- May 22, 2020
- 1,858
Conference Room 1, Floor 10, The Office - Warsaw, Poland - 0800 Local
Private, Secure, All Documentation Secured Above Top Secret within The Office
The atmosphere within the secure conference room on the top floor of the Office of State Protection headquarters, known as ‘The Office’ by those that worked there, was charged with anticipation as senior intelligence officers gathered for a high-level meeting. The agenda, only known by those secured within the room, was a discussion for launching a new global initiative leveraging Polish university students studying abroad for intelligence operations.
Situated around the large table that dominated the center of the room, devoid of all electronic devices that would be capable of spying for potential enemies, were the key members of the various departments that would be involved with the operation. Heading the meeting was the newly minted director, Katarzyna Nowak. Seated around the table from her left, going around the table would be the Deputy Director of Division III, Tomasz Lewandowski, Head of Recruitment and Training, Anna Zielińska, Regional Case Officers from the key geographic regions. For the Americas would be Agents Jan Kowalski, Piotr Zieliński, and Anna Wiśniewska. For Europe would be Agents Marek Kamiński, Zofia Lewandowska, Tomasz Szymański, Magdalena Kaczmarek, Wojciech Wójcik. For Africa and the Middle East would be Agents Agnieszka Woźniak, Jakub Kozłowski, Ewa Jankowska, Michał Król, Dorota Baran, Bartosz Czerwiński. For Asia would be Agents Izabela Górska, Paweł Jabłoński, Alicja Michalska. For Oceania would be Agents Krzysztof Zawadzki and Sylwia Pawlak. Several technical specialists would be brought in to offer their key insight in how to manage the operations technology. Finally, seated to the Director’s immediate right, the Advisor on Psychological Operations Dr. Dr. Piotr Kowalczyk would be ready to offer his insights on the capabilities of the students.
Director Nowak would begin the meeting. “I am aware I have not been in the position of director for very long but in today’s rapidly changing world, it is my belief that intelligence gathering and influence operations require innovative and covert methods. I believe Poland is the forerunner in intelligence gathering to date and it is with this thought that I have decided to discuss with you potential operations abroad, utilizing our students. Poland’s unique position of having key treaties allowing our students easier access to foreign nations allows us to act before our enemies. Today, I hope we begin to lay the groundwork for an operation that will extend our reach and safeguard our nation’s global interests.
Deputy Director Tomasz Lewandowski would proceed with an overview of the potential operation that he had chosen to name Project Alma Mater to the attendees. Several folders, one for each attendee, would be provided for their perusal as the Deputy Director spoke on each subject that pertained to him.
“As the new Director has stated, we are laying the framework for a large-scale international intelligence gathering operation encompassing many nations of the world. We would utilize these operatives to collect vital intelligence on political, economic, and technological developments and to influence foreign universities and public opinion of Poland to be more in favor. We would target key nations that we feel are currently a threat to Poland’s national security or could be a future thread. We will also be targeting key nations that would offer a strategic interest for Poland’s global agenda. To achieve these goals we would need to reach out to Polish students interested in serving their country, getting them the necessary training to operate as intelligence operatives and then deploying them abroad. It is my understanding that this is close to, if not the, largest intelligence operation in modern history and one that won’t come to light for decades to come.
Head of Recruitment and Training, Anna Zielińska would request the attendees to flip to the appropriate page of the folders before discussing her aspect of the operation.
“Having done the appropriate research towards the posed hypothetical operation, I feel would need to have a strict selection criteria for operatives. Recruiting students in critical fields who also exhibit high academic performance, language proficiency, and cultural adaptability would be crucial. The recruitment process would need to be extensive and need to be undertaken for several months before the students are even approached to insure OPSEC. This would need to be followed by official recruitment and comprehensive training in intelligence techniques. Training would need to be quite comprehensive as well. Intelligence gathering, secure communication methods, counter-surveillance, cultural and political briefings, and influence operations would all need to be covered by the training modules before the operation would begin.”
The regional case officers would flip the pages to the pages the concerned their respective regions of operation.
“The Americas would be simple in terms of where they would be located. The United States and Canada are the only real concerns in the region. Especially Canada. With all of the recent regime changes for the nation is a big concern for our department. I would avoid the United States. They are our closest ally in the region and it would not be good to alienate them.”
“Europe would be more difficult to determine where our students would need to go. Best guesses immediately would be France, Portugal, Spain, Germany, Russia, and the UK. Like the U.S., it is our opinion that it would be best to not alienate our closest partners in the region and thus should avoid sending forces into the United Kingdom and Russia. I am aware our Foreign Affairs Ministry is making headway in securing a concrete diplomatic relationship with the current regime of the Russian Federation and any spies caught within would certainly damage those relations.”
“Africa and the Middle-East isn’t pretty cut and dry as other regions. The only real regional power is Egypt and we boast a positive relationship with them so it would be best to not damage our relationship with them currently. There are several minor powers within the region that we should work to infiltrate but they are not stable and would pose a significant problem for agents should they be caught. Syria and Iraq being two of them.”
“Asia is much like Europe and it is difficult to determine where our operatives would best serve. Japan is one nation. Korea and China are two other key locations within the region. Of course the most prevalent cause for concern within the region is Thailand. Their recent foray in socialism and previous international incidents between foreign actors, including Poland, brings them to the top of the list. Let’s not forget that we have audio logs of key members within the Thai government conversing with suspected ringleaders of the New Caledonian insurgent organization.”
“Oceania is much like Africa and the Americas. There are no real big contenders except for New Zealand and Australia. Australia’s actions with Thailand could be useful in these intelligence operations. Their actions and lack of professionalism within the New Caledonian operation also causes concern for our regional department.”
The Technical services team would offer their advice on the technical aspects of the operation.
“Communicating with our agents outside of the Embassy would be imperative to not blow their cover. Encrypted messaging apps and secure email protocols would work best for non-critical communications between operatives and handlers. While there would be security risks involved with the usage, utilizing them for non-critical communications mitigates the risk of them getting caught. End-to-end encryption is a must, however, to prevent unauthorized access to the messages. We would also recommend utilizing an onion routing browser such as Tor to allow the agents to communicate more critical information. Digital dead drops would offer an alternative to physical dead drops for critical communications when real time communication is not feasible or deemed unsafe. This would involve encrypted files stored in cloud services or hidden within public online spaces. They would only be accessible to those who held the decryption key. We could utilize the public sector to provide things such as encrypted messaging apps and emails but it might behoove us to begin working with public agencies to establish Polish versions of these to ease the suspicion of them being utilized abroad.”
“The Psychological aspect of the operations contains a lot more variables in the players. It would rely on the students forming personal bonds with fellow students and professors but also ingraining themselves with communities during their time abroad. The first would be strategically picking a topic of research per operative or groups of operatives. We would need to pick topics that align with our broader influence goals while also focusing on areas that resonate with the current societal concerns and policy debates. Students, however, can position their work to have a greater impact than your typical spy. They would need to frame their research and their studies so that it can influence the interpretation and the reception of their work. This is accomplished by emphasizing certain aspects while they downplay others, this way they can subtly guide the readers toward the desired conclusion. They can also engage in collaborations with other academics and work to insure that their research is widely cited so that they can amplify its reach and credibility. The students can also work on social media to create and share content that supports their research and perspectives. I would recommend blogs and video blogs of their time in a foreign nation while also using their unique position to influence nations. Network building is also important for the operatives. Effective engagement on social media is not just broadcasting messages but also actively participating in discussions, commenting on the relevant posts, and responding to queries. This two-way interaction helps build credibility and trust.”
Director Nowak would conclude the meeting with a simple call to action. “This initiative is going to be a testament to our indomitable spirit and our commitment to safeguarding the Kingdom of Poland. We are entrusting our future generation and leaders with a critical mission that will ensure the safety of Poland. Let’s ensure that they have the support and resources needed to succeed at their jobs.
With that the meeting was adjourned and all relevant documents of the meeting would be brought to the secure holding room for Division III by the Director alongside two armed Agents of Division III. Each piece of paper and document would be filed away in a secured biometric safe within the storage room. The other members of the meeting set off with a sense of urgency and determination. The groundwork was laid and the wheels were set in motion for a new chapter in Polish intelligence operations, and international espionage.
Private, Secure, All Documentation Secured Above Top Secret within The Office
The atmosphere within the secure conference room on the top floor of the Office of State Protection headquarters, known as ‘The Office’ by those that worked there, was charged with anticipation as senior intelligence officers gathered for a high-level meeting. The agenda, only known by those secured within the room, was a discussion for launching a new global initiative leveraging Polish university students studying abroad for intelligence operations.
Situated around the large table that dominated the center of the room, devoid of all electronic devices that would be capable of spying for potential enemies, were the key members of the various departments that would be involved with the operation. Heading the meeting was the newly minted director, Katarzyna Nowak. Seated around the table from her left, going around the table would be the Deputy Director of Division III, Tomasz Lewandowski, Head of Recruitment and Training, Anna Zielińska, Regional Case Officers from the key geographic regions. For the Americas would be Agents Jan Kowalski, Piotr Zieliński, and Anna Wiśniewska. For Europe would be Agents Marek Kamiński, Zofia Lewandowska, Tomasz Szymański, Magdalena Kaczmarek, Wojciech Wójcik. For Africa and the Middle East would be Agents Agnieszka Woźniak, Jakub Kozłowski, Ewa Jankowska, Michał Król, Dorota Baran, Bartosz Czerwiński. For Asia would be Agents Izabela Górska, Paweł Jabłoński, Alicja Michalska. For Oceania would be Agents Krzysztof Zawadzki and Sylwia Pawlak. Several technical specialists would be brought in to offer their key insight in how to manage the operations technology. Finally, seated to the Director’s immediate right, the Advisor on Psychological Operations Dr. Dr. Piotr Kowalczyk would be ready to offer his insights on the capabilities of the students.
Director Nowak would begin the meeting. “I am aware I have not been in the position of director for very long but in today’s rapidly changing world, it is my belief that intelligence gathering and influence operations require innovative and covert methods. I believe Poland is the forerunner in intelligence gathering to date and it is with this thought that I have decided to discuss with you potential operations abroad, utilizing our students. Poland’s unique position of having key treaties allowing our students easier access to foreign nations allows us to act before our enemies. Today, I hope we begin to lay the groundwork for an operation that will extend our reach and safeguard our nation’s global interests.
Deputy Director Tomasz Lewandowski would proceed with an overview of the potential operation that he had chosen to name Project Alma Mater to the attendees. Several folders, one for each attendee, would be provided for their perusal as the Deputy Director spoke on each subject that pertained to him.
“As the new Director has stated, we are laying the framework for a large-scale international intelligence gathering operation encompassing many nations of the world. We would utilize these operatives to collect vital intelligence on political, economic, and technological developments and to influence foreign universities and public opinion of Poland to be more in favor. We would target key nations that we feel are currently a threat to Poland’s national security or could be a future thread. We will also be targeting key nations that would offer a strategic interest for Poland’s global agenda. To achieve these goals we would need to reach out to Polish students interested in serving their country, getting them the necessary training to operate as intelligence operatives and then deploying them abroad. It is my understanding that this is close to, if not the, largest intelligence operation in modern history and one that won’t come to light for decades to come.
Head of Recruitment and Training, Anna Zielińska would request the attendees to flip to the appropriate page of the folders before discussing her aspect of the operation.
“Having done the appropriate research towards the posed hypothetical operation, I feel would need to have a strict selection criteria for operatives. Recruiting students in critical fields who also exhibit high academic performance, language proficiency, and cultural adaptability would be crucial. The recruitment process would need to be extensive and need to be undertaken for several months before the students are even approached to insure OPSEC. This would need to be followed by official recruitment and comprehensive training in intelligence techniques. Training would need to be quite comprehensive as well. Intelligence gathering, secure communication methods, counter-surveillance, cultural and political briefings, and influence operations would all need to be covered by the training modules before the operation would begin.”
The regional case officers would flip the pages to the pages the concerned their respective regions of operation.
“The Americas would be simple in terms of where they would be located. The United States and Canada are the only real concerns in the region. Especially Canada. With all of the recent regime changes for the nation is a big concern for our department. I would avoid the United States. They are our closest ally in the region and it would not be good to alienate them.”
“Europe would be more difficult to determine where our students would need to go. Best guesses immediately would be France, Portugal, Spain, Germany, Russia, and the UK. Like the U.S., it is our opinion that it would be best to not alienate our closest partners in the region and thus should avoid sending forces into the United Kingdom and Russia. I am aware our Foreign Affairs Ministry is making headway in securing a concrete diplomatic relationship with the current regime of the Russian Federation and any spies caught within would certainly damage those relations.”
“Africa and the Middle-East isn’t pretty cut and dry as other regions. The only real regional power is Egypt and we boast a positive relationship with them so it would be best to not damage our relationship with them currently. There are several minor powers within the region that we should work to infiltrate but they are not stable and would pose a significant problem for agents should they be caught. Syria and Iraq being two of them.”
“Asia is much like Europe and it is difficult to determine where our operatives would best serve. Japan is one nation. Korea and China are two other key locations within the region. Of course the most prevalent cause for concern within the region is Thailand. Their recent foray in socialism and previous international incidents between foreign actors, including Poland, brings them to the top of the list. Let’s not forget that we have audio logs of key members within the Thai government conversing with suspected ringleaders of the New Caledonian insurgent organization.”
“Oceania is much like Africa and the Americas. There are no real big contenders except for New Zealand and Australia. Australia’s actions with Thailand could be useful in these intelligence operations. Their actions and lack of professionalism within the New Caledonian operation also causes concern for our regional department.”
The Technical services team would offer their advice on the technical aspects of the operation.
“Communicating with our agents outside of the Embassy would be imperative to not blow their cover. Encrypted messaging apps and secure email protocols would work best for non-critical communications between operatives and handlers. While there would be security risks involved with the usage, utilizing them for non-critical communications mitigates the risk of them getting caught. End-to-end encryption is a must, however, to prevent unauthorized access to the messages. We would also recommend utilizing an onion routing browser such as Tor to allow the agents to communicate more critical information. Digital dead drops would offer an alternative to physical dead drops for critical communications when real time communication is not feasible or deemed unsafe. This would involve encrypted files stored in cloud services or hidden within public online spaces. They would only be accessible to those who held the decryption key. We could utilize the public sector to provide things such as encrypted messaging apps and emails but it might behoove us to begin working with public agencies to establish Polish versions of these to ease the suspicion of them being utilized abroad.”
“The Psychological aspect of the operations contains a lot more variables in the players. It would rely on the students forming personal bonds with fellow students and professors but also ingraining themselves with communities during their time abroad. The first would be strategically picking a topic of research per operative or groups of operatives. We would need to pick topics that align with our broader influence goals while also focusing on areas that resonate with the current societal concerns and policy debates. Students, however, can position their work to have a greater impact than your typical spy. They would need to frame their research and their studies so that it can influence the interpretation and the reception of their work. This is accomplished by emphasizing certain aspects while they downplay others, this way they can subtly guide the readers toward the desired conclusion. They can also engage in collaborations with other academics and work to insure that their research is widely cited so that they can amplify its reach and credibility. The students can also work on social media to create and share content that supports their research and perspectives. I would recommend blogs and video blogs of their time in a foreign nation while also using their unique position to influence nations. Network building is also important for the operatives. Effective engagement on social media is not just broadcasting messages but also actively participating in discussions, commenting on the relevant posts, and responding to queries. This two-way interaction helps build credibility and trust.”
Director Nowak would conclude the meeting with a simple call to action. “This initiative is going to be a testament to our indomitable spirit and our commitment to safeguarding the Kingdom of Poland. We are entrusting our future generation and leaders with a critical mission that will ensure the safety of Poland. Let’s ensure that they have the support and resources needed to succeed at their jobs.
With that the meeting was adjourned and all relevant documents of the meeting would be brought to the secure holding room for Division III by the Director alongside two armed Agents of Division III. Each piece of paper and document would be filed away in a secured biometric safe within the storage room. The other members of the meeting set off with a sense of urgency and determination. The groundwork was laid and the wheels were set in motion for a new chapter in Polish intelligence operations, and international espionage.
