Thailand | Operation Mediterranean I

[Bossza007]

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Title: Operation Mediterranean I
Document Number: RTAF-MEDTE-001/2003
Classification: Semi-Confidential | Secret
Security Level: NSST Protocol + Traditional Maximum Secure Encrypted Method
Date: July 20, 2003

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XI. IntroductionX

Background and Objective

With HTMS Sukhothai being in the process of transferring assets from the RTN Coast Guard to the RTN Middle East Command, Naval Expeditionary Group Five (NEG5) situated in Iskenderun Naval Base would prepare for any immediate deployment in case the situation in Rome escalated.

In the second objective, the NEG5 would occasionally patrol within the Mediterranean Sea to ensure free trade of the region.

XII. Command and ControlX

2.1 Guidance

This operation is conducted under the guidance of the Defense Minister, Sutin Klungsang, and approval from Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

XIII. Operational ForcesX

Republic Thai Navy Middle East Command
Republic Thai Navy Third Fleet

•  Naval Expeditionary Group Five (NEG5)
  • [1] Chakri Narubet-class light aircraft carrier
    • 601 Crew
      • HTMS Sukhothai Narubet
    • RTNAF Squadron 505
      • 240 Crews
        • [24 Eurocopter EC725]
  • [15] Naresuan-class Friage
    • 2,250 Crew
      • HTMS Thong Lan
      • HTMS Ramrachathirat
      • HTMS Intharacha
      • HTMS Borommarachathirat II
      • HTMS Borommatrailokkanat
      • HTMS Ratsadathirat
      • HTMS Chairacha
      • HTMS Ram Khamhaeng
      • HTMS Mahinthrathirat
      • HTMS Maha Thammarachathirat
      • HTMS Ekathotsarot
      • HTMS Si Saowaphak
      • HTMS Phraya Aphaiwong
      • HTMS Khamfan
      • HTMS Prince Thammalangka

Republic Thai Navy Auxiliary Fleet

• Logistic Support Squadron Eight (LSS8)
  • [2] Similan-class Replenishment Tanker (Type 908)
    • 314 Crew
      • HTMS Similan
      • HTMS Tachai
    • RTNAF Squadron 602
      • 20 Crew
        • [2] Eurocopter EC735

Republic Thai Army Tatvan/Bitlis Division

• 1st Tatvan/Bitlis Infantry Regiment
  • 100 Personnel
• 11th Tatvan/Bitlis Infantry Regiment
  • 100 Personnel
• Tatvan/Bitlis Combat Engineer Battalion
  • 75 Personnel
• Tatvan/Bitlis Signal Battalion Battalion
  • 75 Personnel
• Tatvan/Bitlis Combat Medical Battalion
  • 75 Personnel
• Tatvan/Bitlis Long Range Reconnaissance Company
  • 75 Personnel
• Tatvan/Bitlis Military Police Battalion
  • 75 Personnel
• Tatvan/Bitlis Service Support Regiment
  • 100 Personnel

XIV. ExecutionX

4.1 Initial Deployment

All personnel will be reported to the respective base with all necessary equipment per the Defense Ministry documents.

4.2 Communication

Effective communication among all the units must be maintained. Any unidentified or suspicious activity must be reported to the command center immediately.

4.3 Rules of Engagement

Engagement will be per the established Rule of Engagement (ROE) with the application of Increased Vigilance (IVG) and international laws. The use of force must be proportionate, and only used in self-defense or to deter identified threats after all non-lethal methods have been exhausted. They would never enter any country's territorial water

4.4 Support

Logistic support, including fuel, supplies, and maintenance, will be provided by the respective naval bases.

XV. CoordinationX

5.1 Inter-agency

Liaise with maritime agencies such as the Navy, Coast Guard, and Air Force to ensure maximum coverage and sharing of intelligence.

5.2 International

In case any foreign vessels or units are involved, contact must be established with the respective embassies or consulates and the situation must be reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

XVI. ConclusionX

The Defense Ministry has mobilized all necessary resources for the deployment of Operation Mediterranean I. The Defense Ministry expects that its contribution will represent Thailand's role as a world leader dedicated to peace, stability, and cooperation in the Mediterranean.

[Signature]
Sutin Klungsang
Defence Minister

[Signature]
Thaksin Shinawatra
Prime Minister, Republic of Thailand

Document Clearance:
The Office of the Prime Minister
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The National Intelligence Agency
The Republic Thai Air Force Command Center
The Republic Thai Navy Command Center
The Republic Thai Armed Forces Special Warfare & Operation Command

Distribution List:
The Office of the Prime Minister
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The National Intelligence Agency
The Republic Thai Air Force Command Center
The Republic Thai Navy Command Center
The Republic Thai Police
The Republic Armed Forces Headquarters
The Republic Thai Air Defense Command
The Naval Special Warfare Command
The Air Force Security Force Command

 

[Bossza007]

Secret unless contextual possible.​

The Republic Thai Navy Middle East Command (RTNMED) issued the deployment order for Operation Mediterranean I immediately, and all selected personnel gathered at the Iskenderun Naval Base. This assembly featured not only the RTNMED personnel mentioned above but also a force of 2,000 RTN District Force troops. Each person present was in excellent health as a consequence of intensive and ongoing physical and mental wellness programs designed expressly to prepare them for demanding operations such as this. Furthermore, all equipment and vessels allocated to this operation were in excellent shape, demonstrating the highest maintenance and care standards. Each vessel's structural integrity was extensively examined and certified to be at its best, guaranteeing that the fleet was not only ready for deployment but also properly equipped to meet the demands of Operation Mediterranean I with the highest efficiency and dependability.​

 

[Bossza007]

Secret unless contextual possible.​

The map of the Mediterranean Sea as constructed by the RTNMED​

For Naval Expeditionary Group Five (NEG5), based at the strategically important Iskenderun Naval Base, a new instruction has been issued by the Republic Thai Navy Middle East Command (RTNMED). Outfitted with fourteen modern and multi-role Naresuan-class Frigates, NEG5 has already given the RTNMED significant multirole combat capabilities. These versatile frigates were essential in ensuring the RTNMED maritime surveillance and strategic adaptability in the area.

The Naresuan-class Frigates would be equipped with 6 × Decoys Terma SKWS (C-Guard) for 24 x Terma DL-12T and 24 x Terma Mk.137 each, and ESM ITT ES-3601 (AN/SLQ-4), and ECM Type 984-1 noise jammer & Type 981-3 deception jammer, which both could reach the effective range of 80 to 100 kilometers. Their armament included 1 × 5 in/54 (127 mm) Mk 45 Mod 2 naval gun with 500 rounds, 2 × 30mm MSI-DSL DS30MR automated small caliber gun, 8 cell Mk.41 VLS for 32 x RIM-162 ESSM, 8 × RGM-84 Harpoon SSM launcher, and 2 × Triple Mark 32 Mod 5 torpedo tubes. They had Atlas DSQS-24d sonar (Active: 6-9 KHz | Passive 1-11 KHz) (Effective range 15 km Max: 40 km). They can travel for 5600 nautical miles (10371.2 kilometers) at 12 knots.

They began their patrol in the Mediterranean Sea, following the paths marked on the Transit Map by KM, JM, IM, and JN. To optimize their monitoring coverage and reaction times, the ships conducted this patrol in a scattered pattern. The deliberate planning that went into this strategic dispersal made sure that two ships were always in the vicinity of two important maritime chokepoints: the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. The warships were equipped with all the necessary supplies to carry out their mission. They were well supplied and had enough fuel before they left their base, so they could run the operation on their own. The planning allowed for a backup range of 500 kilometers or more over the predicted operational needs as a safety precaution for unanticipated problems or longer missions. This extra range served as a buffer, enabling longer patrol durations or diversions as needed without sacrificing their operational efficacy or requiring an early return for refueling and replenishment.

All onboard equipment, including the armament and surveillance systems, were kept operational during the mission. The systems' constant calibration and inspection ensured optimal performance, which demonstrated a dedication to upholding the highest readiness standards. Everyone on board were also at maximum preparedness. This high degree of readiness covered more than just operational tasks; it included their physical and psychological well-being. They had excellent health as a consequence of well-organized healthy living programs in addition to their demanding training and frequent exercises. This program made sure that every crew member was healthy, aware, and prepared to handle any circumstance by incorporating mental health assistance, regular exercise regimens, and balanced eating.​

 

[Bossza007]

Secret unless contextual possible.​

After successfully deploying NEG5 throughout the Mediterranean, the RTNMED launched a planned intelligence-sharing program to preserve transparency with surrounding countries. This endeavor entailed informing the governments of France, Spain, Egypt, Italy, Israel, and Turkey of the operations and presence of NEG5 in the area. Carefully constructed, within an encrypted line of the NSST protocol, to highlight their adherence to international maritime regulations and treaties, the communication emphasized how law-abiding their operations were. These governments received a communication outlining the precise aims and objectives of the NEG5 patrol. It emphasized the dedication to maintaining unrestricted trade and freedom of navigation, which is essential in an area of such strategic importance. To improve maritime security, the message also described NEG5's function as an escort service for civilian or commercial marine vessels. Additionally highlighted were the NEG5's anti-piracy activities, which emphasized their importance in thwarting maritime dangers. The statement also highlighted NEG5's capacity for operation as a catastrophe rapid response force, prepared to respond quickly to marine situations. In addition to this component of their mission, they also made a point of providing humanitarian assistance, showing the RTNMED's wider commitment to both protecting marine channels and supporting humanitarian activities in the area.

The RTNMED kindly invited all countries to voice any concerns they may have about Thai patrol activities in the Mediterranean Sea using the same secure communication channel that they used to communicate with other governments about their operations. With a diplomatic tone, this outreach emphasized the RTNMED's and Thailand's profound respect for each nation's sovereignty. The statement reaffirmed Thailand's dedication to treating all peoples' viewpoints equally and highly. This was not just a formality; rather, it was an honest attempt to have a conversation and answer any concerns or questions other nations may have about their naval activities.

Alexander Zak Kelly the Mad Isa Judea EnigmaMage​

 

[Bossza007]

Secret unless contextual possible.​

As per the formal paperwork, 675 soldiers were sent to the operational naval base of Naval Expeditionary Group Five (NEG5) in reaction to the transfer of HTMS Sukhothai from the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) Coast Guard to the Republic Thai Navy Middle East Command (RTNMED). A varied mix of crew members, each with specific duties and skills necessary for the operation and maintenance of HTMS Sukhothai, were included in this transfer. In addition to being carefully chosen based on their qualifications and experience, these staff members also received further briefings and training tailored to NEG5's Middle East operating needs and goals. The process of preparation made sure the crew was ready to blend in with the base's current forces and completely acclimated to the operating environment. In addition, the transfer was planned and carried out with precision to guarantee the least possible interference with the continuing activities of RTNMED and the RTN Coast Guard. Personnel movements were arranged with logistical accuracy, guaranteeing that all required gear and private property were moved effectively and safely to the NEG5 base so that they could be deployed right away.​

 

[Bossza007]

Secret unless contextual possible.​

Throughout the whole Mediterranean Sea, the Naval Expeditionary Group Five (NEG5) carried out its patrolling operations with success. Most of the vessels were moving constantly during their patrol schedule, carefully transiting the area to optimize their operating efficiency and coverage. Nevertheless, four ships were placed in fixed positions: HTMS Ramrachathirat, HTMS Intharacha, HTMS Borommarachathirat II, and HTMS Borommatrailokkanat. Within their respective domains, these tactically positioned boats functioned as critical hubs for communication, observation, and quick action. At all times, it was guaranteed that a minimum of six vessels, excluding the stationary ones, were actively patrolling various areas of the Mediterranean Sea. This arrangement ensured that Thailand will always have a significant and obvious naval presence in the area. These ships' constant motion made it possible for them to operate at a wide range, which improved NEG5's overall security and surveillance capabilities in the Mediterranean.

The Naresuan-class Frigates would be equipped with 6 × Decoys Terma SKWS (C-Guard) for 24 x Terma DL-12T and 24 x Terma Mk.137 each, and ESM ITT ES-3601 (AN/SLQ-4), and ECM Type 984-1 noise jammer & Type 981-3 deception jammer, which both could reach the effective range of 80 to 100 kilometers. Their armament included 1 × 5 in/54 (127 mm) Mk 45 Mod 2 naval gun with 500 rounds, 2 × 30mm MSI-DSL DS30MR automated small caliber gun, 8 cell Mk.41 VLS for 32 x RIM-162 ESSM, 8 × RGM-84 Harpoon SSM launcher for 8 × Harpoon Block II, and 2 × Triple Mark 32 Mod 5 torpedo tube with 6 × Mark 54. They had Atlas DSQS-24d sonar (Active: 6-9 KHz | Passive 1-11 KHz) (Effective range 15 km Max: 40 km). They can travel for 5600 nautical miles (10371.2 kilometers) at 12 knots.

The Gibraltar Strait was carefully guarded by the HTMS Ramrachathirat and HTMS Intharacha, who were dutifully assigned to their appointed tasks as watchful guardians of vital maritime chokepoints. The location of HTMS Ramrachathirat was precisely 36° 2'5.99"N 4°22'7.64"W, while that of HTMS Intharacha was 36° 5'47.27"N. Securing the Suez Canal was also the responsibility of the HTMS Borommarachathirat II and HTMS Borommatrailokkanat. The positions of HTMS Borommarachathirat II and HTMS Borommatrailokkanat were respectively 32°38'20.19"N 33°19'4.04"E and 32°32'3.22"N 31°19'10.98"E. These sites were chosen to offer thorough coverage of the Suez Canal, which is an essential route for transatlantic marine traffic between Europe and Asia.

A well-organized system was in place to provide continuous protection and monitoring in the event that any of the stationary vessels, including HTMS Ramrachathirat, HTMS Intharacha, HTMS Borommarachathirat II, or HTMS Borommatrailokkanat, needed to be refueled or resupplied. Other ships in the fleet were assigned to fill in for them while these times were going on. The unique demands and difficulties of the roles the replacement vessel were thoroughly explained to them. By doing this, it was made guaranteed that vital maritime chokepoints like the Suez Canal and the Gibraltar Strait would always be monitored and secure. When the restocking or refueling was finished, the initial ships would immediately take up their positions of advantage. They returned to their stations with accuracy and efficiency, reducing the amount of time they were gone from their assigned spots.​

 

[Bruno]

Secretly, the Portuguese Maritime Radars would easily detect the Thai's Vessels patrolling in the Gibraltar Straits, both ship's exact locations would be easily tracked and monitored, memories of the fleet a few months back would return to the High Ranking officials in the navy. After analyzing their movements it would be easily deemed they were not passing through, both were actively patrolling the area, this information would be immediately relayed to the British Command Jamie in Gibraltar, Spanish high command Zak, alongside the Portuguese President.

In a secret and classified way preparations would start to form an operation to monitor the Thai's ships movement and gather intel of their motives, as blocking the Straits would not only be an international incident, but it would also pose risks to the National Security of Portugal, Spain and British Gibraltar. The entrance of the straits were controlled and inside the Portuguese, Spanish and British EEZ and territorial waters.

So NRP São Rafael, NRP São Sabastião, NRP Flor do Mar, NRP Nossa Senhora do Vale and the NRP Afonso Cerqueira would be prepared and readied to set sail to the Straits of Gibraltar, which would be a small journey from the Lagos Naval Base.
The Batolomeu Dias Classes would be armed with; 16 × RIM-7 Sea Sparrow anti-air VLS; 8 × Boeing Harpoon anti-ship missile; 6 × FN MAG 7.62 mm machine gun; 4 × Browning M2 12.7 mm machine gun; 2 × Twin-Mark 46 torpedo tubes; 1 × OTO Melara 76 mm gun; 1 × Goalkeeper CIWS, all alongside their respective ammunition.

While the Vasco da Gama Classes would be armed with; 1 x 100 mm Mod68 CADAM polyvalent artillery piece; 1 x Phalanx CIWS 20 mm Vulcan anti-ship missile defense system; 2 x 3 12.75-inch Mark 46 torpedo in triple mountings; 2 x Mk 141 quad-pack Launcher for a maximum of 8 RGM-84 Harpoon; 1 x MK 21 Guided Missile Launching System for 8 RIM-7 Sea Sparrow.

Meanwhile, the Baptista de Andrade Class would be armed with; 1 × 100 mm (4 in) gun; 2 × single 40 mm/L70 Bofors guns; 2 × triple 12.75-inch (324 mm) ASW torpedo tubes.

All the ships would have their complements, their systems and countermeasure would also be active. The ship would also have an Eurocopter AS565 Panther on each, the Vasco da Gamas however would have two on board. These would have AS 15 TT anti-ship missiles armed alongside with the M621 cannon 20 mm (0.787 in) cannon pods.

All the ships would leave port secretly, being this a closed compound would be easily done. All the ships would be fueled and crewed, enough to make the journey various times over. They would move in square formation with the NRP Afonso Cerqueira traveling behind the square, they would all be far enough to do various maneuvers, but close enough to protect each other. They would be in high alert, which meant all systems, weapons and countermeasures were ready to be used.

Furthermore, they would move towards the location of the Thailand Ships which were patrolling the Gibraltar Strait. Upon arriving and having the element of surprise, they would contact the Thai's two ships.

"This is the NRP São Rafael, of the Portuguese Navy, state your intentions of patrolling an active merchant zone under the surveillance of the Portuguese Republic, you are also to close to known territorial water of Britain, Spain and the Portuguese Republic, which can pose severe threats to national security. Over."

The Portuguese fleet would remain close enough to engage in combat if needed, however they would not aim any weapons of the Thai's. Meanwhile, NRP Afonso Cerqueira would contact, secretly, the Lagos Naval base informing them of every moment. They would deem necessary to inform the Portuguese Air Force and request backup, they would also prepare 2x Lockheed P-3C Orion of the 601 - Squadron, they would however be prepared with 6× AGM-84 Harpoon on its wing station and 6 x Torpedo MK-46 in the internal bay. They would take turns, while one was surveying the area around the ships, another one would be refueling and restock on the closest Airbase in Portugal, this would be easily done considering their combat range of over 2000km. Likewise, they would fly in a good enough altitude to engage in combat.

The Portuguese Fleet would await the Thailand'a answer. Bossza007

 

[Bossza007]

Secret unless contextual possible.​

The map drafted bv the RTNMED​

As anyone with a keen analytical mind and sensible reasoning, akin to the acumen possessed by the astute Portuguese military personnel, would comprehend, their nearest Thales LW08 long-range surveillance radar, precisely located at the coordinates 37.11353008684812,-7.624598171373759, was in no position to detect or effectively track HTMS Ramrachathirat. This was primarily due to the considerable distance, over 315 kilometers, that separated the vessel from the radar's location. Furthermore, given the radar's technical specifications and operational range limits, it lacked the capability to engage in surveillance of targets at such an extended range. Thus, HTMS Ramrachathirat, positioned well beyond the radar's effective operational scope, remained undetected and untracked by this particular surveillance system.

Furthermore, radars operated primarily on the principle of line of sight. Due to the Earth's curvature, the line of sight of any ground-based radar was inherently limited. The radar horizon, which demarcates the maximum range of detectable targets, depended on the radar's height relative to the Earth's curvature. For a radar positioned at sea level, like the one in question, the horizon typically extended to approximately 35-40 km. Even with the radar placed on a higher elevation, the feasibility of detecting targets over 200 kilometers was considerably constrained without substantial elevation. In this specific scenario, the presence of geographical features, particularly mountains and undulating terrain between the radar's location in Portugal and the strategic Strait of Gibraltar, further impeded the radar's line of sight. Mountains and other topographical obstructions could significantly limit radar coverage. This limitation was particularly pronounced for the Portuguese radar, which was situated at a modest elevation of just 5 meters. Consequently, its ability to monitor or detect distant objects, such as naval vessels in the Strait of Gibraltar, was markedly diminished due to these natural and technical constraints.

Previously, while the LW08 radar was recognized as a long-range system, its effective operational range was still bound by inherent technical limitations. The maximum detection range of any radar is a function of several factors: its power output, operational frequency, the dimensions of its antenna, and the size and material composition of the target. In typical operational conditions, reliably detecting targets, particularly smaller ones, at distances exceeding 200 kilometers posed a considerable challenge. Even in scenarios where the radar might theoretically have the capacity to detect a target at such an extended range, which was not the case here due to the radar's limited reach, the task of accurately identifying and tracking the target was fraught with difficulties. Factors such as noise, environmental clutter, and electronic interference tend to amplify with distance. This escalation in background noise and signal distortion significantly hampers the radar's ability to differentiate between actual targets and false readings. As a result, the fidelity of target detection and tracking diminishes markedly at extended ranges, further constraining the radar's effective operational scope.

Furthermore, it was a well-recognized fact, even acknowledged by the Portuguese themselves, that the area of the Mediterranean Sea beyond the Strait of Gibraltar was a hive of maritime activity. This bustling nature necessitated the use of precise and efficient communication protocols. The decision to communicate via an open channel in such a heavily trafficked area not only attracted undue attention but also contributed to a heightened sense of confusion among the numerous vessels traversing these waters. The sheer volume of communication in the region, coupled with the use of an open channel, likely led to overlapping transmissions, thereby increasing the potential for misinterpretation or missed communications among the myriad of ships present.

The assumption that the Portuguese ship could maintain an element of surprise was, to put it mildly, overwhelmingly optimistic. Any maneuvers or activities undertaken by Portuguese vessels would have been readily detected, effectively tracked, and meticulously scrutinized by the advanced 2D and 3D radar systems aboard the Thai vessels. These radar systems, with their sophisticated detection capabilities, were designed to identify even subtle vessel movements in their vicinity. Furthermore, Thailand's role as a neutral force, committed to ensuring safe passage for ships transiting through the region, was a well-established fact, recognized by all Mediterranean countries. This reputation for neutrality and the corresponding operational protocols had been previously communicated and affirmed by the Thai Government in various international forums (basically as the Thai Government has notified them). As a result, the presence, and actions of Thai vessels in these waters were conducted under a banner of transparency and trust, further diminishing the likelihood of any unobserved or clandestine activity by foreign ships, including those from Portugal.

Bruno​

 

[Bruno]

Considering the contraction posed by the answer, where in one part the Radars would not have the detection range to detect the position of the Thailadense vessels, the second part of the answer as contradicted the first part detailing that "Any maneuvers or activities undertaken by Portuguese vessels would have been readily detected, effectively tracked, and meticulously scrutinized by the advanced 2D and 3D radar systems aboard the Thai vessels." as such, it would mean that the Radars had detected the ships, due to this contradiction.

With this confirmation by the above player it would give continuity to the contact post by confirming it with the second part as such it was also clearly stated that the Portuguese Vessels had "Upon arriving and having the element of surprise, they would contact the Thai's two ships." which meant they would have done so not in open channel, but in a military channel, destined to these communications. Furthermore, the evidence of surprise would be kept, as it was directed to the Thai ships, not the commercial ones. However, even so, it is correct that the straits do operate with commercial vessels, so the presence of Thailand's ships would not go unnoticed as they wanted. Since it is clearly stated by the aforementioned player, that the straits had many commercial ships passing through it, so the presence of the Thai ships would still make the ears of the militaries of the three nations either way.

So, as clearly stated, the previous answer by me would remain valid due to the contraction and confirmation of contact of the response after it.

Again, the Portuguese Ships would contact Thailand's ships via encrypted channels, in a military channel.

"This is the NRP São Rafael, of the Portuguese Navy, state your intentions of patrolling an active merchant zone under the surveillance of the Portuguese Republic, you are also too close to known territorial water of Britain, Spain and the Portuguese Republic, which can pose severe threats to national security. Over."

By this time, the Orion would already be above the Portuguese fleet, at an altitude which would make it possible to track the Thailand's ships, and monitor them.​

Bossza007

 

[Bossza007]

Secret unless contextual possible.​

As previously noted, the maximum detection range of a radar system such as the LW08 was severely limited by both technical requirements and environmental conditions. The claim that Portuguese radars had identified Thai warships ran directly counter to the well accepted limits of radar technology, particularly over long distances. Given the varied geographical features between Portugal and the Strait of Gibraltar, including the presence of various landforms such as hills and valleys that could obstruct radar signals, it was highly unlikely that ground-based radars in Portugal could effectively track naval vessels at such a great distance. This scenario was exacerbated further by the fact that marine targets often have a lower radar cross-section than aerial targets, making long-distance detection much more difficult. Since the Thai vessels were equipped with sophisticated 2D and 3D radar systems, as previously mentioned, the likelihood of the Portuguese fleet approaching unnoticed was highly implausible. These advanced radar systems were not only capable of detecting a wide range of targets but also featured enhanced tracking capabilities, allowing for the monitoring of multiple objects simultaneously with high precision. Additionally, these systems were designed to operate effectively under various sea conditions and weather scenarios, further reducing the probability of any vessel, especially one as sizable as a fleet, approaching undetected.

The Thai ships' superior radar systems allowed them to not only identify but also automatically track and inspect Portuguese aircraft after they had flown many nautical miles outside of Portuguese airspace. The incorporation of advanced algorithms and sensor technologies aided in this automated process, allowing continuous monitoring and identification of airborne objects across long distances. Furthermore, these ships' radar systems were competent at detecting surface boats, with an effective operational range of up to 160 kilometers beyond the Gibraltar Strait. This long-range capacity was enabled by their radar's high-power output and sophisticated detecting technologies, enabling complete monitoring deep into the strait of marine approaches. Given the expertise of the personnel of the Republic Thai Navy Middle East Command, these individuals were more than competent, having received training that rivaled some of the best in the world, including that of the United States and the United Kingdom. Their training encompassed not only tactical and operational skills but also included extensive modules on advanced navigation and maritime warfare strategies. They were in the best health, exhibiting high spirits both physically and mentally. As previously mentioned, all systems onboard their vessels, as well as the internal facilities, were maintained at their peak condition, ensuring operational efficiency and readiness for any scenario.

Furthermore, given the vague specifics of the Portuguese fleet's coordination, which was merely described as 'remain close enough to engage in combat,' it was reasonable to infer that they were within the range of their vessels' Surface-to-Surface Missiles (SSM). This proximity inevitably placed them within the precise detection radius of the Thai 3D radar systems. Consequently, comprehensive data about the Portuguese vessels would have been gathered and analyzed by the Thai Navy far before these ships could reach their intended combat range. This advanced analysis enabled Thai personnel to thoroughly understand the nature of the approaching Portuguese vessels. The radar's sophisticated processing capabilities allowed for the identification of key characteristics such as structural design, potential armament, and even deducing aspects of their mission profile, based on movement patterns and formation. This level of detailed surveillance and analysis would also apply to the Portuguese P-3C Orion aircraft. The Thai 3D radar systems, with their advanced tracking capabilities, were not limited to surface vessels but were equally adept at monitoring and analyzing airborne targets. As a result, the P-3C Orion, despite its design for maritime patrol and reconnaissance, would have been detected and its characteristics thoroughly assessed. This included not only its flight path and altitude but also potential insights into its operational role based on its flight behavior and patterns. Thus, just as with the Portuguese vessels, comprehensive information about the P-3C Orion would have been acquired and scrutinized well in advance of it reaching any critical engagement range.

"By the time the Portuguese fleet attempted to communicate with the Thai vessel, their position had already been irreversibly compromised due to the advanced automatic detection systems of the Thai vessel. These systems, continuously operating and analyzing maritime traffic, had not only pinpointed the precise location of the Portuguese fleet but had also been monitoring their movement patterns. This meant that any strategic advantage the Portuguese fleet might have hoped to gain through stealth or surprise was effectively nullified, as the Thai vessel's sophisticated tracking technology had already provided a comprehensive understanding of their positioning and likely intentions. The Thai vessel's automated system began recording as soon as the transmission from the Portuguese armada was received. This included not only the communication itself, but also a vast array of environmental and operational data. It contained accurate navigational data, thorough meteorological measurements, and current radar readings. The system was meant to connect various aspects, resulting in a comprehensive situational perspective. This combination of communication with real-time environmental and navigational data allowed the Thai vessel to examine not only the message's content but also the context in which it was transmitted, boosting tactical awareness.

“NRP São Rafael. NRP São Rafael. This is HTMS Ramrachathirat of the Republic Thai Navy Middle East Command, Naval Expeditionary Group Five, Republic Thai Navy Third Fleet. We are conducting routine patrol in the Mediterranean Sea. We are not too close or anything because other commercial vessel is far closer, and we operate under the international recognized principle of the freedom of navigation. We apologize for your inconvenience as the headquarters deems you nation not as a Mediterranean nation, so your government wasn’t notified. Please visit the RTNMED website to find more about our mission. If you have any concern, please contact the Republic Thai Navy Maritime Service to address your concern formally. Thank you for your cooperation and we apologize again for your inconvenience.”

Bruno​

 

[Bruno]

The Portuguese fleet, now using their own radars and detections systems, could easily pinpoint the exact location of the Thai Ships, being in combat range, this would be easily done. Moreover, the Orion, up above, was tracking their every movement relaying via encrypted means to the Portuguese ships. After contact with the Thai ships, they would maneuver into a crescent moon facing towards the Thai ships. Giving them ample opportunity to use their weaponry to decimate the two old Thai vessels, which when compared to the Vasco da Gama and Bartolomeu Class Frigates, these would have a noticeable more diverse weaponry, alongside better radars and other system capabilities. Using the SMART-L which is capable of long-range air surveillance of ABT up to 250km, compared to the meager radars on board of the Thai ships, which could only detect up to a range of 160km. As such, even before the Thai ships knew about the Portuguese, the Portuguese would already have plenty of information regarding the ships inside the straits, which would be able to pinpoint the Thai ones.

However, the element of surprise would be lost the moment they had contacted the Thai ships, as such they would continue to contact them.

"HTMS Ramrachathirat, we acknowledge your transmission, and thank you for your clarification, we would like to however express our concern regarding the considerable distance from your normal area of operations, on the matter of maritime security and regional stability, normally military vessels are expected to operate within their designated zones, to prevent any unnecessary rise of tensions. We have to urge you to reconsider your location and follow the recognized maritime protocols in order to maintain safety in shared waters. It is essential to uphold these norms. We appreciate your cooperation and understanding on this situation.

Thank you, NRP São Rafael, out."


With that the Portuguese Fleet would remain in their position, monitoring the Thai vessel's every move, being so close to their home base, their refueling and resupplying would be easily done by one of the Berrio-Class Replenishment Vessels which would rendezvous with this fleet when they needed to refuel and restock. The same however could not be said by the Thai Vessels, which, for the time they had been in operation in the Mediterranean and their journey towards it, could possibly be running out of fuel, if not replenished.

Bossza007

 

[Bossza007]

Secret unless contextual possible.​

To clear up any confusion about the Thai vessel's radar capabilities, the operating range of its 2D radar system stretched up to 270 kilometers, while the 3D radar had a range of 180 kilometers. Its sonar capabilities were also effective up to a distance of 40 kilometers. It is crucial to note that while addressing the vessel's capacity to monitor regions 160 kilometers from the Strait of Gibraltar, this figure was derived from the midpoint of the Strait itself, not from the Thai vessel's actual position. Given the aforementioned radar ranges and the Thai vessel's strategic positioning, any approach by the Portuguese vessel would have been detected and scrutinized by Thai radars at least 20 kilometers before it could have realistically posed a threat or breached the monitored zone. This early detection capacity gave the Thai ship a significant edge in terms of situational awareness and operational preparation.

Furthermore, given Thailand's standing as a technologically sophisticated nation compared to Portugal's comparatively less developed technical capabilities, it was realistic to expect Thai warships to have a major technological advantage. In this case, the ship in issue was a modernized Naresuan-class Frigate, noted for its cutting-edge equipment and outstanding marine capabilities. As a symbol of Thailand's naval might, this frigate was outfitted with cutting-edge equipment, such as sophisticated communication systems, modern weapons, and improved radar technology. The combination of these modern equipment not only emphasized the vessel's operational supremacy, but also the technical gap between Thai and Portuguese naval capabilities.

Furthermore, while the Portuguese vessel boasted an outstanding arsenal of weapons given its comparatively smaller size, the Thai vessel definitely held the upper hand in terms of both firepower and armament diversity. Because the Thai warship was larger, it not only had a wider range of armaments, but also a wider array of offensive and defensive systems, providing for better tactical flexibility in varied maritime combat scenarios. The Thai vessel's electronic warfare capabilities were notable in addition to its superior weaponry. This comprised cutting-edge electronic countermeasure equipment that could intercept, jam, and deceive enemy radar and radio signals. Such capabilities provided the Thai warship with a considerable advantage in electronic warfare, boosting its defensive posture and capacity to negate possible opponent vessel threats. While both ships were well-armed, the Thai ship's combination of more diversified weapons and better electronic warfare technologies plainly demonstrated its advantage in total fighting capability.

“NRP São Rafael, we have received your transmission. We apologize again for any inconvenience and reaffirm our sincere commitment to ensuring safe passage for non-military vessels and the smooth flow of international trade. Our operations are currently based out of the Iskenderun Naval Base in Turkey, recently renamed under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire. We acknowledge your concerns and will duly convey them to the Admiral of the Republic Thai Navy's Third Fleet. However, with regret, we must inform you that we do not have the authority to alter the course of our current mission.

We understand and empathize with your apprehensions, particularly in these rapidly changing and uncertain times. Nonetheless, we strongly encourage your side to engage in diplomatic communication with the Republic Thai Navy Maritime Service. The Republic Thai Navy remains steadfast in its commitment to ensuring that all parties involved are treated with fairness and respect. We are grateful for the Portuguese Navy's concerns and appreciate your proactive approach in addressing them. Thank you, and we wish you a pleasant day. HTMS Ramrachathirat Out.”

After concluding this transmission, the Royal Thai Navy’s Maritime Awareness Domain (MAD) would promptly categorize the Portuguese vessels as friendly forces. This classification not only reflected the diplomatic nature of the communication but also ensured that operational protocols aboard the Thai vessels were adjusted accordingly, fostering an environment of mutual respect and understanding in these international waters. Bruno

---

The light aircraft carrier HTMS Sukhothai, as well as the Similan-class Replenishment Tankers (Type 908) HTMS Similan and HTMS Tachai, were effortlessly incorporated into the operating profile of Operation Mediterranean I. This integration followed their involvement in Operation Guardian Harmony. All vessels participating in Operation Mediterranean I were thoroughly replenished during the transfer procedure, ensuring they were properly supplied and ready for their new tasks. Each vessel properly followed established standards for rerouting and patrolling as part of this changeover. These protocols were rigorously crafted to ensure that there were no gaps in monitoring and that the team was always ready. The meticulous and planned rerouting guaranteed that the boats' surveillance capabilities were not compromised by gaps in coverage.

At this point, all three vessels - HTMS Sukhothai, HTMS Similan, and HTMS Tachai - were sent into the Mediterranean Sea, following every protocol that had previously been established for similar operations. In reaction to recent events in Rome, the HTMS Sukhothai, in particular, maintained a strategic position at least 200 kilometers away from the Italian city. HTMS Sukhothai maintained the same helicopter flight rotation pattern that had been successfully used throughout their trip from Southeast Asia during their deployment. This pattern included frequent flights for reconnaissance, observation, and potential fast reaction, ensuring that the carrier's aircraft capabilities were always ready.​

 

[Bossza007]

Secret unless contextual possible.​

The Chakri Narubet Class would be equipped with 4 × SRBOC decoy launchers for 32 decoys each and SLQ-32 towed decoy. Their armament would include 2 × 0.5-inch machine guns and 3 × sextuple Sadral launchers for Mistral surface-to-air missiles. Their deck can carry up to 14 Eurocopter EC725s with another 10 in the hangar. They have two transport lifts for these helicopters and another 2 lifts to transport supplies for 16 sorites of all kinds of armament. Each Eurocopter EC725 would be able to be equipped with a pair of 7.62 mm FN MAG machine guns with 200 rounds each mounted within forward left and right windows, or two air-to-ground rocket system 68 mm (2.75") with 19 tubes. The Similan-class Replenishment Tanker would house two EC725s each.

The HTMS Sukhothai, HTMS Similan, and HTMS Tachai were safely deployed into the Mediterranean Sea." Their purpose was to secure free passage and the sustainability of international trade in the region. During this time, both Similan-class Replenishment Tankers played critical roles in replenishing all naval vessels involved in Operation Mediterranean I. They adhered to a well-organized timetable, causing as little disturbance to their support tasks as possible. They returned to their respective base for replenishing after finishing their replenishment responsibilities. The crew effectively managed the logistics of refueling and resupplying, ensuring that each vessel in the operation maintained peak operating readiness.

A systematic and well-coordinated aerial surveillance plan was methodically performed for HTMS Sukhothai. At all times, the ship kept at least ten helicopters in flight within a 50-kilometer radius while not entering any country's territorial water. To maintain this degree of operational readiness, at least four helicopters were always stationed on the carrier deck, engines idling and crews ready for a wide range of mission plans. As the ten helicopters aloft prepared to return to the deck for resupply and repair, another set of ten helicopters, fully packed and waiting in the hangar, were meticulously moved to the deck for instant departure. The previously flown helicopters were quickly transferred to the hangar upon their return. They were thoroughly checked and restocked there, ensuring that they were ready for their next mission.​

 

[Bossza007]

Secret unless contextual possible.​

The HTMS Sukhothai Narubet was successfully and safely deployed to the precise coordinates of 40°32'27.0"N 11°27'40.0"E, putting itself strategically around 170 kilometers from Rome, in the center of the Mediterranean. Every crew member on board was in excellent physical and mental health, owing to the intensive physical and mental training regimens they had experienced. These were not ordinary sailors and soldiers; they were seasoned warriors chosen for their knowledge and experience, establishing an elite organization famous for its efficiency and discipline. The vessel itself was in perfect condition. The vessel itself was in perfect condition. Every system, from navigation to communication and defense, was completely operational and up to date. Routine tests and maintenance were carried out with great care, ensuring that the HTMS Sukhothai Narubet was always battle-ready. Furthermore, the staff were continually on active duty, working in alternating shifts to ensure awareness and preparedness. Drills and exercises were held on a regular basis to keep the crew sharp and ready for anything.​

 

[Bruno]

With Thailand's fleet now being counterbalanced by the US fleet, the Portuguese ships, alongside the two orion planes, would return to base to debrief and report on their findings. Especially the way how the crews from Thailand acted upon being confronted with their actions. This information would be used to draft new ways to engage with Thailand's navy forces in the future. However, with the deployments made from Thailand, so far from their own region of operations it was taken as an act of provocation towards the national sovereignty of Portugal, and the rest of the Mediterranean nations. Such slight would not be forgotten in the meantime. Especially after the previous debacle with Spain, the US and them, when they deployed into the Atlantic Ocean. Perhaps it was time to also engage for western nations to engage in operations in Asia.

After return to their Naval base, all ships would be maintained and cleaned, with the crew would being instructed to how to act in the future. The Aircraft used would also be cleaned and maintained to their highest standards, with the pilots also receiving more information and filling reports.

 

[Bossza007]

Secret unless contextual possible.​

While patrolling near the Gibraltar Strait, the HTMS Ramrachathirat established contact with the USS Daniel Akaka. Admiral Narong Nantapak, Commander of the Republic Thai Navy Third Fleet, immediately issued instructions for a strategic repositioning maneuver after getting confirmation of their existence and understanding their operational objective. This command included his flagship, the HTMS Sukhothai Narubet (Chakri Narubet-class Modernized Variant: M), which was stationed in the Tyrrhenian Sea some 170 kilometers southwest of Rome at the time. In response to the American fleet's proximity to the Strait of Gibraltar, precise instructions were given for the relocation of all Thai vessels operating in the area. Each warship was told to shift to a different location while keeping a safe distance from the American navy. The Thai warships remained out of the American fleet's fighting range, as well as out of their own combat range, providing no threat or impediment to their progress. The Thai vessels were instructed to either return to their original positions or resume their individual patrolling missions, according to their pre-defined mission profiles, once the American fleet had successfully navigated the Strait of Gibraltar and their distance from the Thai fleet was deemed sufficient. In particular, HTMS Sukhothai received orders to relocate to the precise coordinates of 41°51'18.7"N 16°34'52.0"E, a strategic location in the Adriatic Sea.

Bruno Odinson​

 

[Zak]

Cartagena, Spain​

ENCRYPTED
Not only was Cartagena a beautiful city but it was also home to a Spanish naval base which allowed the Spanish Navy to project power across the Balearic Islands and into the rest of the Mediterranean Sea and beyond. With the recent reports given by the Portuguese Navy through encrypted channels, a heightened state of alert across the Spanish Navy had been raised with all offshore leave cancelled by senior staff and all personnel had been ordered to report to base in the case of an emergency deployment.

The two main patrol boats (the SPS Audaz and SPS Furor, both Meteoro-class offshore patrol vessels) based at the naval base were fuelled, supplied and weapons loaded and readied for the case of an emergency deployment to confront any threats that posed a risk to the Spanish homeland. The order had came from the Minister of Defence who had ordered a meeting with the Prime Minister after she had deemed the reports very concerning.

At the other end of the Mediterranean Sea, all offshore leave had been cancelled and personnel had began the preparing, loading of supplies and weaponry and fuelling in a safe manner of the SPS Álvaro de Bazán, an Álvaro de Bazán-class frigate. Once ready, the ship would leave port out of Rota Naval Base and would transit through the Strait of Gibraltar and up the Spanish coastline towards Cartagena via square IM where the ship would anchor in a safe manner as the crew awaited further orders as personnel within the ship utilised their Lockheed Martin AN/SPY-1D 3D multifunction radar and Raytheon SPS-67(V)4 surface search radar to detect any threats to Spain or the actual ships themselves.

Bossza007 Bruno

 

[Bossza007]

Secret unless contextual possible.​

As previously stated, Spain was among the states formally notified of ongoing Thai naval activities in the Middle East by the Republic Thai Navy Middle East Command (RTNMED). RTNMED had previously established contact with the Spanish government prior to this operation. They had communicated broad information about their operational aims and expected operations in the region through this route, promoting openness and encouraging mutual understanding. Furthermore, considering the proximity of the Thai Third Fleet's Naval Expeditionary Group Five (NEG5) to Spanish territorial seas, RTNMED was extra cautious. They made it clear that their efforts were not designed to endanger Spanish sovereignty or security. It is also worth noting that the Naval Expeditionary Group Five (NEG5)'s home base was in close proximity to Spain, strategically placed inside the Mediterranean Sea. This posture was essential in the NEG5's operational logistics and strategic deployment. Given this environment, the Spanish government would be considered extremely unusual and perhaps provocative to view the NEG5's routine operations as a danger to their national security. The NEG5's home base's closeness to Spanish territorial waters was a long-standing geographical reality that had been included into the planning and execution of their naval operations. Furthermore, the Spanish government's approach would raise larger concerns about reasonable operational expectations. It would necessitate a reevaluation of traditional naval operating criteria, specifically how a fleet is expected to function efficiently if it is not permitted to operate within a reasonable distance of its own home base.

Given the limited and somewhat ambiguous information available regarding the operational procedures of Spanish warships, a plausible inference about the movements of the Spanish SPS lvaro de Bazán may be drawn. This ship was almost certainly going to travel through Spanish territorial waters before entering the Strait of Gibraltar. Even with the superior radar capabilities of the Spanish SPS lvaro de Bazán, the Thai warship HTMS Ramrachathirat was well-equipped to detect the Spanish ship. Given the advanced radar systems on both naval vessels, this mutual detection was expected to occur simultaneously. The HTMS Ramrachathirat, with its cutting-edge detection equipment, was perfectly capable of spotting the SPS lvaro de Bazán as soon as it entered radar range. Given the operating capabilities of both warships and their respective positions in reference to the Strait of Gibraltar, this reciprocal detection scenario was not only the most logical, but also the most plausible conclusion. The radar system of the HTMS Ramrachathirat had been tuned to provide optimal performance in such strategically important maritime zones, ensuring its capacity to efficiently monitor and respond to the presence of other naval vessels, particularly those of the Spanish Navy.

With both Thai and Spanish naval vessels outfitted with advanced 3D radar systems, it was extremely likely that the quantity and quality of critical information acquired by each would be remarkably comparable. These sophisticated technologies were capable of registering, examining, tracking, and recording a vast range of data, giving both fleets with a full situational awareness. The Thai vessels' autonomous combat systems, in particular, were designed to handle and analyze incoming radar data with precision and efficiency. This computerized processing included identifying vessel types, course, speed, and other essential navigational parameters, all of which were critical for maintaining situational awareness and strategic planning. Given the Thai Navy's policy of adopting neutral to friendly attitudes toward all Mediterranean states, the Thai Navy's response to the Spanish vessel followed standard diplomatic norms. This was especially true in the case of Spain, which the Thai government regards as reasonable and cooperative. In accordance with this strategy, a sailor onboard the Thai ship who had received special training in diplomatic communications made contact with the Spanish ship. This conversation was done in a kind and courteous manner.

"Good morning. Good morning! The Republic Thai Navy Third Fleet-s Naval Expeditionary Group Five is represented by HTMS Ramrachathirat. What about you? There is no need to respond; simply greet. Have a wonderful day!"

Zak​

 

[Zak]

CLASSIFIED
The Spanish Navy vessel arrived on scene just outside of its assigned positioning just outside of Cartagena Naval Base where it had dropped anchor to monitor the positioning of Thai assets in the region but the Spanish objectives remained classified to those outside of the command circle aboard the ship. The Spanish Navy had adopted a policy of being friendly but remained cautious after a Swedish Air Force intrusion into Spanish territory over a year ago. Life on board the ship was relatively calm as they did not expect any danger from the Thai assets based in the region but the crew was still cautious as at any moment, danger could strike.

Naval intelligence officers began painting a picture of what assets were in the region as they liaised with the systems personnel who had been operating their radars as previously stated. This was passed onto the National Intelligence Center for a further advanced analysis before being briefed to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence to brief respective departments within the central cabinet.

Within the command bridge, the Álvaro de Bazán which has strong track record of anti-air warfare, protection of expeditionary forces, anti-submarine duties, long-range anti-aircraft defence and anti-missile protection. The Captain had been passed information that a member of the Thai assets had been trying to make contact with the ship and the Captain himself responded in a thick Spanish accent.

"HTMS Ramrachathirat, this is the Spanish Navy warship Álvaro de Bazán, we are operating within Spanish territorial waters. No further communication will responded too unless an emergency. Over."​

Through a classified line, the British, Portuguese and American governments were respectively informed of communication between the Spanish and Thai assets within the region.

Jamie Bruno Odinson Bossza007

 

[Bossza007]

Secret unless contextual possible.​

The HTMS Ramrachathirat would respond to the Spanish transmission through the appropriate and secure channel that they had acknowledged their communication. They would also be made aware and reminded that the Thai Navy had province the Spanish Government direct communication line to the high-ranking Thai Government officials. Zak

The HTMS Sukhothai Narubet arrived in the Adriatic Sea at the designated coordinates of 41°51'18.7"N 16°34'52.0"E. When the aircraft carrier reached this location, it promptly activated its Hughes SPS-52C air search radar. This advanced radar system was fully operating, monitoring the sky meticulously. It continually sought, tracked, evaluated, and recorded all airborne objects within its range, providing the vessel and her crew with full surveillance and situational awareness. In addition to their continual air operations, the crew on board the HTMS Sukhothai Narubet engaged in regular exercises and drills throughout this time. These meticulously planned exercises would enhance and hone their operational preparedness while also ensuring adherence to a strict and healthy regimen. This was a typical practice for maintaining the crew's physical well-being and morale. While the crew were constantly vigilant and cognizant of their surroundings, the Thai Navy also placed a significant emphasis on preserving its personnel's mental and emotional wellbeing. They established a healthy balance of vigilance and well-being by following planned routines that included physical fitness sessions, leisure activities, and enough rest intervals. These routines were meticulously crafted to satisfy the demands of naval life while also maintaining a good and healthy work environment.​