Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russian Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации, МИД РФ) is the central government institution charged with leading the foreign policy and foreign relations of Russia. It is a continuation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, which was under the supervision of the Soviet Ministry of External Relations.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a federal executive authority responsible for the development and implementation of state policy and normative-legal regulation in the field of international relations of the Russian Federation.

The current Foreign Minister is Lucie Albrecht. She assumed office on January 16 2002. She was nominated by Prime Minister Valeriya Kuzmina and is the first Russian Minister coming from Volga German minority.

Minister Albrecht is a seasoned diplomat, bringing a wealth of experience and expertise to the role. She received a bachelor's degree in Foreign Affairs from the German University Hertie School of Governance, and a Master's in International Law from Lomonosov Moscow University and a Masters in International Law and Security from Harvard Law School.

Having served as a career civil servant in the Netherlands, the United Kingdoms, and the United States, Minister Albrecht is a well respected figure within the Russian Foreign Ministry. She is Fluent in her native tongues Russian and German, as well as English, Dutch, and French.

Lucie Albrecht​

Relations with neutral countries Relations with other state bodies Grigory Karasin	Relations with American countries Security & disarmament issues Sergei Ryabkov	Relations with African countries Mikhail Bogdanov	Relations with Asian countries Chingiz Aidarbekov	Relations with Europe states Oleg Syromolotov
On countering terrorism Yana Lyashenko	Aleksandr Grushko	Sergei Vershinin	Andrei Rudenko	Mukhtar Tileuberdi

 

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Exercise Normal Safety Precautions ►No significant risk when travelling ►Proceed with usual precautionary. measures ►Report all suspicious activity in the area

Exercise a high degree of caution ►Be cautious of your all surroundings. ►Proceed with precautionary measures. ►Report all suspicious activity in the area.

Reconsider your need to travel ►Elevated risk when traveling. ►Use constant precautionary measures. ►Try to avoid travel to this location if possible.

Do Not Travel ►Travel is strictly prohibited. ►All travel routes are restricted to military use. ►Travel is not accepted on German Passport without special authorization.

Country	Travel Advisory	Envoy	Diplomatic Mission
Afghanistan	Do Not Travel	N/A	Russian Embassy, Kabul
Australia	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Aleksey Pavlovsky	Russian Embassy, Canberra
Canada	Reconsider your need to travel	Ambassador Oleg Stepanov	Russian Embassy, Ottawa
China	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Igor Morgulov	Russian Embassy, Beijing
Egypt	Exercise a high degree of caution	Ambassador Georgy Borisenko	Russian Embassy, Cairo
Ethiopia	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Sergey Bakharev	Russian Embassy, Addis Ababa
France	Reconsider your need to travel	Ambassador Aleksey Meshkov	Russian Embassy, Paris
Germany	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Sergei Nechayev	Russian Embassy, Berlin
Italy	Reconsider your need to travel	Ambassador Alexey Paramonov	Russian Embassy, Rome
India	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Vyacheslav Trubnikov	Russian Embassy, Delhi
Iraq	Reconsider your need to travel	Ambassador Elbrus Kutrashev	Russian Embassy, Baghdad
Japan	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Mikhail Galuzin	Russian Embassy, Tokyo
Korea	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Andrey Kulik	Russian Embassy, Seoul
New Zealand	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Andrey Belyaninov	Russian Embassy, Wellington
Netherlands	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Alexander N. Zmeyevsky	Russian Embassy, The Hague
Poland	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Sergey Andreev	Russian Embassy, Warsaw
Portugal	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Igor Zubov	Russian Embassy, Lisbon
Spain	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Sergey Kozlov	Russian Embassy, Madrid
Sweden	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Victor Ivanovich	Russian Embassy, Stockholm
Ukraine	Reconsider your need to travel	Ambassador Sergey Toropov	Russian Embassy, Kyiv
United Kingdom	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Grigory Karasin	Russian Embassy, London
United States of America	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Alexander Bessmertnykh	Russian Embassy, Washington, D.C.
Vatican City	Reconsider your need to travel	Ambassador Vladimir Frolov	Russian Embassy, Rome
Vietnam	Exercise Normal Safety Precautions	Ambassador Alexander Panov	Russian Embassy, Hanoi
Thailand	Do Not Travel	N/A	N/A
Turkiye	Reconsider your need to travel	Ambassador Andrei Karlov	Russian Embassy, Ankara

Not Listed? Travel Advisory presumed Exercise Normal Safety Precaution -- please consult your nearest Russian diplomatic mission for further information.

 

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State Sponsors of Terrorism in Russia​

Countries determined by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to have repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism are designated pursuant to several Russian federal laws. These include the Federal Law No. 87-FZ “On the Fight Against Terrorism” and the Federal Law No. 47-FZ “On Export Controls and Sanctions”. The main categories of sanctions resulting from designation under these authorities typically include:

1. Restrictions on Russian foreign assistance to the designated countries;
2. A ban on the export and sale of military technology, defense systems, and related goods;
3. Specific export controls on dual-use goods and technologies that have both civilian and military applications;
4. Additional financial and miscellaneous restrictions, such as freezing of assets and blocking of Russian financial institutions from engaging with designated foreign entities or individuals.

These measures also trigger additional penalties under other laws, such as the Federal Law No. 98-FZ “On the Regulation of Foreign Trade and International Economic Relations”, which penalizes individuals and entities that engage in prohibited trade with state sponsors of terrorism. Currently, the following countries are designated under these Russian authorities

State Sponsors of Terrorism​

State	Date of Designation
N/A	N/A

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Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) in Russia​

Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign entities or groups that are designated by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in accordance with Article 17 of the Federal Law No. 87-FZ “On the Fight Against Terrorism”. Designating an organization as an FTO plays a significant role in curbing support for terrorism and applying diplomatic pressure on groups involved in such activities.

Presidential Decree No. 577 provides the Russian Government with the mechanism to impede the funding of terrorism, ensuring Russia's commitment to disrupt global terrorism. The Decree empowers the Russian government to designate individuals, organizations, and foreign entities that engage in or pose a significant threat of involvement in terrorism, freezing their assets and blocking their financial activities within Russian territory.

In line with this, Russian financial authorities, such as the Central Bank of Russia and the Federal Financial Monitoring Service, maintain an updated list of individuals and entities designated under Presidential Decree No. 577. The Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN) is regularly updated to ensure effective sanctions enforcement.

Legal Criteria for Designation as a Terrorist Organization under Russian Law
To be designated as a terrorist organization in Russia, the following legal criteria must be met:

1. The organization must be foreign.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activities, as defined under Article 205.1 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (which outlines the definition of terrorism and terrorist acts), or engage in activities that could threaten the security of the Russian Federation, its nationals, or its political, military, economic, or international interests.
3. The organization must either have engaged in terrorist activity or have the capability and intent to engage in such activities in the future.
4. The organization's terrorist activities or potential terrorism must threaten the security of the Russian Federation, the safety of its nationals, or its political, military, and economic interests, or violate international agreements to which Russia is a party.

Once an organization is designated as a terrorist organization under Russian law, the following legal ramifications apply:

• It is illegal for any person within Russian territory or subject to Russian jurisdiction to knowingly provide "material support or resources" to the designated terrorist organization. The term “material support or resources” is defined under Article 205.3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which includes any property (both tangible and intangible), services, money, weapons, explosives, logistical support, or any other assistance that could contribute to the terrorist activities of the designated organization.
• The term "training" is defined under Article 205.3 as any instruction or teaching designed to impart specific skills to individuals involved in terrorism rather than general knowledge.
• The term "expert advice or assistance" is similarly defined to mean advice or assistance that derives from scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, as outlined in Article 205.3.

Representatives and members of a designated terrorist organization, if they are foreign nationals, are prohibited from entering the Russian Federation and may be subject to deportation or removal under Article 27 of the Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals and Article 18.8 of the Federal Law on the Entry and Exit of Foreign Nationals.

Financial Sanctions and Reporting Requirements
Any Russian financial institution that becomes aware that it holds or controls funds in which a designated terrorist organization or its agents have an interest must freeze these assets and report them to the Federal Financial Monitoring Service of Russia (Rosfinmonitoring), which enforces the country's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing measures. The funds must remain under Russian control until further legal action is determined in accordance with Federal Law No. 115-FZ on Counteracting the Legalization (Laundering) of Criminally Obtained Incomes and Financing of Terrorism.

Other Effects of Designation
Designating an organization as a terrorist entity in Russia carries a number of significant effects:

• It strengthens efforts to combat the financing of terrorism within Russia and internationally, encouraging other nations to adopt similar measures.
• It stigmatizes and isolates the designated terrorist organization on the international stage, limiting its ability to operate freely in the global political and economic systems.
• It deters financial contributions, donations, and economic transactions with the named organization, making it difficult for the group to fund its activities.
• It heightens public awareness about the existence of terrorist organizations, their methods, and their ideologies.
• It sends a clear signal to other governments about Russia's concerns regarding the threat posed by the named organizations, fostering international cooperation in combating terrorism.

An FTO designation includes sanctions such as:

• Freezing the assets of the designated organization.
• Banning the organization from conducting any business or fundraising activities in Russia.
• Criminalizing any involvement with, support for, or participation in the activities of the organization within Russian jurisdiction.

FTO designations are a key tool in disrupting terrorism financing and targeting groups that pose a threat to Russia’s national security.

Foreign Terrorist Organizations​

Name of Organization	Date of Designation
Supreme Military Majlis ul-Shura of the United Mujahideen Forces of Caucasus	2003
Congress of the Peoples of Ichkeria and Dagestan	2003
Al-Qaeda	2003
Osbat al-Ansar	2003
Egyptian Islamic Jihad	2003
al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya	2003
Muslim Brotherhood	2003
Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami	2003
Islamic Liberation Army of the Levant	2005
Islamic Republican Guard of the Levant	2005

 

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Classified Legal Opinion Legal Memorandum: Legality of Targeting a Foreign Leader in a Foreign Country TOP SECRET CONFIDENTIAL & PRIVATE ACCESSIBILITY​

FILE INFORMATION​

Name:	Расследование в Таиланде
Original Classification	TOP SECRET
Current Classification	Confidential Access
File Name	Legality of the use of force against a foreign leader
File Number	RFMOFA OLC-MLUOF-03

Preample: I, Legal Advisor for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Anna Stavitskaya, hereby affirm the contents of the legal analysis and investigation regarding the legitimacy of a targeted strike in a neighboring country on a foreign leader. At the request of the Federal Security Council the Office of Legal Counsel prepared the following report to explain the leglaity of the requested action. This report has been prepared in accordance with international law and Russia's legal framework to ensure a clear understanding of the actions under consideration by the Russian Federation. This preamble serves as a formal acknowledgment of the thoroughness of our legal process, the strategic implications involved, and the ethical considerations that guide our actions. The investigation carefully weighs the principles of necessity, proportionality, and the right to self-defense as enshrined in international law, ensuring that any potential actions are fully compliant with legal norms. It is with this objective in mind that I submit this report for further consideration by the government and military leadership. SIGNED, Anna Stavitskaya Legal Advisor for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Russian Federation

Preamble​ Introduction This memorandum examines the legality of Russia executing a targeted strike against the President of the FWCT while they are visiting Ukraine, following Thailand's alleged intervention in support of the communist regime in Ukraine. We assess this action under three legal considerations: Extrajudicial killing of a foreign leader; Violation of Ukraine's sovereignty; Russia's right to act in preemptive self-defense. The analysis is grounded in international law, including customary international law, the Global Assembly (GA) Charter, and relevant precedents concerning extraterritorial use of force.

I. Overview of the Legal Framework for the use of force​ Introduction​ In light of Thailand's involvement in Ukraine, particularly its support for the communist revolutionary faction that Russia considers illegitimate, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seeks guidance on the legal grounds for carrying out a targeted strike against the Thai leader in Ukraine. This brief examines relevant international law principles, state practice, and Russian legal doctrine to determine under what conditions such an action would be considered legitimate under international law. Legal Framework​ Any military action, including a targeted strike against a foreign leader, must be examined through the lens of international law, particularly the following: The GA Charter The Global Assembly Charter prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. However, exceptions exist under Article 51 (self-defense) and Chapter VII of the UN Charter (UN Security Council authorization). Self-Defense The inherent right of a state to self-defense if an armed attack occurs is a transicent part of the global legal order. Customary international law, as reaffirmed in the Caroline case, recognizes the right to preemptive self-defense when the necessity for defense is "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." International Humanitarian Law (IHL) IHL, including the Geneva Conventions, imposes restrictions on targeting individuals in armed conflict. Combatants, military objectives, and civilians taking a direct part in hostilities can be targeted, but all strikes must adhere to the principles of necessity, proportionality, and distinction. II. Analysis of Conditions for Legitimacy​ 1. Existence of an Armed Conflict​ For a targeted strike to be justified, the situation must constitute an armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, with Thailand being a combatant or a supporter of one of the factions involved. Although Russia is not currently engaged in an active conflict with Ukraine, Thailand’s direct involvement with an illegitimate revolutionary faction could be find justification fo the existence the balance. Thailand’s active support for the insurgents in Ukraine may be interpreted as an act of intervention in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, creating a de facto state of armed conflict between Russia and Thailand. In such a scenario, Russia could invoke its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 2. Necessity of the Strike​ Following the principle established in the Caroline case, the necessity for self-defense must be instant and overwhelming, leaving no alternative but to act. Russia would need to demonstrate that the Thai leader’s actions in Ukraine pose an immediate threat to its national security or political stability. The threat posed by the Thai leader must be of such gravity that a targeted strike is the only viable option to neutralize it. For instance, if the Thai leader is actively coordinating military operations that endanger Russian interests or the stability of Eastern Europe, the necessity criterion could be satisfied. Additionally, there must be clear evidence that diplomatic or peaceful measures have been exhausted or are unavailable, making a military strike the only remaining option. 3. Proportionality of the Strike​ Under customary international law and IHL, the use of force must be proportionate to the threat posed. A strike against the Thai leader must not exceed the level of force necessary to neutralize the immediate threat. For proportionality, the harm caused by the strike must not be excessive in relation to the military advantage gained. In this context, Russia would need to ensure that a targeted strike is limited in scope, carefully calibrated to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties and collateral damage, and aimed solely at incapacitating the Thai leader’s ability to further destabilize the situation in Ukraine. 4. Direct Participation in Hostilities​ Under IHL, individuals who are directly participating in hostilities lose their civilian protection and can be lawfully targeted. If the Thai leader is providing direct military support to the revolutionary faction—such as planning or commanding attacks against Russian interests or its allies—this could qualify as direct participation in hostilities, making the leader a legitimate target. However, it is crucial that Russia be able to demonstrate clear and convincing evidence that the Thai leader is directly engaged in activities that amount to direct participation in hostilities. Vague allegations or indirect support would not suffice. 5. Imminent Threat and Preemptive Self-Defense​ If the Thai leader is planning an imminent attack against Russian forces, interests, or its allies in Ukraine, Russia may invoke the doctrine of preemptive self-defense, as articulated in the Caroline case. This would require showing that the attack is imminent and that there is no time for deliberation or alternative measures. For example, intelligence showing the Thai leader’s involvement in supporting the build up of revolutionary forces within Ukraine or facilitaitng the deployment of troops could meet the threshold for preemptive self-defense, justifying a targeted strike. 6. Authorization by the Ukrainian Government​ Russia may also explore whether it can justify the strike under the doctrine of consent if it can secure explicit authorization from the Ukrainian government. Due to the revolution within Ukraine, the issue of state succession remains with the Government of Ukraine deposed and replaced by a revolutionary council. If Ukraine’s legitimate authorities, as recognized by Russia, recognize the Thai leader’s involvement as a threat to their sovereignty and request Russian assistance in neutralizing the threat, Russia could act on Ukraine’s behalf in a collective self-defense arrangement. Necessity and Imminence: The Thai leader must pose an imminent and overwhelming threat to Russian interests, leaving no viable alternative to military action. Proportionality: The strike must be proportionate to the threat posed, avoiding excessive harm to civilians or infrastructure. Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Thai leader must be directly involved in military activities that threaten Russian forces or its allies in Ukraine. Collective Self-Defense or Authorization by Ukraine: If possible, Russia should seek authorization from the Ukrainian government to justify the strike as part of a collective defense effort. Given these conditions, a carefully calibrated and legally justified strike could be undertaken in accordance with international law, though it would inevitably raise significant diplomatic challenges. ​ III. Opinion of the OLC on Legality of Extrajudicial Killing of a Foreign Leader with regards to the circumstances​ Customary International Law and Sovereignty Under international law, the extrajudicial killing of a foreign leader is prohibited unless justified by extraordinary circumstances, such as armed conflict or acts of self-defense. Assassination of foreign officials is typically deemed a violation of their right to life, as protected under human rights conventions to which Russia is a party. Furthermore, the targeting of a foreign leader while in a third country raises additional concerns about state sovereignty and immunity. In The Caroline case, it was established that for the use of force to be justified in self-defense, the necessity must be "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." Even under such stringent criteria, the act must not be "unreasonable or excessive," and actions must be kept strictly within the bounds of necessity. Given this precedent, the killing of Tanida Pongwiroj, if not connected to an immediate and overwhelming threat to Russia, would likely be seen as an unlawful extrajudicial killing. Such an act could violate both international norms and the inviolability of foreign leaders. The GA as a matter holds that the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state is considered a violaton of its charter. Any strike conducted on Ukrainian soil would be considered a violation of Ukraine's sovereignty unless justified under specific exceptions, such as Ukraine's consent or the legal basis for self-defense. Ukraine and Russia are not in an open conflict, and Russia does not currently recognize the legitimacy of the new communist regime. Therefore, any Russian operation within Ukraine without Ukraine's consent would likely lead to the risk of being in violation with the principle of non-interference. The Caroline precedent underscores that any extraterritorial use of force within the borders of a "power at peace" (in this case, Ukraine) requires a necessity that is "clear and absolute." Absent such necessity, Russia would be infringing upon Ukraine’s sovereignty by executing a strike on its territory. Preemptive Self-Defense Doctrine and Customary Law A State's inherent right to self-defense if an armed attack occurs is a right protected by international law. However, international law remains unclear about the scope of preemptive self-defense, especially when there is no immediate armed attack. Under the Caroline test, preemptive self-defense can only be justified if the threat is "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." For Russia to justify a preemptive strike against Tanida Pongwiroj while in Ukraine, it must establish: A clear, immediate, and overwhelming threat from Thailand's intervention in Ukraine directly threatens Russia’s security. That no other means are available to neutralize the threat aside from the targeted strike. Lastly the action must be proportionate to the threat posed, and must not be excessive. Russia's prior warning to Thailand regarding its intervention in Ukraine might provide a basis for asserting that Thailand’s support to Ukraine's communist regime makes them a party to a conflict. However, absent an imminent threat of an armed attack from Thailand, the strike would be seen as disproportionate and a violation of the principle of necessity. Furthermore, any claim of preemptive self-defense must also consider the principle of proportionality; a strike on a visiting foreign representative would likely be viewed as excessive under international law. However, as the President of the Federation of Workers’ Councils of Thailand which supports Thailand's vision for global revolution and the federation of socialist states, such immunities may be arguably voided. VII Conclusion​ Russia would like face significant legal hurdles in justifying a targeted strike against Tanida Pongwiroj Extrajudicial Killing: Such an act would likely violate international norms prohibiting the extrajudicial killing of foreign nationals, especially in a situation where there is no immediate armed conflict between Russia and Thailand, or with Ukraine. Violation of Ukraine's Sovereignty: A strike within Ukraine without its consent would contravene the general principles and customs of international law and would be viewed as an unlawful violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. Preemptive Self-Defense: The current international legal framework does not support preemptive self-defense unless there is an imminent and overwhelming threat, which appears absent in this scenario. Even if Thailand’s involvement in Ukraine raises concerns, it does not meet the threshold for preemptive action. The Office of Legal Counsel, therefore is of the opinion that such a strike should not be carried out due to the risks to the international legal order, Russia's security, and risks for ramifications under Russia's treaty obligations with other nations including Ukraine.

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