Information Request | Australia

[Jay]

Dışişleri Bakanlığı Ministry of Foreign Affairs​

AUTHENTIC COMMUNIQUE OF THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS Security Clearance: Secure and Encrypted ŞİFRELEME KORUMASI: KAPLUĞA​

[Recipient]: Royal Australian Navy, Australia < Owen > [Sender]: Office of International Cooperation, Turkish Armed Forces < elif.karaca@msb.gov.tr > [Subject]: Confidential // Operation Gateway Information Request

Your Excellencies, The Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Türkiye, through its Office of International Cooperation, extends its respectful greetings to the leadership of the Royal Australian Navy and the Australian Defence establishment responsible for the planning and execution of Operation Gateway. Türkiye has followed Australia’s sustained contribution to maritime security in the Indo-Pacific with considerable interest. The longevity and adaptability of Operation Gateway since its inception in 1980 represents a notable example of persistent maritime surveillance and regional cooperation aimed at maintaining security and stability across critical maritime corridors. As part of its ongoing strategic planning, Türkiye is currently examining the establishment of a maritime security operation designed to strengthen interdiction, surveillance, and cooperative enforcement efforts across the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The proposed framework is intended to support regional stability by countering maritime threats such as piracy, smuggling networks, narcotics trafficking, and other illicit maritime activities. Given the operational parallels between these objectives and the longstanding mission of Operation Gateway across areas including the Strait of Malacca, Andaman Sea, Bay of Bengal, and the South China Sea, the Turkish Ministry of National Defence would greatly value the opportunity to learn from Australia’s experience in designing, sustaining, and evaluating such a long-running maritime security operation. Accordingly, we respectfully request the possibility of arranging a professional teleconference between representatives of the Turkish Northern Naval Command and the Australian naval office responsible for Operation Gateway. Such an exchange would allow our respective naval professionals to discuss operational insights and lessons learned in a collegial and cooperative setting. In preparation for such discussions, Türkiye would particularly appreciate any information Australia may be able to share regarding the following areas: The operational structure and command arrangements supporting Operation Gateway; The typical operational load placed upon naval and air assets, and how these demands have influenced adjustments to force structure or deployment patterns over time; Methods used to measure operational effectiveness, including metrics employed to evaluate interdiction success, maritime domain awareness improvements, or deterrence effects; The operational and strategic outcomes achieved since the mission’s establishment, including its contribution to regional stability; Australia’s experience in coordinating with regional partner nations, including mechanisms for information sharing, joint patrols, and cooperative maritime enforcement. We recognize that many aspects of such operations may be sensitive; accordingly, Türkiye would welcome any level of information that Australia considers appropriate to share within the context of professional naval cooperation. The Ministry of National Defence believes that an exchange of perspectives between our naval commands could contribute meaningfully to strengthening maritime security practices and fostering greater understanding between our respective defense institutions. Should the proposal be agreeable, our office would be pleased to coordinate with the relevant Australian authorities to identify a mutually convenient time for the teleconference and to facilitate communication between the appropriate operational staffs. Please accept the assurances of our highest consideration, along with our sincere appreciation for Australia’s longstanding commitment to maritime security and regional stability. Respectfully, Commander Elif Karaca Office of International Cooperation Tel: +90 312 455 27 64 DSN: 779-2764 Email: elif.karaca@msb.gov.tr Turkish Naval Forces Ministry of National Defence Ankara, Türkiye

 

[Owen]

​

MINISTER FOR DEFENCE​

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET​

10 June 2008

Dear Commander Karaca, Thank you for your message. Operation Gateway was established in 1980 in order to deter the growing threat of Soviet submarines passing through the region at the time. Due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union moved quite a few assets into the Indian Ocean through their Pacific Fleet and as such would use the Singapore Straits and Malacca Strait to do this. Australia has had long-standing defence arrangements with both Malaysia and Singapore since their decolonisation in the 1960s. This had been built during their British colonial periods, during the Second World War and then afterwards with the Malayan Emergency and the Konfrontasi with Indonesia. The operational structure and command arrangements supporting Operation Gateway: All Australian Defence Force operations are conducted through the Headquarters Joint Operations Command with the Chief of Joint Operations maintaining overall operational control. The Chief of the Defence Force and the Chiefs of Service Committee, to which the Chief of Joint Operations is a member of, provides overall strategic advice to the Defence Force and is the highest body of decision making within the Defence Force. There is a Commander, Operation Gateway who is on the ground in the region and maintains control of day-to-day operations. Ultimate decision making power rests with the National Security Committee of Cabinet, myself and the Prime Minister, who ultimately authorised the Operation and can ultimately change its scope or withdraw it all together. Some say it is the most powerful body of the Australian Government because it is has ultimate authority to use force and the only body of Government with authority to kill. The Chief of the Defence Force is the principal advisor to the National Security Committee of Cabinet. The typical operational load placed upon naval and air assets, and how these demands have influenced adjustments to force structure or deployment patterns over time: Most of this is highly sensitive information and I will not be revealing operational details such as payloads. Let's just say you come prepared for anything, but we're not there fighting a war. Methods used to measure operational effectiveness, including metrics employed to evaluate interdiction success, maritime domain awareness improvements, or deterrence effects: Operation Gateway does not necessarily have set parameters for success. Of course, piracy attacks, Soviet submarines, at-sea rescues and the like are all still going to occur. We would like to believe it deters these actions from happening on a wider scale, but our primary focus is to ensure that the shipping lanes remain open, we can provide a search and rescue service and that we are able to reaffirm our alliances with Malaysia and Singapore and so far, for the past 40 years, we have managed to do that. The operational and strategic outcomes achieved since the mission’s establishment, including its contribution to regional stability: Australia is now a partner of choice for nations like Malaysia and Singapore, but it is also developing that stance more broadly with Brunei, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and in more recent years, Indonesia. Australia's presence works because it doesn't get the region entangled in broader geopolitics, which is what South East Asia tends to stay away from, but it also provides a very capable and consistent presence and expertise which is hard to come by in many militaries within the region. It has also at times, been used as an improvement to the relationship between Australia and Thailand, whereas many would possibly see it as a detriment, it opens up possibilities for cooperation. Australia’s experience in coordinating with regional partner nations, including mechanisms for information sharing, joint patrols, and cooperative maritime enforcement: As I mentioned prior, assets deployed on Operation Gateway have cooperated with Thailand in the past in terms of joint patrols and cooperative maritime enforcement. Ensuring you have clear goals, clear targets, makes for a much smoother experience. It was a possible issue, given the political differences, that we may not have been on the same page about potential threats. Making sure you have that, is a good foundational asset. Embedding officers within headquarters and joint commands is crucial for that flow of information. Australia has in the past also cooperated with the United States and New Zealand in regional patrols. Yours sincerely, Senator John Faulkner.

Parliament House, CANBERRA, ACT 2600 Telephone: (02) 6277 7700​

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Jay