National Security Council

[Odinson]

UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL​

The United States National Security Council (NSC) exists to advise the President on military matters, national security affairs, and foreign affairs. The NSC is chaired by the President and consists of numerous members such as the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others. The NSC has regular meetings at the White House and can also be summoned by the President to the White House during emergencies.

CHAIRMAN

Benjamin V. Sinclair
President


MEMBERS

Richard Blumenthal
Vice President

Luke Adams
Secretary of State

Robert M. Gates
Secretary of State

Tom Lambert
Secretary of Energy

Dillon Clark
Secretary of the Treasury

Sean Langley
Attorney General

Arlo Poole
Secretary of Homeland Security

Harvey Baker
White House Chief of Staff

Alice Fink
National Security Advisor

General Roy Clements
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Lucy Marsh
Director of Central Intelligence​

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[Odinson]

NSC MEETING​

Secret​

The United States's new Strategic Accountability policy, which aimed to hold the sellers/producers of strategic weapons and WMDs responsible as well as those who use them against the United States or her allies, had drawn criticism from a few countries, most notably the Russian Federation. The purpose of the temporary policy was to be a stopgap measure until an international summit on strategic weapons and WMDs could be held later in 2005. President Sinclair is especially worried about the effect of this policy's relationship between the United States and Russia. This meeting was held in the Oval Office.

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MEETING MINUTES
THE WHITE HOUSE
June 28, 2005​

MEMBERS PRESENT
President Benjamin V. Sinclair
Vice President Richard Blumenthal
White House Chief of Staff Harvey Baker
Attorney General Sean Langley
Secretary of Energy Tom Lambert
Secretary of State Luke Adams
National Security Advisor Morgan Fink
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates
Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff General Roy Clements (USAF)
Secretary of Homeland Security Arlo Poole
Director of Central Intelligence Lucy Marsh


BENJAMIN SINCLAIR [POTUS]: Thank you all for coming to this meeting, I know that it was last minute. First, I want to congratulate Lucy Marsh on being confirmed by the Senate as the Director of Central Intelligence. I know that the Senate gave you a harder time than most of my appointees, so thank you for sticking through it.

LUCY MARSH [CIA]: Thank you, Mister President. It is my pleasure to serve.

BENJAMIN SINCLAIR [POTUS]: You all should have gotten the memo of why we are meeting today. Strategic Accountability has upset the Russians. On page two of your packet is President Nemstov's message to me from this morning... Your copies of our correspondence doesn't leave this room. I am not looking to pass blame on anyone for this. I am ultimately responsible since I approved this the last time we met, but I think we all really dropped the ball since the Russians were barely mentioned.

ROY CLEMENTS [JOINT CHIEFS]: Mister President, the Russians would have had something negative to say regardless of what we did. Any action by us reminds them that their entire country is a dying relic of the Cold War.

ROBERT GATES [DEFENSE]: I have to agree with the general, Mister President. There is no scenario where the Russians would have been happy that we are trying to limit their ability to export arms. Sometimes it seems like the Russian state is just an international arms dealer with sovereignty.

BENJAMIN SINCLAIR [POTUS]: Robert, that might be true for the previous two governments, but the democratic system under Nemstov seems to be a lot more... stable and realistic. President Nemstov even told me directly about that situation with Portugal, and he did that because I had told him I wanted to hold these international talks in Washington. Do you all really think that he wants to shoot down a world where the United States and Russia can be partners?

ROBERT GATES [DEFENSE]: Yes.

ROY CLEMENTS [JOINT CHIEFS]: Yes, sir.

LUKE ADAMS [STATE]: No, Mister President. I think that President Nemstov is under immense pressure by his own government and high-ranking officials in his military to appear strong and tough. I think that this policy we made isn't necessarily the issue, but it's that we did it without consulting the Russians.

ROBERT GATES [DEFENSE]: Consulting the Russians? What else should we consult the Russians about, Mister Secretary? Should they have a say in how many warships we're allowed to build, or what laws congress can pass? We can't just run everything through the Russians.

LUKE ADAMS [STATE]: Secretary Gates, we both know you're using a strawman argument there. I'm not saying we should run everything by the Russians. But think about it from their perspective, this probably seems like a pretty big slap in the face to them.

LUCY MARSH [CIA]: Mister President, I agree with Secretary Adams. The Russians, or at least President Nemstov, are expecting you to treat them like an international partner, since that is how you worded things when you were running for President. When you're working on a project with a partner, you make major decisions like this with the informed consent of the other partner. Keep in mind that this potential summit predates your presidency. President Gore reached out to President Nemstov, and he seemed receptive then too. We only have so much grace from the Russians before they start to think that we're leading them along.

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL [VPOTUS]: Director Marsh, are you suggesting that we publicly abandon Strategic Accountability right after we have put it in place? I mean, sure the Russians would be getting what they want, but their entire culture is all about strength. Wouldn't that concession do more harm than good?

LUCY MARSH [CIA]: Abandoning the policy is not a sound option, Mister Vice President. It would indeed make us look weak to the Russians and the rest of the world.

ROBERT GATES [DEFENSE]: Mister President, I think we're forgetting part of the bigger picture here. I don't think that the Russians are upset with this policy because we didn't include them in making it, I think they're upset because they want to continue to be one of the biggest arms dealers in the world, and they want to export strategic weapons as well. This is all about money and somewhat about Russian pride too. Mister President, you should send a response to President Nemstov and tell him that you regret that our policy has frustrated them, but that it's only temporary and for the better of the entire world until we get some kind of international agreement in place. If he's a man of his word, they'll still send someone to the conference.

LUKE ADAMS [STATE]: He probably is a man of his word, whatever the Russian version of that is. The problem is that kind of response would make us, or more specifically the President, look like he isn't a man of his word. If we do that we'd be setting back relations with the Russians at best, and making them resent us while making President Nemstov look stupid at worst.

BENJAMIN SINCLAIR [POTUS]: So, we can't abandon the policy and we also cannot uphold the policy and tell the Russians to punch sand. I want an outcome where President Nemstov can see that I made a genuine mistake, that we are taking a step to make up for it, that we want to work with them, but that we are also still standing strong on our policy... Alice, you've been quiet. What are your thoughts?

ALICE FINK [N.S. ADVISOR]: ...Mister President, I think that the two greatest gestures you could make for the Russians would be to be honest why we put this policy in place in the first place, and the modify the policy.

BENJAMIN SINCLAIR [POTUS]: I don't think anyone has suggested that we lie, Alice. What do you mean?

ALICE FINK [N.S. ADVISOR]: A lie by omission is still a lie. We're not being honest with them about why we had to shoot from the hip with this policy instead of waiting for the summit to put policy in place: that imperial proclamation from France made us concerned that they'll start selling ICBMs and Anthrax or something worse to Thailand and any other rogue state just so that they can start crawling their way out of the immense debt that they're in. Tell President Nemstov that, tell him that we had no choice but to act hastily, tell him "sorry" in some kind of diplomatic way, and also tell him that the State Department will modify the policy so that it does not, in any way, apply to the Russian Federation. That way the Russians don't have the policy apply to them and Nemstov has a valid explanation for his advisors and generals, we can limit the reputational damage to the White House and the State Department, and we can keep the policy.

ROBERT GATES [DEFENSE]: And then what, we'll make exceptions for Sweden, China, and the French?

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL [VPOTUS]: Amending the policy for one country does seem kind of.... open ended.

LUKE ADAMS [STATE]: I like Alice's approach. What we can do is make the amendment and release a statement that this is a one-time change and that this is the only exception... In fact, maybe we can call it a "clarification." The optics would probably be a bit better.

BENJAMIN SINCLAIR [POTUS]: I don't think that would be a direct enough way to do it... I think it needs to come from me, somehow. I'm not exactly sure how we would do it.

SEAN LANGLEY [JUSTICE]: Mister President, you could issue an executive order that states that the policy does not apply to the Russian Federation. Executive orders, as you know, hold the force of law and are a legal order from you to the rest of the government. The State Department wouldn't need to amend the policy, because you just amended it yourself with the powers of the presidency... You could sign the executive order here in the Oval Office, and then walk the fifteen feet to the press briefing room, stand at the podium, and briefly explain the executive order and then take questions. That would be the most simple, streamlined, and direct way to do this.

ALICE FINK [N.S. ADVISOR]: I agree with the Attorney General, that would be a great way to do it....

LUKE ADAMS [STATE]: Maybe you could even get Nemstov to watch the press briefing live. Send him a message early that morning and explain everything to him, and tell him that you will sign an executive order at 1:00 P.M. in Washington to exempt Russia from the policy. That would be 9:00 P.M. in Moscow. Sign the executive order at 1:00, and then talk to the press and answer their questions. If that is not the best way to correct this, then I don't know what is. We maintain the policy, but we exempt the Russians. You can explain to the press, if they ask, why the Russians are being exempted. Say that it was a miscalculation and that we want the United States and Russia, as the two most powerful countries in the world, to set an example and work together... Something like that.

BENJAMIN SINCLAIR [POTUS]: So, send the message to President Nemstov in the morning, sign the executive order at 1:00, and then I give the press briefing immediately after and answer all of the hardest questions that the vultures can throw at me. Are we missing anything?

HARVEY BAKER [CHIEF OF STAFF]: Thank you, everyone.​