Federal Intelligence Service

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Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation Служба внешней разведки Российской Федерации ​

Information presented in the General Overview seen below is considered public, something that would be found on a wikipedia article. The only exception is personnel size, which is listed publicly as being "greater than 262,000", but with overall numbers remaining classified; all classified information is listed at LEVEL 6 "Сварог" and LEVEL 7 "Чернобог", in particular information regarding concurrent operations or operations not having been declassified is under strict LEVEL 7 classification. Exceptions will be listed with a |DECLASSIFIED| statement.

General Overview

Headquarters	105 Kvartal, 1с3, Southewestern Administrative Okrug, Moscow
Agency Executives	[align=left] Director: Sergey Naryshkin First Deputy Director: Samuil Sidorov Deputy Director - Directorate PR: Classified Deputy Director - Directorate S: Classified Deputy Director - Directorate KR: Classified State Secretary of the FSB: Yuri Gorbunov

The Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (SVR USS; Russian: Служба внешней разведки), tr. Sluzhba vneshney razvedki) is the external intelligence agency of the Russian Federation, focusing mainly on civilian affairs. The SVR succeeded the First Chief Directorate (PGU) of the KGB in 1987 after the reorganization of the KGB was demanded by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The SVR has its headquarters in the Yasenevo District of Moscow, though it is technically outside of the central ring of Yasenevo.

Unlike the Federal Security Service (FSB), the SVR is tasked with intelligence and espionage activities outside the Federation. It works together with the Main Intelligence Directorate (Russian: Главное разведывательное управление, tr. Glavnoye razvedyvatel'noye upravleniye, GRU), its military-affairs espionage counterpart, which reportedly deployed six times as many spies in foreign countries as the SVR in 1997. The SVR is also authorized to negotiate anti-terrorist cooperation and intelligence-sharing arrangements with foreign intelligence agencies, and provides analysis and dissemination of intelligence to the All-Union Presidium. Any information pertaining to specific identities of staff employees (officers) of the SVR is legally classified as a state secret; since September 2018, the same applies to non-staff personnel, i.e. informers and recruited agents. This is considered far more strict than with staff of the FSB, a trait shared by the GRU.

The SVR, according to 2002 organization, has its own top secret elite special force within the Operations Department of Directorate Z known as Zaslon (Заслон) (meaning Screen, Barrier or Shield) about which extremely little is known, formerly referred to as Vympel. However, the mere existence of such group within the SVR is denied by Russianauthorities.

Nevertheless, there were some rumors that such a group does indeed exist and is assigned to execute very specific special operations abroad primarily for protection of embassy personnel, internal investigations, and cooperation. It is believed that the group is deep undercover and consists of approximately 300–500 highly experienced operatives speaking several languages and having extensive record of operations while serving in other secret units of the Russian military.

Foreign Intelligence Service Operations Personnel​ ​

SVR Field Operatives	Trained Personnel: 50
SVR Counterintelligence Analysts & Intelligence Operatives	Trained Personnel: N/A
SVR SIGINT Analysts & Intelligence Operatives	Trained Personnel: N/A

Foreign Intelligence Service Spetsnaz Personnel

SVR Spetsnaz Operators

Trained Personnel: N/A

 

[Jay]

Classified After Action Report Operational Plan 883 Confidential Secured and Encrypted​

FILE INFORMATION​

Name:	Расследование в Таиланде
Original Classification	Classified After Action Report
Current Classification	Classified After Action Report
File Name	Operational Plan 883, Operations in Ukraine
File Number	RFSVR OP-883 UA-E-05

I, Acting-Director of the SVR, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, hereby affirm the contents of the After Action report into joint SVR/GRU operations in neighboring country's elections. This report contains an after-action assessment of the operation including the undesired post-election outcomes and the challenges the SVR faced. SIGNED, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, Acting Director of the Foreign Intelligence Services

Preamble​ Pursuant to the authorization by the Federal Security Council, the SVR and GRU conducted joint operations aimed at disrupting Ukraine's national elections. In light of the continued de-Russification of Ukraine's political elites beginning in 1995, the Ukrainian Government has persistently undertaken actions that undermine Russia's ability to retain regional hegemony over Eastern Europe. In the pursuit of the general views of the Federal Security Council resolution 8834 of 2001, the preservation of Russia's hegemony and national security in the post-Soviet world, the SVR and GRU undertook several actions to support pro-Russian politicians and political parties. All requests for access to the unredacted version of this report must be submitted through the Office of the Director of the GRU, in accordance with established protocols for handling sensitive information.

I. Overview​ Objectives: To manipulate the 2005 Ukrainian presidential election through cyber and HUMINT operations, securing a pro-Russian victory for the Party of Regions, and destabilizing pro-European political factions. Operational Period: November 9, 2005 - November 15, 2005 Outcome: Initial Success for Party of the Regions and other pro-Russian factions followed by unforeseen post-election volatility Executive Summary:​ The operation sought to influence the 2005 Ukrainian presidential election in favor of pro-Russian interests, specifically the Party of Regions. It involved a two-pronged approach: cyber operations aimed at discrediting pro-European political factions and physical HUMINT operations involving ballot manipulation. Initial phases of the operation successfully disrupted the political landscape, with targeted disinformation campaigns influencing public discourse and ballot stuffing skewing electoral outcomes in favor of the Party of Regions. However, post-election protests (Orange Revolution) led to widespread dissent, resulting in the invalidation of the manipulated results and the rise of a pro-Western government. Ultimately, while the operation was successful in the short term, external interference, which the SVR assumes came from Western sources, and internal Ukrainian volatility undermined Russia's strategic goals. II. Assessment and Phase Operations​ Phase I: Cyber Operations and Initial HUMINT Deployment ​ Objectives: Amplify pro-Russian narratives on social media, messaging apps, and news outlets. Discredit pro-European parties, especially Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc. Deploy HUMINT agents to monitor and gather intelligence on election procedures. Execution: Cyber teams launched coordinated disinformation campaigns targeting Ukrainian political discourse, using bots and fake accounts to spread pro-Russian narratives and destabilizing content. Bots focused on promoting fear and instability tied to Ukrainian nationalism, while framing pro-European factions as corrupt and influenced by Western powers. HUMINT agents were strategically placed to observe polling stations and identify opportunities for ballot manipulation. Agents also initiated contact with local election officials to influence the process. Results: Initial cyber efforts succeeded in amplifying pro-Russian voices with the Party of the Region winning the first election. HUMINT teams made significant headway in identifying key polling stations for future ballot stuffing, using local proxies to gain insight into voting patterns and schedules. Phase II: Escalation of Operations​ Objectives: Intensify disinformation efforts, particularly in high-stakes regions where the Party of Regions faced close competition from pro-European candidates. Execute physical ballot stuffing in targeted polling stations. Execution: Cyber operations scaled up, with targeted disinformation and accused opposition parties of ballot stuffing in a bid to undermine election credibility. Bots pushed fake stories to sway undecided voters towards the Party of Regions. HUMINT agents engaged in widespread ballot manipulation by inserting pre-marked ballots favoring the Party of Regions in key regions known for supporting pro-European candidates. Results: Disinformation campaigns successfully distorted public perception of the opposition, with increasing doubts cast on the integrity of pro-European parties. Ballot stuffing operations were conducted with relative success, with the insertion of false ballots in multiple targeted regions, despite some resistance from local authorities. Phase III: Conclusion and Post-Election Evaluation​ Objectives: Monitor online sentiment and assess the success of cyber operations. Address any potential risks of exposure and minimize the risk of direct linkages to Russian operatives. Execution: Following the election, the cyber teams intensified their monitoring efforts, analyzing social media and news platforms for sentiment related to the election results. Efforts were made to maintain the appearance of a legitimate electoral outcome, despite the substantial manipulations. HUMINT teams ensured that physical evidence of ballot stuffing was minimized. Agents prepared for extraction, ensuring all covert activities remained undetected. Results: The initial victory appeared to favor the Party of Regions, as manipulated votes and cyber narratives shifted the electorate. However, the aftermath of the election saw widespread protests, culminating in the Orange Revolution, fueled by accusations of electoral fraud and Western interference. The pro-European factions, particularly under the leadership of Viktor Yushchenko, managed to overturn the manipulated results, with significant external support from Western governments, especially France. The immediate success of the operation was overshadowed by the subsequent political turmoil and the invalidation of the election results. Assessment and Lessons Learned​ Successes: The operation succeeded in manipulating public opinion through targeted cyber disinformation, contributing to a shift in voting behavior that initially favored the Party of Regions. HUMINT operations, including ballot stuffing, were successful in several regions, ensuring a pro-Russian bias in the vote tally. Coordination between cyber and HUMINT operatives allowed for effective synchronization of efforts. Challenges: The post-election volatility, driven by the Orange Revolution, significantly undermined the operation’s long-term goals. The rise of pro-Western political factions, particularly Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency, indicated a decrease in Russia's ability to influence Ukrainian political processes. The external interference from the West, particularly from Western intelligence services and media outlets, proved difficult to counter, leading to the invalidation of manipulated election results. Recommendations: Future operations must account for increased resilience in Ukrainian political structures, particularly the growing resistance to Russian influence in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution. Given the higher risk of exposure through digital channels, future operations may require more sophisticated methods of disinformation that target both online and offline narratives, and address the growing role of Western-backed civil society movements. Greater emphasis on counteracting external interference from Western powers is necessary, as the ability to manipulate Ukraine's political environment may be constrained by international pressure and Ukrainian nationalism. Conclusions: While OPLAN-883 was initially successful in shaping the election outcome in favor of pro-Russian interests, the broader political context—particularly the influence of Western governments and the subsequent Orange Revolution—led to the undoing of these efforts. Russia’s influence in Ukraine, particularly in the western regions, has significantly diminished. A new strategy, one that accounts for the heightened nationalistic sentiment and Western involvement, is necessary for future operations in Ukraine. All agents and operatives have successfully returned to Russia. All online presences have been deactivated and remain untraced to Russian sources.

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