- May 4, 2021
- 2,886
The Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) was a highly advanced over-the-horizon radar systems with a range of air survey detection of target at approximately 3,000 kilometers and its maritime surveillance capabilities were inherently limited to a shorter range of around 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers. The overstated air and sea surveillance range of 4,000 kilometers was a significant overstatement and it was unlikely to detect the presence of the Polish force, and Thai’s at large.
The discrepancy in the Australian sophisticated JORN radar system arose from the fundamental physics of over-the-horizon radar technology, which heavily relied on the ionosphere to refract and propagate signals over long distances. Due to these factors, the ionosphere’s properties and its ability to refract signals effectively vary depending on factors such as frequency, time of day, solar activity, and atmospheric conditions, which ultimately limited JORN’s maximum range.
Moreover, even if the Australian Government and its proud Armed Forces had traveled into the future to acquire such a technological marvel of the over-the-horizon radar system, the JORN would be in no position to identify specific vessel types and formations based on their shapes, facts that could not be challenge due to the inherent limitation of the over-the-horizon radar system. JORN’s resolution would have no idea how incapable it was to not be able to reliably distinguish between different classes of vessels or identify their nationalities based solely on their radar signatures. Over-the-horizon radars like JORN were designed primarily for wide-area surveillance and target detection, but they lacked the high-resolution imaging capabilities required for detailed target identification and classification. While JORN could detect and track maritime targets, it could not provide the level of granular detail implied in the prompt made by the Australian high command, such as discerning the specific types of vessels or their formations.
Furthermore, the JORN’s system would not able to cover the majority of Indonesia, Singapore, and some parts of Malaysia, which was a clear exaggeration if anyone had done so, but the Thai force would remain there and know nothing. Given that the JORN’s primary focus was on the Australian’s northern approaches, its effective coverage was primarily limited to maritime regions surrounding Australia’s northern coastline. Additionally, the JORN system would not be able to serve as a standalone system capable of seamlessly integrating with various other sensors and surveillance equipment as the Australian Government tried to attempt.
Owen
The discrepancy in the Australian sophisticated JORN radar system arose from the fundamental physics of over-the-horizon radar technology, which heavily relied on the ionosphere to refract and propagate signals over long distances. Due to these factors, the ionosphere’s properties and its ability to refract signals effectively vary depending on factors such as frequency, time of day, solar activity, and atmospheric conditions, which ultimately limited JORN’s maximum range.
Moreover, even if the Australian Government and its proud Armed Forces had traveled into the future to acquire such a technological marvel of the over-the-horizon radar system, the JORN would be in no position to identify specific vessel types and formations based on their shapes, facts that could not be challenge due to the inherent limitation of the over-the-horizon radar system. JORN’s resolution would have no idea how incapable it was to not be able to reliably distinguish between different classes of vessels or identify their nationalities based solely on their radar signatures. Over-the-horizon radars like JORN were designed primarily for wide-area surveillance and target detection, but they lacked the high-resolution imaging capabilities required for detailed target identification and classification. While JORN could detect and track maritime targets, it could not provide the level of granular detail implied in the prompt made by the Australian high command, such as discerning the specific types of vessels or their formations.
Furthermore, the JORN’s system would not able to cover the majority of Indonesia, Singapore, and some parts of Malaysia, which was a clear exaggeration if anyone had done so, but the Thai force would remain there and know nothing. Given that the JORN’s primary focus was on the Australian’s northern approaches, its effective coverage was primarily limited to maritime regions surrounding Australia’s northern coastline. Additionally, the JORN system would not be able to serve as a standalone system capable of seamlessly integrating with various other sensors and surveillance equipment as the Australian Government tried to attempt.
Owen
