the highest levels of government. This included the sale of a minority stake of the organisation from an internationally-accredited European defence industry back to an organisation within Turkiye with little-to-no international reputation. Another of the most critical cases was the proposed sale of an advanced unmanned aerial vehicle to a country where the deployment of such a system could have directly challenged the very core of Swedish ethics and values. Swedish export control mechanisms blocked the transaction, but the story did not end there. We began to see clear indications that the additional sale of unacquired stock was being considered from within. Efforts that could have altered the shareholdings in such a way that would erode Swedish influence over export licensing decisions. Such a shift would have left us with diminished capacity to prevent similar transactions in the future. That is not a risk wer are prepared to accept.
This recently intercepted sale may have been the flashpoint, but the underlying concern has always been broader: a recognition that once control over strategic technologies slips beyond our reach, it becomes exponentially harder to regain. The consolidation of our control over TAI ensures this will not happen.
We must also acknowledge the wider economic context. Turkieye is currently in the grip of one of the most severe economic crises in our international setting, carrying unsalvageable levels of debt and facing prolonged instability. These conditions place extraordinary pressure on its defence sector to generate revenue by any means available. Whilst this is an understandable survival instinct from a business perspective, it introduces a dangerous strategic risk: the sale of advanced weapons systems to actors unconstrained by the standards we and our allies uphold. This is not theoretical. We have already seen an appetite among certain firms to explore markets that fall outside the bounds of responsible export policy. Sweden cannot afford to allow its controlled assets, whether intellectual property, manufacturing capabilities or export rights, to be leverages in that way. By moving from majority shareholder to full operational and strategic control of TAI, we have placed all decisions on design, production and sales firmly under Swedish jurisdiction. Turkish facilities will remain active under Swedish licencing at present - but their future direction will be determined here in Stockholm, not elsewhere.
This policy will not be limited to Turkish Aerospace Industries. The same approach will apply to all Turkish-origin defence companies in which Sweden holds a majority stake. This includes Aselsan AS with its advanced sensor and electronics capabilities, and Roketsan, a leader in missile and rocket systems. Both of these firms possess technologies that, if misused, could alter regional balances of power. The same vulnerabilities exist here: the same pressures to sell to buyers of questionable alignment, the same risks of proliferation, the same potential for strategic compromise. We will not leave these risks unmanaged.
The Prime Minister will, in the coming hours, sign an Executive Directive that formalises this ownership consolidation policy, granting the government clear authority to act decisively when the security of strategic assets is at stake. But the groundwork has already begun and out national security is firm.
Sweden's defence industry as built its reputation on responsibility, quality and trust. These are not abstract values, they are strategic assets in themselves and they underpin our ability to maintain strong alliances, secure contracts and protect our citizens. The consolidation control over TAI and soon over other firms where similar risks exist, is an act of stewardship. We will continue to work with Turkish partners where our interests align and where cooperation strengthens our security. But we will never sacrafice the safety of our people or the integrity of our alliances for short-term commercial gain.
That is the choice before us, and we have made it. Thank you."
