- Oct 3, 2018
- 3,013
Security Classification: TOP SECRET
SITUATION REPORT
| In preparation for the upcoming Ukrainian elections, Russian Intelligence Services the SVR, have been tasked with overseeing operations designed to counter the rising influence of anti-Russian parties and prevent the consolidation of pro-Western alliances. In addition, the ability for pro-Western parties to support Western integration of Ukraine, particularly the Anglo-American-led efforts to establish a foothold in the region, are of concern for Moscow. The operation will employ a range of strategies, including the deployment of human and AI-driven bots to manipulate online discourse, spread disinformation, and sway public sentiment in favor of pro-Russian factions. Additionally, human intelligence (HUMINT) assets will infiltrate key electoral structures to ensure the manipulation of voter outcomes, including ballot stuffing and influencing local election officials. The primary objective is to safeguard Russian geopolitical interests in Ukraine, ensuring that anti-Russian factions do not gain significant power, which could pave the way for closer ties between Ukraine and ISAF, undermining Russia’s influence. Another key element is the protection of the rights and interests of Russian ethnic minorities in Eastern Ukraine, ensuring their representation and preventing their marginalization by nationalist and ultranationalist factions. |
BELLIGERENTS
BLUFOR
OPFOR: 
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CAMPAIGN REGISTER
| Operation | Objective | Status |
| Preparation November 1st - 8th 2005 | The operation will begin with the cyber division mapping the online political landscape and identifying vulnerable points in Ukraine's electoral infrastructure. SVR cyber teams will target social media platforms, messaging apps, and news outlets to begin amplifying pro-Russian narratives, discrediting opposing parties (especially pro-European groups such as Our Ukraine and Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc), and reinforcing Party of Regions talking points. Concurrently, HUMINT agents will be deployed across Ukrainian regions to begin identifying key locations for physical ballot stuffing. These agents will monitor polling stations, bribing low-level election officials and gathering intel on voting schedules and patterns. Flight approvals will be obtained to allow undercover agents, arriving as Ukranian-Russian couples, British tourists, Polish students, and Ukranian nationals to travel undetected into different regions. Covert communication systems will be set up to enable encrypted data transfer and updates to home base. SVR cyber teams will initiate the primary phase of the online operation. Bots will be employed across various online platforms to influence public discourse and disrupt the social media presence of Our Ukraine and the Socialist Party. The goal is to spread divisive content, promote fear about potential instability from Ukrainian nationalism, and heighten tensions among pro-European voters. At the same time, agents operating in Ukrainian cities will begin physically surveying polling stations, identifying weak points in election security, and using relationships with local election officials to gain access to facilities. Cyber teams will prioritize evading detection from Ukrainian authorities, ensuring that no unusual traffic patterns are traced back to Russian IP addresses | Active |
| Phase I November 9st - November 10th 2005 | The cyber team will scale up its activity, focusing on destabilizing specific high-stakes races where the Party of Regions is in direct competition with pro-European candidates. Social media algorithms will be used to push targeted disinformation campaigns, particularly around issues of economic instability, foreign influence, and corruption within pro-European parties. Bots will spread fake news, fabricate endorsements, and create fake voter testimonies to sway undecided voters towards the Party of Regions. HUMINT agents will finalize their preparations for the actual ballot stuffing operations, coordinating with local proxies to ensure that each station is adequately supplied with the false ballots including false flag operations stuffing ballots in favor of Ukraine's ultranationalist Right Sector and the Our Ukraine movement. The agents will work through a complex web of intermediaries to avoid detection and using the voter poll list information to create legitimate ballots to not trigger suspicion. Secure communication channels will be used to synchronize the cyber campaign with ground operations, ensuring that the influence efforts are maximally effective and aligned. | Planned |
| Phase II November 11th - November 13h 2005 | HUMINT agents will be deployed to targeted polling stations in regions with close races or areas known to favor pro-European parties. These agents will use their influence over local election officials to insert large quantities of pre-marked ballots in favor of the Party of Regions. At the same time, the cyber operation will go into overdrive—amplifying messages that attack the credibility of the opposition, particularly focusing on fabricated claims of foreign interference in the election. False narratives about election fraud and Western involvement will be widely spread, sowing distrust in the pro-European factions. All agents involved in the ballot stuffing will use disposable identities and local cover stories to minimize risk of exposure. Secure data collection will be used to monitor the success of both the cyber influence operations and the physical ballot manipulation. | Planned |
| Conclusion November 15th 2005 | Once the election results begin to filter in, SVR agents will continue to monitor online sentiment, analyzing the effectiveness of the cyber operations and ensuring that the Party of Regions maintains the perception of a legitimate victory. The ballot stuffing will be discreetly covered up, with the results being altered in such a way that they appear credible despite the manipulations. The SVR’s success in shifting voter sentiment through online influence and securing fraudulent votes through HUMINT will have secured the desired outcome—ensuring that pro-Russian influence is solidified within Ukraine. Post-election, the SVR will conduct a thorough review of the operation, gathering lessons for future influence campaigns. The agents will secure all evidence, ensuring that no direct link to the Russian government is left uncovered. Any remaining ballot fraud will be handled by trusted agents within local law enforcement to minimize the risk of exposure. SVR assets will begin extraction plans and leave at various points to match their cover stories. | Planned |
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