- Oct 3, 2018
- 3,487
| TYPE | Infrastructure |
| BUILDER | Kurdistan Workers' Party |
| CLIENT | Kurdistan Workers' Party |
| SITE LOCATION | Syria |
| SECTOR | Military |
| PROJECT NAME | Infrastructure Building |
| PROJECT COST | 75,000,000.00 |
| COMPLETION DATE | 6/9/2025 |
| PROJECT INFORMATION | The PKK, following the December Coup, would be ousted from government. Many in the group didn't think peace was possible and split to form the TAK. However, now out of power, the PKK promised to resume its militant struggle. With the civil war in Syria brewing, the PKK wanted to use the vacuum in the Kurdish-held regions of Northern Syria to develop a dispersed but durable network of operational infrastructure, prioritizing training, supply, munitions storage, repair capacity, and command coordination. The aim would be to build enough facilities to sustain a steady flow of fighters and materiel while avoiding detection and destruction by airstrikes or artillery. The plan would allocate funds to construct six to eight training camps, each accommodating 150–200 fighters. These camps would be simple but functional, shielded by camouflage netting, shooting ranges dug into natural depressions to limit visibility, and obstacle courses integrated into treelines or olive groves. Structures would be made from locally available stone, wood, and corrugated sheet metal, with tents and lighter equipment regularly shifted to new positions to avoid leaving identifiable patterns in satellite imagery. Mock urban environments for close-quarters training would be built from scavenged building materials to simulate street fighting. To ensure operational endurance, the network would include roughly twelve to fifteen supply depots, each dug into low ridgelines or built within abandoned farmhouses. Consisting mainly of shallow earth-covered storage chambers lined with wood or scrap metal, but still capable of holding up to three months’ worth of food, fuel, medical supplies, and spare parts for a battalion-sized unit. Entrances would be hidden with tarps, false walls, or piles of debris, and access paths would be disguised by brush and loose soil. Munitions storage would focus on concealment over fortification. They'd create ten to twelve ammunition caches, each dug into embankments, caves, or disused basements. These would hold assault rifles, machine guns, RPGs, ATGMs, mortar rounds, and improvised rocket components. Instead of heavy reinforced concrete, these sites would rely on earth cover, sandbag walls, and natural terrain masking. A mix of vegetation planting and debris camouflage would reduce aerial recognition, and ammunition would be dispersed among several sites to limit losses from single strikes. Repair and fabrication capability would be provided by six to eight field workshops. These would be set up in small warehouses, large tents, or roofed sheds disguised as agricultural buildings. They would be equipped with basic welding and machining tools, generator power, and covered bays for maintaining technicals, motorcycles, and trucks. The workshops would also produce improvised munitions and repair communications equipment, with work timed to night hours to avoid attracting attention from drones. To coordinate the network, eight to ten rudimentary command and communications posts would be established. These would be adapted from basements, partially buried rooms, or concealed upper floors of village structures. Communications gear, including encrypted radios, satellite phones, and signal relays, would be hidden inside civilian-appearing structures such as water towers or minaret-like frames. Fiber lines, where feasible, would be run along existing irrigation channels to blend with civilian infrastructure. The entire system would be designed to blend with its surroundings rather than stand out as fortified military construction. Many sites would be integrated into abandoned villages, ruined industrial buildings, or derelict farmsteads. Local materials would be used extensively to ensure visual continuity, and decoy positions would be erected to mislead reconnaissance. With careful site selection and rotation of high-value assets between locations, seventy-five million dollars could yield a network of forty to fifty functional, concealed facilities capable of sustaining several thousand fighters over an extended conflict. Reconnaissance teams have already identified and surveyed rural and semi-abandoned areas, focusing on natural cover, terrain masking, and proximity to supply routes. |
